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During the Black Local Authority period, which spanned the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
efforts to gain access to precious resources such as housing in the poor African urban 
townships of South Africa led inevitably to competition between actors from both the 
state and local communities over the rights to allocate them. The struggle to gain 
agency in resource allocation reflected a broader quest for legitimacy and legality in the 
highly politicised township environments of that time. In this complex urban landscape, 
such competition produced a range of constantly evolving identities and relationships. 
Urban Africans began to challenge the legitimacy of the apartheid state, targeting the 
Black Local Authority system nationwide during resistance campaigns. In the Lagunya 
townships, Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, in the Western Cape, interactions between the 
Ikapa Town Council and the Lagunya communities, between the Council and other tiers 
of government. between the individual local officials and their communities and among 
local community groups themselves, often led to contradictory identities. Depending on 
the nature of the particular relationship, a role player could simultaneously be 
positioned as an "insider" with recognized rights and legitimacy and as an "outsider" 
with no rights and a lack of legitimacy. Many of these identities often overlapped each 
other and were interchangeable, so that the African local officials while representing 
the state were also township residents themselves, and local community groups while 
challenging the legitimacy of the state, were also cooperating with local government 
and competing for access to resources amongst each other. 
In this thesis I draw on experiences in a particular neighbourhood within the Lagunya 
townships, New Crossroads, in order to examine the realities of local government 
housing administration at the local scale. The New Crossroads housing allocation 
process illustrates the insider/outsider polemic and the ways in which complex 
interrelationships developed between the local authorities and the community 
leadership structures, between the New Crossroads community and the residents of 
townships surrounding them, and among the residents of the New Crossroads 
community themselves. Such interactions speak to the ways in which both state and 










access resources such as housing and to navigate the highly politicised terrain of the 
townships during the BLA era. 
This thesis provides an historical analysis of housing allocation strategies at the end of 
the apartheid era. In so doing it facilitates an understanding of the complexities of 
current of housing allocation issues in the Ikapa area and the perpetuation of insecurity 
of tenure, reflecting the same contestation for agency in the allocation process, creating 
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THE 'LAGUNYA LACUNA': CONTESTATIONS OF LEGITIMACY AND 
AGENCY IN HOUSING PROCESSES IN A BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITY 
ERA 
Introduction 
The current Housing Act promises all South African citizens access to 'permanent 
residential structures with secure tenure' (Republic of South Africa, 1997), and 
recogmzes that insecurity of tenure has historically denied the majority of South 
Africans access to many other socio-economic opportunities. However, in spite of such 
policy statements, secure tenure remains one of the most pressing housing problems in 
townships even today (Royston, 2002). The persistence of African I urban housing 
dilemmas in contemporary South Africa can only be comprehensively understood 
against the ideological and institutional background of the former apartheid state. 
Struggles for formal housing were a fundamental part of 'Black' South African history 
during the apartheid era. Housing was a central social issue that had repercussions in 
the lives of poor African urban dwellers. Fast (1995a) notes how housing 
administration under the apartheid regime was used as a means of social control. As 
part of the National Party's policy of separate development African people were 
removed from urban areas to specifically identified labour reserves or townships. 
Urban Africans' means of coping with repressive social controls such as pass laws, lack 
of permanent residency rights in the cities, and inadequate and insufficient housing and 
infrastructure provision can only be understood in the broader context of the African 
Group Areas legislation of the time (Shubane, 1991; Pota; 1988; Wolfson, 1991). 
1 Use of terminology: Due to the historical nature of this study it has often been necessary to use old 
apartheid racial classifications in order to explain clearly how the discriminatory government and 
administration systems worked at all levels. Thus, while I have made use of the term 'Black' in reference 
to South African people of colour, be they Coloured. African or Indian. and 'White' when it was 
necessary to differentiate between African and White township officials I have preferred the use of the 
term' African' when referring to the township dwellers who fell under the administration of the Black 
Local Authorities. Terms such as 'Bantu' also occur historically but were not as relevant to this study 













Without a democratic state system, poor communities nevertheless found ways to 
engage with the powerful state machine, even though they were denied representation 
at any level of government, had few rights and little space in which to negotiate 
solutions for themselves (Coorvadia, 1991; Seekings, 1991). 
The rising discontent among urban Africans finally erupted in the late 1970s. Civic 
associations were established in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto uprisings and grew 
rapidly in popularity among township populations. These civic groups rallied increasing 
support for protest action and defiance campaigns against the apartheid government. 
The focus of much apartheid period civil-society organization related to fighting for 
security of tenure, access to housing and urban legal rights. For example, Cameron 
(1991), Cornell (1983) and Goodlad (1996) among others, record how rent increases 
and evictions were central issues in township resistance during the 1980s. 
In the face of escalating confrontation, the South African government introduced 
conciliatory forms of local government as a 'substitute for political rights at central 
government lever (Humphries, 1988b: p 107). At different times, various local 
government structures were made responsible for housing in African urban areas and, 
according to Royston (2002), with each institutional change housing tenure became 
more confused. 
In 1982, the Black Local Authorities (BLAs) were introduced to concede some measure 
of power to local Mrican communities in governing their own urban areas (Shubane, 
1991). However, in the climate of anti-government sentiment that then existed the 
BLAs were vigorously rejected by township residents who saw them merely as new 
government control mechanisms. Civic associations challenged the authority of the 
BLAs, refusing to recognize them as representative bodies. Due to civic resistance, 
almost half of these bodies had collapsed by 1990, with government -appointed 
representatives acting as local administrators in their absence (Shubane, 1991). 
Although the era of the BLAs at a general level has been well documented, little 
account of the experiences of the local government officials themselves and of their 
interactions with their communities has been documented. In the Western Cape, only 












(1982) concentrate on the earlier Community Council system, while Cameron's thesis 
on Western Cape institutional history (1991), which does cover the lime period of the 
Ikapa Town Council, a significant BLA, concentrates on parallel political structures in 
the Western Cape.2 These works provided a starting point for my research, which made 
extensive use of primary archival documents, press reports and interviews with some of 
the local government officials, community leaders and residents to analyse the Ikapa 
history. 
Although much of the available literature documents the general state of local 
government and housing administration in South Africa in the 19805 and early 1990s, 
my focus is directed specifically at the Ikapa area. Filling the gap in Ikapa' s local 
authority history that was identified by Cameron (1991), this thesis chronicles 
administration under the Ikapa Town Council, focusing specifically on housing 
administration. This encompasses not only an investigation into official policies and 
practice, but also an examination of some of the subtle, underlying elements that shaped 
housing administration, such as the relationships that developed among the officials and 
the communities of Ikapa and how these influenced the housing history of the township 
residents. The interactions between the Ikapa Town Council and the township 
communities, between the Council and other tiers of government, between the 
individual local officials and their communities and among local community groups 
themselves, often led to contradictory relationships based upon either collaboration or 
resistance. The consequences of these complex interactions and their implications 
become particularly clear in the case study. 
I chose the case study of New Crossroads, one of the Ikapa township areas, to 
investigate in detail the realities of implementation of housing policy during this violent 
political period. During the archival investigation that formed the first part of my 
research (see methodology section later) I became aware of the pivotal role of housing 
allocation in generating many of the housing problems that existed in the Ikapa area. 
Efforts to gain access to precious resources such as housing in the African townships of 
apartheid South Africa led inevitably to competition over the rights to allocate them 
1 Cameron states that although it was his original intention to research the Ikapa Town CounciL he was 
unable to enter the Ikapa area because of the political violence that had erupted there during the lime of 












between actors from both the state and local communities. The struggle to gain agency 
in resource allocation reflected the broader quest for legitimacy and legality in the 
highly politicised township environments of that time, creating a range of constantly 
evolving identities and relationships. It is these changing tensions between role players 
that I investigate in this thesis in the Ikapa context. 
Ikapa: A context of contested rights and complex housing histories 
During the historical period under review, Ikapa consisted of the three large townships, 
then situated on the periphery of the city of Cape Town, namely Langa, Guguletu and 
Nyanga, known to local residents by the acronym 'Lagunya'. The case study area of 
New Crossroads was then, and indeed remains today for administrative purposes, 
considered as part of Nyanga. The map below shows the spatial relationship of the 
townships to each other as well as to the central city area of Cape Town in order to 
illustrate the peripheral nature of the BLA area. 
Figure 1. Location of the Ikapa townships 













My research seeks to explain how we can understand the relationship between housing 
and poor African families' struggles in the South African cities of the 1980s. This 
requires an interrogation of the apartheid ideologies that shaped the state's housing 
policies for urban Africans and how they generated tenure insecurity for township 
dwellers. I investigate the ways in which, in spite of the powerful racist state, and 
armed with few rights, poor urban communities were nevertheless able to negotiate 
access to housing. I focus on engagement with the state at the level of local government 
over issues relating to access to houses, exploring the nature of the relationships that 
developed. 
While Royston describes how a "chequerboard of tenures and governing legislation has 
resulted in many urban areas" (2002: p 199), Mazur and Qangule (1995) in their survey 
of appropriate housing responses in Cape Town identify insecure tenure as the foremost 
housing problem in the city. My objective in this thesis is to interrogate the ways in 
which insecurity of tenure was manifested and perpetuated in the Ikapa context. This 
entails an analysis of the kinds of constraints that changing state ideologies and the 
resulting modifications in housing policy placed upon BLAs, the realities that the 
officials had to deal with working with residents on the ground, and the ways in which 
the officials themselves ameliorated stringent legislation during implementation of 
policy. I explore the administrative incapacity of the local authority in terms of its 
answerability to and reliance on higher tiers of authority such as Administration Boards 
or Provincial Departments that often delayed or thwarted their efforts, as well as 
financial and personnel inadequacies. J consider the variety of community responses to 
the actions of the Ikapa BLA, and why this complex history generated insecurity of 
tenure. 
The research focuses on one particular aspect of housing administration, which I feel is 
critical in generating tenure insecurity, namely housing allocation processes. The case 












history of earlier engagement with the state regarding housing issues during the 
residents' days in the Old Crossroads settlement. Although this earlier history has been 
well documented by Cole (1987) among others, I seek to trace the continuing saga of 
the New Crossroads residents and their housing histories in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
My research investigates housing allocation in New Crossroads, within the context of 
changing policies, civil organizing and the political climate of this period in township 
history. It delves into the complex interrelationships and levels of engagement between 
the various role players, exploring the community-driven processes that have 
historically been adopted to ameliorate housing allocation problems despite the 
limitations set by the apartheid era local authority structures and legislation. 
Methodologies: Multiple research strategies for compiling complex township histories 
The intent of this Master's research was initially to record a history of the Ikapa Town 
Council, which was identified as a lacuna in the academic literature. My focus was to 
be on housing as this was my particular interest, and I chose the New Crossroads area 
as my case study, investigating a particular aspect of housing, which I would identify 
during the research process and develop further. 
After an extensive literature survey of all secondary sources pertaining to local 
government in the Ikapa Black Local Authority era, I continued with a further survey of 
African township housing literature. Armed with this basic understanding of the 
background I negotiated an agreement with the City of Cape Town Access to 
Information Directorate in order to conduct extensive research in the Ikapa Town 
Council archives, which were in their possession. The archive includes hundreds of 
files containing a variety of materials such as the minutes of Council meetings, policy 
information received from both central and provincial levels of government, letters 
from various civic organisations, and legal advice from lawyers to give only a few 
examples. These materials documenting Ikapa' s history and form were critical for 
establishing my argument. 3 
3 In terms of this agreement] was contractually bound to "treat personal information such as names and 












Over a period of several months facts were painstakingly withdrawn from minuted 
records of Council meetings and agendas as well as official documents. such as letters 
and policy papers that circulated between the Ikapa local authority and provincial and 
central government. This information was necessarily very dense covering as it did the 
routine functioning of the Council, making it necessary to select at a very preliminary 
stage only information which I felt was pertinent to the proposed direction of my 
research into housing administration. 
In order to substantiate the Ikapa archival information I visited the archives of the local 
newspapers The Cape Argus and the Cape Times, scanning these badly kept and often 
undated extracts which were catalogued according to themes and consisted of 
'yellowed' cuttings pasted into scrapbooks kept by the South African National Library 
in Cape Town. I also conducted an Internet search of old Cape township newspapers. 
Not all this information was directly relevant to my research but it informed a general 
understanding of the socio-political environment of the time. Many press comments 
emanated from the Black Sash and the Development Action Group, which led me to 
delve into the archival records of both these organizations, not sure as yet what the 
focus of my housing research would be. I also visited a lawyer who had advised the 
Ikapa Town Council on their legal issues for many years. He gave me a great many 
insights, as did the retired Town Clerk of Fish Hoek who had been seconded by the 
Provincial government to investigate the charges of fraud and corruption at the Ikapa 
Town Council in the early 1990s. 
At a later stage, I refined my research focus to processes of housing allocation, which 
had been an important function of the Ikapa Town Council. I then revisited the Ikapa 
archives to explore the Housing Allocation files where I discovered the minutes and 
agendas of their Housing Allocation Committee meetings, official policy documents 
and case files from which I drew trends in practice and process. Armed with these facts 
I then conducted further interviews with a range of role players. These included ex-
Ikapa officials and councillors, some retired and others still local government 
employees, local community leaders, two from the large civics, one from a local 












one who dealt with housing disputes among Ikapa residents, and one who advised the 
Council, an official from the Deeds Office, a community worker with a long association 
with the Ikapa area, and local residents from New Crossroads. I recorded their 
experiences relative to the housing process to discover where policy and practice had 
differed. This led to the compilation of a history of housing allocation in I\ew 
Crossroads, which informed a better understanding of the complexities of the housing 
histories of the broader Ikapa area. 
Oral histories confront the researcher with the reminiscences and memories of past 
events (Vansina, 1985). Long after they occurred, such accounts are likely to become 
embellished or stated as concrete facts when they are in fact personal interpretations or 
perceptions. As the Ikapa history drew on the memories of twenty-five years or more, 
many of my interviewees were elderly and told passionate and compelling stories. As 
people presently or previously in positions of authority, they spoke with confidence and 
conviction. Often their accounts were contradictory, reflecting the complex and 
contested times in which they lived and worked. 
My field research experience concurs with the experIences recorded by Perramond 
(2001), who argued that although: 
'Events may seem straightforward and understandable to witnesses, yet 
the context and rationale for them and their consequences is sometimes 
unclear". (Perramond, 200 1: p 151) 
In this respect, it was only after conducting several interviews and then revisiting the 
archival records in search of specific issues that had received mention that I began to 
get a sense of the more nuanced reasons for the actions and events that I was recording 
and began to glean another level of understanding. It was also only at a later stage that I 
realized how important an understanding of the earlier Old Crossroads background was 
in contextualising the New Crossroads history. Again I quote from Perramond who said 
that: 
" ... rarely does anyone arrive at the true "beginning" of any event, 












very middle of places and spaces, where we may not understand the 
importance of spatial context and meaning". (Perramond, 2001: p 156) 
I soon recognized that it was an effective strategy to allow interviewees to deviate from 
the topic at times, allowing them to wander backwards and forwards in time and space. 
So that, although I arrived at each interview prepared with leading questions, I was 
often drawn away from my intended research focus as my subjects digressed towards 
their own particular memories. After the first few interviews, I realized that in some 
ways these digressions often served to better inform the bigger picture, granting me 
insights into each individual, the realities of the Ikapa Townships of the 1980s and 
1990s and the conflicts and confusion of administration as well as particularities of 
housing allocation in this period. 
Motivations jor the research 
The history of the changing local government institutional structures and the ways in 
which they interacted with the Ikapa communities were identified as lacunae in the 
academic literature. This research begins by addressing this vacuum in Western Cape 
township history, recording the saga of local government during the 1980s and early 
1990s in the Ikapa area, simultaneously narrating the rise of local civic resistance 
movements and community organizations that were a direct response to the new local 
authority mechanisms. 
In an attempt to produce a rigorous research, I cross-examine the experiences of the 
local authority officials themselves in implementing state policies as well as those of 
local community leaders and residents. The thesis thus examines the realities of 
township administration for the officials, working under the strain of community 
rejection and rising levels of physical violence that jeopardized their own personal 
safety. It also records the experiences of the township communities and how their 
struggles to survive in the depressed urban landscape of the African townships during 
this period shaped their various strategies to access resources. 
The analysis of housing struggles has been compiled by drawing trends from the 












Unfortunately, it is because of their ostensibly trivial and unimportant nature and due to 
a critical lack of archival space that many of these records are destined to be destroyed 
in the very near future, making further historical recording from this primary source 
impossible. This research has therefore been conducted at the eleventh hour before 
much critical information disappears forever. 
It is important to note that the history that is being recorded on these pages occurred 
twenty-five years ago and many of the important role-players have already passed 
away. This has motivated the writing of a history that, although previously 
undocumented in the literature, still exists in the memories of those who were a part of 
it. Their memories, recorded for posterity, have informed a better understanding of 
housing administration in the BLA era, and the community and local government 
strategies that developed regarding housing allocation in the Lagunya townships. 
Thesis framework 
This thesis begins in chapter two, with a discussion of the era of the Black Local 
Authorities, explaining the ideological paradigm of the state that led to institutional 
changes at the local authority level. I briefly discuss the Community Council era that 
preceded the BLAs, to contrast the two systems of local authority and to explain how 
fundamental inadequacies of the earlier councils were essentially perpetuated in the 
BLAs. I trace the history of the BLA system, explaining why its demise was predictable 
in light of its inadequate resources, its links to the National Management System, and as 
the target of mass resistance campaigns to destroy the apartheid regime, identified as 
the 'Achilles heel' of the state (Atkinson, 1994: p45). The chapter follows the 
administrative and legislative changes that were engendered in answer to the civic 
resistance strategies in the African townships. 
To understand the local rather than the general institutional challenges of the BLAs, 
chapter three examines the old Ikapa Municipal jurisdiction in Cape Town. This section 
describes the Western Cape experience of local authority changes, briefly recording the 
era of the Cape Town Community Council as an introduction. Indeed, unlike the rest of 












Town Community Council remained in effect until as late as 1988 due to particular 
area-specific issues that will be explained. 
Chapter three also explores the history of civic organizing in the Ikapa townships, from 
street committees to the larger civics, illustrating how these structures shaped the 
histories of the townships during the BLA period. I document the local elections, the 
rent boycotts and the use of 'people's power' to undermine the Council. This section 
interrogates the so-called 'de-centralisation' of powers to local authorities in light of 
other parallel developments that essentially served to consolidate central government 
control via alternative structures. I discuss the introduction of the Western Cape 
Regional Services Council in 1987 and how the National Management System was 
integrated into both the local authority and the new regional body to facilitate greater 
state control at the local level, contradicting the simultaneous devolution of power to 
lower tiers of government. Finally, the demise and collapse of the Ikapa Town Council 
is discussed recording central government efforts to keep the local authority alive in 
terms of sustaining their 'reform' programme at local government level. 
In chapter four, I introduce the specific focus of the thesis, housing administration 
during the BLA era. I investigate the origins and extent of the housing crisis that existed 
in the townships. I examine historical changes in housing administration in the. African 
townships during the 1980s and early 1990s, beginning with an account of earlier forms 
of housing administration in order to illustrate the contrasts and similarities with the 
BLA structures. Much of this section concentrates on the legislative changes that 
occurred and the rationale that underlay them. 
Chapter five, which covers the administrative housing history of the Ikapa area 
specifically, examines the realities of apartheid housing administration at the local 
scale. It begins in the earlier period of the Bantu Affairs Administration Board, tracing 
the gradual changes that ensued during the time of the BLAs. I discuss the increases in 
rent and service charges and community responses to these, the introduction of the 
'Great Housing Sale' in the Ikapa area, noting the legislative changes at the local level, 












The scale of my research changes in chapter six to consider a smaller case study area, 
New Crossroads, in order to detail the practice of housing allocation. This section 
explores the changes that occurred in community authority structures and argues that 
the struggle to gain agency in the allocation process underlay some of the broader 
political events that ensued in the Ikapa area. 
Finally, in chapter seven, I analyse how both government officials and communities 
strategised around the constraints of apartheid legislation. I explore the competing 
identities that evolved in response to the critical shortage of resources such as housing 
in the Lagunya environment of the BLA period, interrogating the ways in which 
relationships were configured in the quest for legitimacy and rights. I trace how an 
insider/outsider polemic was variously manifested, demonstrating how this shaped the 
complex interactions between role players from both the state and the local 
communities, and the contestations for legitimacy and agency in the townships. 
This research illustrates that knowledge concerning local specifics, such as the range of 
changing relationships and identities that existed within the Ikapa neighbourhoods, is 
essential for a comprehensive understanding of local government history. The inherent 
existence of area-specific issues and situations has contributed significantly to the 
shaping of Ikapa's housing history. Many of the unsolved housing dilemmas in Ikapa 
today are better understood contextualised in their historical origins. Through this 
detailed historical account of local government housing history, pieced together from 
thousands of archival records, and brought to life through the oral accounts of some of 
the role players recorded during interviews, I hope to accurately analyse a missing piece 













- CHAPTER 2 -
BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITIES: STATE EXPERIMENTS IN DEVOLUTION 
OF POWER IN THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Introduction 
"The 1980s were characterised by reforms [which] acknowledged the 
inevitability of black urbanisation". (Goodlad, 1996: p.1634) 
Any comprehensive understanding of the crisis of local government that emerged 
during the 1980s and 1990s in South Africa is only possible by situating it in the 
broader .national crisis of those times (Grest, 1988) and in considering historical 
changes at the local leveL Rapid urbanization together with economic recession was 
instrumental in the 'sharpening' of conflict between the government and urban Black 
communities on both a national and a local level (Grest & Hughes, 1984) as apartheid 
policies clashed head-on with the realities of a changing South Africa (Bernstein, 
1991 ). 
Coming to power in 1948, the Nationalist Party was challenged to decide which tier of 
state should govern the townships, aware that the success of urban apartheid was 
contingent upon effective implementation of apartheid policies at the local level 
(Nieftagodien, 2002). The degree of decentralization of power to second and third tier 
levels of the state was to change over time, but began with two decades of increasing 
centralisation of control over the townships (Bekker & Humphries, 1985). The political 
struggles against apartheid during the 1980s were partly a response to these changes in 
local government structuring (Shubane, 1991). 
This chapter examines the period of the Black Local Authorities (BLAs), which were 
introduced by the state in 1982 in order to administer the African townships. This was 
a time of intense political upheaval, following soon after the riots of the late 1970s as 
Black civil society began increasingly to contest the legitimacy of the state. In response 













In order to contextualise the inception of the BLAs, this chapter begins with a brief 
political background to African township administration. I then discuss the BLAs, 
explaining their place in the state power hierarchy, outlining their functions and duties. 
I examine the inadequacies and dilemmas of the new local authority structures, as well 
as officials' experiences, particularly their struggles to legitimise their existence in light 
of their rejection by the township communities, who did not recognise them as 
legitimate local authority structures. I describe how other agents of the state effectively 
undermined the BLAs. Through necessity this chapter is chronologically structured, 
painting a background to contextualise the thesis research. 
This chapter is not an exhaustive study of the BLAs. Rather it broadly explores the 
BLA system against the background of the central government's shifting stance on 
African urban rights and the responses this elicited from township communities. It 
investigates the battle for legitimacy and agency in the African urban townships during 
the BLA period between the state, represented by different tiers of government as well 
as individuals, and township community groups. I explain how the state's experiments 
with varying degrees of devolution of power to lower tiers of government were in fact 
always counter-balanced by other institutional changes that effectively re-asserted their 
control in other less explicit ways, often presented as political reforms. 
The introduction of the BLAs was the catalyst motivating the growth of organised 
resistance to the state. I discuss therefore how African civil society contested the 
legitimacy of the BLAs, tracing the state's responses to these challenges. In the process, 
I examine how divisions between urban Africans were engineered by the state, by 
granting increasing rights to 'legal' urban dwellers, identifying them as the 'insiders, 
while increasingly denying such rights to the 'illegals', or 'outsiders'. I trace the 
various manifestations of these themes of legitimacy and positionality throughout this 
thesis. 
Foreshadowing the introduction of the BLAs in the early 1980s 
In their efforts to recentralise state control over the African townships, the state 
introduced the Black Affairs Administration Act in 1971. This divested the White Local 












South Africa, 1971), establishing instead twenty-two Administration Boards 
responsible directly to the central government. The Administration Boards marked the 
peak of apartheid African urban administration (Grest, 1988), the pinnacle of the state's 
centralisation strategies around influx and labour control (Bloch, 1982). The outbreak 
of violence that occurred nationwide in South African townships in 1976 was a critical 
turning point, marking the growth of a strong Black consciousness movement, and 
leading the Nationalist government to accept the necessity for political change and to 
rethink their strategy regarding African urbanisation to diffuse the tense political 
situation. 
The 1977 the Community Councils Act was the first direct government legislative 
response to the riots of 1976. Established as representative local authorities with limited 
powers. the Community Councils acknowledged the government's changing stance on 
African urbanisation, and marked a tentative movement towards legitimising African 
political representation outside the homelands (Bernstein, 1991; Heymans & White, 
1991). The state presented the new Councils as a serious attempt to establish local 
government structures similar to those for Whites. 
The Councils were, however, also designed to function as 'safety valves' to diffuse the 
rising political tensions in the African townships and to avert a repetition of the 
violence that had ensued in 1976 (Cameron, 1991: p.288). The state believed that 
educated, middle-class Africans would be appeased, and perhaps co-opted as agents for 
the state, while township residents in general would be satisfied with the granting of 
limited political concessions (Bloch, 1982; Shubane, 1991). It was intended that the 
Councils would be given increasing responsibility and authority over time, eventually 
becoming full-fledged local authorities. 
The Community Councils, however, remained under the control of the Bantu Affairs 
Administration Boards, unpopular within the townships due to their aggressive 
implementation of Influx Controls and the Pass Laws (Bekker & Humphries, 1985). By 
retaining the Administration Boards within the new dispensation, the new Councils 
were tainted from the outset by association with the repressive machinery of the regime 












administrative extensions of the Boards (1988), staffed largely by White civil servants 
with 'Verwoerdian' ideologies (Totemeyer, 1984 ).4 
The Minister of Cooperation and Development had control over the Councils in a 
highly vertically integrated bureaucracy (Hughes & Grest 1983). However, Board 
officials became pivotal in this power hierarchy and could effectively hold up any 
transfer of power because the Minister had to consult with them before any additional 
functions could be delegated to the Councils by the central state. This effectively left 
the Community Councillors powerless 'puppets' of the regime (Cornell. 1983), and at 
the mercy of Administration Board officials who did not always see eye to eye with the 
state' s reform measures. 
Although most Administration Boards had inherited healthy financial accounts they 
were soon experiencing serious financial difficulties, becoming reliant on the 
Department of Cooperation and Development for additional budget allocations (Hughes 
& Grest 1983). In turn, the Councils, having to be financially self-sufficient,5 were 
forced to increase rent and service charges in the townships in order to raise revenue, 
creating rising animosity among township residents (Bloch, 1982). 
The township communities rejected the Community Councils from their inception, and 
their scepticism of the government's African local authority system was further 
aggravated by the fraudulent actions of individual councillors who early acquired a 
reputation for corruption and self-enrichment (Fast, 1995a: Grest, 1988; Kahanowitz, 
1988). By 1982, the Community Council system had virtually collapsed and few 
elections were held either to re-elect or to set up new councils. An effective form of 
local government for urban Africans had become essential in order to quell the 
increasing discontent in the townships. 
The rejection of the Community Councils by the township communities undermined 
their status as legitimate local authorities despite the 'legal' and official process that 
4 After Hendrick Verwoerd, former South African Prime Minister. considered the grand architect of 
apartheid. a word he coined himself. 
;, The main sources of finance for the Boards and their Councils was derived from rents. profits on beer 













had been followed in order to introduce them. Legitimacy and legality can be 
differently perceived depending upon how one is positioned in respect to an authority 
structure. This theme is explored in the historical discussion of the BLAs that follows. 
The era of the Black Local Authorities: experiments in devolution 
"The state has responded to the local crisis by modifying existing structures 
for participation and creating new ones, without conceding ground to 
opposition groupings".(Grest & Hughes, 1984: 60) 
In answer to the continuing political crisis at the local government level the state 
introduced the Black Local Authorities Act in 1982. The new BLA system was 
designed essentially to be an 'evolutionary process' whereby full autonomy could be 
achieved by African local authorities over time (Evans, 1988: p. 52). The Act converted 
the previously discredited Community Council system, to one similar in structure to the 
White local government system such that Councillors were to be elected for each ward 
by the township residents themselves during local authority elections (Kahanowitz, 
1988). 
As the Community Councils before them, the new local authorities were placed under 
the control of the Administration Boards, while at central government level the BLAs 
became the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and Provincial Affairs. The new 
local authority structures were empowered to make their own by-laws in order to allow 
for the effective implementation of state policies and smooth administration. They were 
tasked with the imposition of levies and taxes, the preparation and implementation of 
town-planning schemes, the allocation and management of housing, as well as the 
collection of rent and service charges in the townships (Ikapa file 2/2/2; Kahanovitz, 
1988). 
However, although BLAs seemed to offer a more substantial form of local 
administration to township dwel1ers, they were also designed as control mechanisms in 
the face of rising African political power, restricting African local government within a 
'segregated framework' (Gardner, 1997: p.65). Thus, African local authority structures 
effectively remained situated 'outside' the local government system as external 
appendages controlled by other tiers of the state. Riekert, who had headed up the 












Authorities Act, was quoted as saying that in his view, the real purpose of the BLAs 
was to " ... diffuse pent-up frustrations and grievances against administration from 
Pretoria" (Rand Daily Mail 29/8/85). The BLAs were a vital element in the 
government's new local government reform programme, and formed the basis for the 
proposed evolution of representative local government for urban Africans (Heymans & 
White, 1991; Kahanowitz, 1988). 
Theoretically, the Black Local Authorities Act presented urban Africans with the 
opportunity to elect their own local representatives and granted them some political 
voice. However, by the early 1980s, the new authority structures did not offer a 
sufficient solution to Black political aspirations (Heymans & \Vhite, 1991), still only 
acknowledging 'legal' African urban dwellers, those who qualified under Section 1 O( 1 ) 
of the Black (Urban) Areas Act of 1945 to reside in the city. This discounted the 
thousands of 'illegal' residents who still had no rights to the city,6perpetuating their 
illegitimate status and effectively setting them apart from established township 
dwellers. 
These artificial divisions of African urban society, engineered by the state in terms of 
their Influx Control strategies. created notions of 'otherness' among township residents 
themselves. These social divisions were often manifested spatially in terms of 'insiders' 
and 'outsiders': while 'legal residents' were allocated houses in state-built housing in 
the townships, the 'illegals' congregated in the burgeoning informal settlement areas on 
the periphery of major urban areas, and the temporary, though, 'legal' hostel-dwellers 
were separately contained within hostel compounds in the established townships. 
Chapter six will explore how the separation of 'insiders' from 'outsiders', i.e. Africans 
with 'legal' rights to stay in the cities from the 'illegals' who were denied such rights, 
created a complex range of identities and interactions that was to shape the course of 
the housing histories of the Lagunya townships. 
6 Hindson and Lacey (1983) comment that from 1982 pass law regulations. which had become somewhat 
relaxed over several years prior to the introduction of the BLAs. were once again severely enforced by 
the Administration Board officials. The BLAs. who were answerable to the Boards and were therefore 
identified as their agents, received the blame for these repressionary actions and their credibility as 












The new local authorities were given significant formal municipal powers, many of 
which had previously held by the Administration Boards, making them responsible for 
some of the most unpopular aspects of government policy, such as collecting rent, 
increasing rentals, evicting defaulters and allocating houses (Muller & Van Rooyen, 
1994). This successfully deflected the blame for some of the most contentious 
government policies away from the central state, placing the responsibility for these 
tasks in the hands of local government officials, redirecting the wrath of township 
residents. 
Lawrence, a retired government official, spoke of the frustrations of officials in this 
period in implementing unrealistic policies at local government level: 
"You were sat in terms of the Bantu Urban Areas Act [and] ... the 
Black Local Authorities Act. That is the way you ran a Black Local 
Authority, written by the ball-makers in Pretoria who haven't got the 
foggiest idea what happens in the inner workings of a Black township, 
no idea at all. Now how do you impose that on people?" (Lawrence, 
pers. comm. 20 May 2005) 
Thus, local government officials were aware that the new political dispensation for 
urban Africans did not sufficiently address the realities of the townships and the nature 
of the administrative problems being experienced by the officials themselves. 
How a lack of critical resources undermined the BIAs 
The effective functioning of the BLAs nationwide was compromised by a lack of 
resources. A critical lack of financial resources undermined the administration of the 
townships by the BLAs just as it had the previous Community Councils. Central 
government required that all local authorities be financially self-sufficient, but although 
theoretically BLAs had similar functions to White Local Authorities, African urban 
areas lacked essential financial resources such as commercial and industrial bases 












The state's Group Areas legislation had successfully positioned urban Africans outside 
established financial and economic boundaries, historically denying African urban areas 
commercial and industrial rights of their own (Pota, 1988). The Black Sash commented 
on the control inherent in this arrangement: 
"Real power in any country or government lies in the control of the 
national-wealth and financial resources. It is this control which decides 
the national priorities. In South Africa this power remains firmly 
entrenched in the hands of the ruling white minority elite". (Black 
Sash. BC 668 E. Special Projects. Local Government 1988: p. L 
15/5/88) 
According to Riekert, African towns had been planned and administered as 'sleeping 
towns' and 'uneconomical outgrowths of the White towns' where the necessary 
infrastructure for economic viability was absent (1983: p.158). He believed that while 
Administration Boards were 'busy going under' larger White municipalities were 
financially much healthier (Grest & Hughes, 1984: p. 49/. While many White Local 
Authorities were often able to run at a profit due to their healthy tax bases, some even 
investing surplus revenue to fund future schemes, a different situation prevailed in the 
African townships, where most communities were poor (Mandy, 1991). Denied 
facilities within their own areas, African communities shopped and traded in the White 
areas, underpinning the revenue generated there rather than in their own areas (Mandy, 
1991 ). 
The official opposition at the time, the Progressive Federal Party, warned the 
government that BLAs had a limited future because no serious provision had been 
made for their financial sustainability and no additional resources had been investigated 
(Cameron, 1991). Similar criticism from many other quarters prompted government to 
commission the Browne Committee to investigate other possible sources of finance for 
the BLAs (Humphries, 1988).8 
The Administration Board's loss of revenue was partly due to the privatisalion of township beer halls 
and bottle stores in the early 1980s. Sales accruing from the brewing of sorghum beer and the sale of 
liquor had represented their largest source of revenue (Driver, 1992b). 
Humphries explains thal the initiative for the Regional Services Councils that followed in 1985 












Thus, the BLAs, inheriting a small revenue base (Gardner, 1997), were left with the 
collection of rates and service charges from residents as their prime source of income, 
fiscally separated from the wealthy white tax bases (Poto, 1988; Swilling, Cobbett & 
Hunter, 1991). Poto believes that this was the largest single obstacle to the success of 
the new structures and indirectly triggered the resistance movement that later brought 
about their downfall (1988). It was in order to raise revenue to drive development and 
infrastructure upgrading, that the BLAs were forced to increase rent and service 
charges, aggravating their already tenuous relationship with the poor township 
communities. 
There was also a critical shortage of African staff qualified in local government 
administration. Rammala (1987) comments that many of the new African officials did 
not have the necessary experience in municipal governance to function effectively. This 
frequently necessitated the employment of White officials, further linking the new 
structures firmly within the regime rather than setting them apart as semi-autonomous 
local authorities. Although the Boards had been tasked to employ African officials as 
understudies to the seconded White officials, this seldom happened, enabling the 
permanent employment of the seconded officials in the BLAs. In this way, not only 
were the jobs of the White officials kept secure, but they also effectively remained in 
positions of control within African administration (File 7/3/1/11 Ikapa Archive). 
Totemeyer states that indeed one of the problems that undermined government reforms 
was the presence of civil servants who remained faithful to 'Verwoerdian' ideologies 
and effectively delayed the implementation of changes at the local level (1984: p.16). 
However, Lawrence, who was tasked with the physical development of Khayelitsha, a 
large township area developed from 1983 in Cape Town, recalled his training initiative 
proudly: 
"I think that the core of a lot of the people that I worked with and 
trained, today occupy positions, because they were the only ones that 
received proper municipal training. From day one they were being 












Although there were such exceptions,9 the frequent seconding of White government 
officials necessitated by the administrative incapacity of the BLAs tainted the image of 
the local authority officials among the township communities still further due to their 
working relationship with officials of the 'regime'. 
In an effort to disassociate the BLAs from the Administration Boards. the Black 
Communities Development Act (No.4 of 1984) upgraded the Administration Boards 
to Development Boards. The state wanted to appear to be relinquishing some degree of 
centralised control over African administration by granting the BLAs greater autonomy. 
Thus, the Development Boards were designed to function not as local authority 
structures as the Administration Boards had done, as this now became more essentially 
the responsibility of the BLAs, but rather were presented as state development agencies 
(Republic of South Africa, 1984). Their duties were redefined. placing emphasis on 
'viability, development, welfare and autonomy of urban African communities' (Grest, 
1988: p.105), confining their activities to establishing housing schemes and personnel 
training for local authorities. 1O 
Initially falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Co-operation and 
Development, in July 1985 Development Boards became the responsibility of the new 
Department for Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP), in accordance with 
the Local Government Affairs Amendment Act No. 110 of 1985 (Cameron, 1991). This 
new department was conceived as a means to 'centralize' state control over the 'reform' 
process. At the same time, the Promotion of Local Government Affairs Act, No. 45 of 
1985. gave increased powers to the Provincial Administrators who remained 
answerable to the Minister of DCDP, at that time the influential and powerful reformist 
Heunis (Cameron, 1991; Hughes & Grest, 1983). The new DCDP was effectively given 
control over almost every aspect of African urban life (Swilling, 1988a). 
9 Although close to retirement today. Grey Ngqaqu is still employed as a housing official in Khayelitsha, 
and was one of the officials trained by Lawrence in the early 1980s. I interviewed him about housing 
allocation procedures. material discussed in chapler six of this thesis. 
H' Acknowledging that the shortage of skills contributed to BLA inefficiency and in an effort to 
ameliorate the lack of administrative skills and trained personnel the Local Government Training Act was 












In effect there was a shifting around of control with the state restructuring its power 
base without conceding any real control to lower tiers of government such as the BLAs 
(Cameron, 1991; Survey of Race Relations, 1985). While seemingly conceding 
increasing powers to the local level of government the state was simultaneously 
recentralising its control in other ways. Dr. Van Zyl Slabber!. leader of the Progressive 
Federal Party, challenged that instead of devolving power 'what actually happens is that 
the powers of the lower level are monitored and determined by central government' 
(Hansard (A) 14 Col 4910, 1985), 
However, divisions were emerging within the central state itself at this point. Phillips et 
al explain that a struggle was ensuing between the political reformist block, led by 
Heunis, and the military security establishment (1988: p.20). Swilling explains that 
these divisions within the state mechanism created a kind of power pendulum: 
"Elements within the state attempted to extend the reform programme 
beyond its original parameters and dowse the flames of resistance with 
'more concessions'. When these measures failed to achieve their 
objective, a struggle resulted in the ascendance of the security 
establishment determined to implement a penetrating reform strategy", 
(l988a: p.2) 
The influence of Heunis' reform programme waned with the inception of the States of 
Emergency during the mid-1980s, when the hard-lined 'securocrats d1 gained influence 
and began to make extensive use of the state's National Management System. The next 
section analyses the functioning of this powerful state apparatus and how it established 
agency from the highest level of the state networking down to township communities 
and the grassroots level. 
An ambiguous identity: The role of the National Management System in the townships 
The National Management System was established in 1979 by the central government 
as a means of restoring law and order in the troubled townships. Forming a tight 
1 J The 'securocrats' were a conservative block within the central government with a strong military and 












network, it had extensive control at all levels of government and became a crucial 
element of the government's control mechanism during the urban revolt of the mid-
1980's, and later 'as a longer-term mechanism for implementing new policies and 
controls to restabilise urban areas' (Boraine, 1989: p.l1 0). 
The State Security Council formed the apex of the National Management System 
hierarchy, chaired by the State President with the Chiefs of the Defence, Police, 
Intelligence and several cabinet ministers. Sarakinsky believes that the State Security 
Council had become the most important decision-making body in the state by the late 
1980s and that even members of parliament were aware that decisions had often already 
been taken at 'another level' before being brought to the caucus for ratification (1989 
p.74). The Black Sash claimed that the National Management System held the real reins 
of power in the country with little true decision-making going on at lower levels (Black 
Sash, BC668.E.Speciai Projects. Local Government. 5/5/88), while Swilling believes 
that it had effectively become 'a state within a state to control the state' whereby the 
President was able to consolidate his power and influence (l988a: p.7). 
The National Management System re-established many of the collapsed BLAs, 
coordinating security forces in the townships (Boraine, 1989). The BLAs became 
incorporated into the security system through the mini-Joint Management Centres 
(Shubane, 1991), identifying them closely with the state' s oppression of township 
populations. The police, security police, riot police, special police (the dreaded 
kitskonstabels deployed in some townships after 31 January 1987) (Survey of Race 
Relations, 1987), municipal and traffic police, the South African Defence Force local 
command as well as military intelligence, and the National Intelligence Service were all 
represented on the security committee at the local Joint Operations Centres (Boraine, 
1989). They forged relationships with local community organizations and vigilante 
groups within the townships (Development Action Group, case files ).12 In the 
townships the functions of the Joint Operation Centres were various, but included the 
12 The references to Development Action Group's case files were inadvertently not recorded. My visit to 
this NGO occurred at the beginning of the research process when I examined dozens of random case files 
in order to establish general information about the BLA era. Among the records were many handwritten 












setting up of roadblocks, conducting patrols and house-to-house searches, as well as 
monitoring community organisations (Boraine, 1989: p, 115 ).13 
The National Management System was also responsible for implementing the state's 
'winning hearts and minds' (WHAM) strategy, This was a concerted attempt to identify 
political 'hotspots, and concentrate infrastructural improvements there. This, it was 
hoped, would help to improve the image of the local authorities and gain them some 
measure of support from the township residents, The Joint Management Centres 
undertook various tasks for BLAs lacking the expertise themselves, covering anything 
from building sports fields, fund-raising, speech writing, to crash courses in public 
administration and finance (Boraine, 1989). Swilling described the loint Management 
Centres as: 
"The delicate' balance between using just the right amount of 
repression without triggering a counter-reaction and identifying the 
most explosive grievances that need to be addressed, .. Their 
coordinated control of intelligence, coercion and developmental 
resources equip them very effectively for the task of restructuring and 
remoulding civil society". (1988a: p.30) 
Thus, in spite of their stated intentions of establishing viable local authorities, the state 
remained determined not to relinquish control in the townships, tightening their 
security network in the face of growing confrontation from township communities. By 
becoming integrated into the Joint Operations Centres, the BLAs were able to access 
precious resources. 
The lack of resources available to BLAs undermined their viability and credibility as 
legitimate local authorities. The state attempted to address this through the introduction 
of the Regional Services Councils. 
u After 1987 the National Management System also became integrated into the new Regional Services 












Panacea for all political ills: Regional Services Councils - an institutional re5ponse to 
the state's crisis of control 
'[The purpose of RSCs is] to rationalise area-wide local government, to 
provide effective political representation for all communities in a region; and 
to generate funds, primarily for the development of Black, Indian and 
Coloured areas'. (Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development & 
Planning, 1985) 
First conceived by the Browne Committee during the 1970s, the controversial Regional 
Services Councils Act (No. 109 of 1985) only began establishing Regional Services 
Councils (RSCs) in 1987 (Humphries, 1988b). Introduced as a regional tier of 
government in order to facilitate a sharing of resources, the RSCs allowed for the 
redistribution of wealth to the predominantly bankrupted township councils 
(Humphries, 1988b). Phillips et al (1988) suggest that by attending to material 
grievances through the new regional authorities the state hoped to make the BLAs more 
credible. 
The RSCs were to provide for a more effective rendering of services across local 
authority boundary lines and facilitate improved provision of bulk service delivery 
(Solomon, 1988). The government had recognised the need to abandon its previous 
fiscal separation policies and used the new RSCs as vehicles for channelling funds to 
alleviate the financial difficulties accrued by the BLAs (Humphries, 1991). Bridging 
loans from Provincial Administrations helped to cover BLA deficits, which at this stage 
had risen nationwide to some R271 m (Cameron, 1991). Revenue to run the new RSCs 
was collected as taxes from local businesses on their total turnover and wage bills 
(Bekker et aI, 1986; Humphries, 1991). While some RSCs did allocate large amounts of 
revenue to townships for infrastructure development, much of it remained unspent due 
to the inefficiency and incapacity of the local Town Councils themselves (Ikapa file 
7/3/1/8). 
The introduction of the RSCs was the state's first attempt at some form of metropolitan 
political framework, representing local authorities of all races, while simultaneously 
continuing to centralise power away from local level authorities (Humphries, 1991). 
Humphries believes that although their conception began with technical and financial 












campaign to render the townships ungovernable (ibid).14 A Black Sash report reiterates 
this: 
"These Regional Services Councils are a key element in the 
government's strategy of control. This control is enforced on the one 
hand by extreme repression and on the other hand by 'reform' 
measures - 'winning the hearts and minds of the people' co-
option". (Black Sash. BC668. E. Special projects. Local 
Government. 6/5/88) 
The introduction of the RSCs was widely criticised. While White local authorities 
believed they meant capitulation and loss of White privilege because of their financial 
implications (Humphries & Shubane, 1989; Humphries, 1991), African communities 
regarded them as an extension of the discredited and hated BLAs. Since BLAs were 
positioned at the heart of township conflict as local agents of the state, bringing with 
them a past riddled with bankruptcy and corruption, it was argued that their inclusion 
into the RSCs would prejudice the success of these new regional structures from the 
outset (Lombard & Pisane, 1985). 
However. in spite of their inclusion in the RSCs, BLAs were still firmly positioned as 
peripheral state agents, the 'outsiders' in the regional government system. 
Representation of local authorities on RSCs was calculated according to the amount of 
services consumed within each jurisdictional area, resulting in over-representation of 
the wealthier White areas and BLA areas that lacked resources being grossly under-
represented. Therefore, some saw the RSC system as another way to extend white 
domination, moulding black administrative institutions according to the White 
government's own design under the guise of reform, with a token show of ineffectual 
and relatively powerless African representation (Grest, 1988). 
The introduction of the RSCs can also be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to shift the 
balance power in order to maintain state influence at the regional level, to ensure 
against opposition from White local power bases. Wary of increasing right wing 
14 The RSCs represented the National Management System at the Regional level through the Regional 












influence the government was careful to centralize power away from local level 
structures, such as the increasingly popular Conservative Party, determined not to allow 
them to ambush their reform initiatives (Pretorius & Humphries, 1991).15 Thus, the 
RSC system was a contradiction in terms - a seeming devolution of power to regional 
level authorities, with simultaneously strengthened central government control (Grest, 
1988).16 
While the state was vacillating between devolution of its control of the African 
townships to local tiers of government and recentralisation of its influence through 
other structures in order to ameliorate its loss of control, township communities were 
organising themselves to contest the right of the state to shape every facet of their lives. 
The next section explores how civil society, despite its lack of political rights, 
nevertheless managed to find ways in which to challenge the BLAs. 
The civic movement and local communities contest the authority and legitimacy of 
the state 
"Resistance has often been analysed for its ability to mobilize collective 
action, to perturb or alter arrangements of power, and to initiate changes in 
social structures". (Ewick & Silbey, 2003: p.329) 
The early 1980s was a turning point in South African political history. The introduction 
of the BLAs spurred the emergence nationwide of a strong civic movement to counter 
the government's local authority structures with alternative, legitimate representative 
bodies (Coorvadia, 1991). The rejection of the BLAs was driven by calls from the 
banned African National Congress (ANC) to destroy the 'puppet organs of government' 
(Tambo, 1986: p.lO). Never before had South Africa seen the mobilization of urban 
African people in such numbers, from all sectors of society, across all generations 
(Swilling, 1988b), as civics and youth groups emerged wherever people gathered 
(Rasool, 1984). Civic movements nation-wide became the voice of the 'silent' majority, 
and began to co-ordinate resistance to the BLAs, contributing significantly to their 
eventual demise (Shubane, 1993). Bloch (1082) recalls that: 
15 In the 1987 general election the right wing Conservative Party replaced the more liberal Progressive 
Federal Party as the official opposition, illustrating that many among the White electorates were 
distrustful. perhaps fearful, of the reformist policies of the state (Humphries & Shubane, 1989). 
16 The National Management System was also well integrated into the new regional system of 











This involved door-lo-door organizing, mobilizing people around 
day-to-day problems, a very slow process of breaking down the 
fragmentation and fear caused by the Group Areas Act, to begin to 
give people the confidence to act in collective ways". (Bloch, 
1989: p.26) 
Chapter Two 
Mass action was to a large extent based on street and area committees, which were 
highly effective structures of people's power (Du Toit, 1995). The United Democratic 
Front, established in 1983, was able to co-ordinate civic resistance to the state at a 
national scale, identifying the BLAs as the primary targets in a mass-action campaign to 
oppose government reform programmes and particularly what had become known as 
the 'KoornhofBills,17 (Seekings, 1992; Swilling, 1987). 
The civics encouraged a sense of solidarity among township dwellers, who began to see 
themselves as citizens with legitimate claims to the urban areas and equitable access to 
resources. The civic call for a boycott of elections for the BLAs were attempts by the 
larger civics to exploit the inadequacy of these structures in order to demand political 
reforms (Swilling in Frankel et aI, 1988). 
A boycott of the payment of rates and service charges began in 1985 (Heymans & 
White, 1991). Driven by civic organizations, it spread quickly and sparked riots 
nationwide. The loss of revenue that accrued forced the central government to fund the 
BLAs in order to keep them running. Township residents grew increasingly vociferous, 
demanding lower rents and the resignations of Town Councillors. Local councillors and 
officials became the regular targets of violent resistance actions, and many were 
attacked and even killed (Wenzel, 1991; Poto, 1988; Seekings, 1986). 
However, the government believed that the boycotts were only the work of political 
agitators trying to fuel opposition to local government administration, underestimating 
17 Three pieces of legislation originally introduced by Minister Koornhof in 1979: the Black Local 
Authorities Bill, the Black Communities Development Bill and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of 
Black Persons Bill. Although the bills had stimulated serious debate from all sides of the political 
spectrum, and had been sent back to the drawing board several times, the first two bills were nevertheless 












the levels of frustration of township residents (Chaskalson et al. 1987; Shubane & 
Madiba. 1992). 
Trade unions and political organisations coordinated their actions to make areas 
ungovernable, forcing BLA Councillors to resign and leading to a total collapse of state 
authority (Swilling, 1987). Swilling asserts that community newspapers. such as 
'Grassroots' in Cape Town, also played an essential role in 'cultivating a growing 
consciousness of a shared national political identity' (1987: p.12). Many such township 
newspapers were banned under the States of Emergency. 
Heymans and White suggest that, although township residents initially opposed their 
local BLA over rent increases, this eventually evolved into a criticism of the whole 
system of Black local government (1991). Speaking in Parliament in March 1985, a 
member of the opposition stated that there was a real danger of the third tier 
government completely disintegrating, adding that if a lack of financing power and 
authority had caused local authorities to suffer from a legitimacy crisis the largest 
contributing factor had been the belief by Africans that local government participation 
was a substitute for political rights in central government (Hansard (A) 13 Col. 4774 
1985). Indeed, Rammala contends that township residents misconceived the function of 
BLAs and the role of local officials. He stresses the 'crisis of expectations' that existed 
in African communities: 
"As a result these representatives are expected to address all the 
community's problems in their negotiations with the government and 
other authorities ... [ over] issues which go far beyond the normal scope 
of local authorities. Often constituents even judge the success or failure 
of councillors on their ability to bring about redress for such issues". 
(Rammala. 1987: p.5) 
Rammala further explains that because of the exclusion of 'blacks' from all levels of 
government for many years, the introduction of local government was a highly 
politicised issue, representing as it did the only link between township communities 












The boycotts successfully revealed the 'Achilles heel' of the apartheid government, 
namely the Provincial Administrations and the BLAs (Atkinson, 1984; Muller& Van 
Rooyen, 1994). It was therefore at this level that civil society began to contest the 
legitimacy of the state and to demand substantial political reforms. 
Mounting tensions within the African townships led the government to rethink its 
ideological stance on African urban rights. In a public statement in January 1985 the 
State President announced that the government had accepted the permanence of large 
numbers of African people in the urban areas (Survey of Race Relations, 1985). Later 
in the same year the government confirmed this paradigm shift by abolishing Influx 
Control, which had underpinned their urbanisation strategy since the early 1950s. 18 
By mid-1985, due to concentrated mass action many local authorities had collapsed (Du 
Toil, 1995). However, the state remained determined to continue with its reform 
programme and to maintain the BLAs, the foundation upon which they planned to build 
a new system of local government. It responded to increasing popular resistance by 
establishing a permanent military presence in the townships under the States of 
Emergency, declared at various times between 1985 and 1989. Some of the BLAs were 
resuscitated by the Provincial Authorities under the administration of appointed White 
government officials, in lieu of elected councillors. Township residents often more 
readily accepted these officials, who were clearly identifiable as state agents, than 
African councillors who were regarded as traitors (Hendricks, 1988; Heymans & 
White, 1991). 
The position of the local government officials and councillors in the township 
environments was thus a rather precarious one. In a sense they were the 'piggies-in-the-
middle'. sandwiched between various levels of the state and the politicised township 
communities. The next section explores the crisis of identity of BLA officials, 
delicately positioned within the state and at the interface between the state and 
township residents. 
]8 With this change the Development Boards lost much of their raison d'etre and were eventually 
disbanded in June 1986 under the Abolition of Development Bodies Act (No. 75 of 1986). Many of their 
employees however. became absorbed into the restructured Provincial Administrations (Grest. 1988; 
Hendler, 1991). This confinns TCitemeyer's (1984) contentions regarding the effective perpetuation of 












Exploring the controversial identities of BLA officials and councillors 
Seen as collaborators with the apartheid government (Hughes & Grest, 1983; 
Humphries & Shubane, 1989; Rammala, 1987), many questioned the motives of 
African officials and councillors' for taking up office on the BLAs. Local residents 
distrusted councillors who they regarded as puppets of the regime, subject to the 
'paternalism' of the Development Boards (Ikapa File 7/3/1/1] UCASA. 1984). Van 
Eck (1990) speaks of the underhand actions of councillors: 
"Because of mass rejection by the community, large numbers of 
councillors have used and abused widespread coercion, intimidation, 
violence and nepotism in an attempt to retain some grassroots 
support". (1990 p.S) 
However, Rammala, who was the Town Clerk of the Atteridgeville BLA, while not 
denying the underhand tactics of many African local government officials, contributes 
another point of view: 
"Participants in black local government find it difficult to rebut 
allegations of collaboration and collusion with unpopular aspects of 
central government policy as a result of the relationship in which local 
government stands to central government. The difficulties are 
compounded ... by the excessive expectations which the black 
community itself often places on its local government representatives". 
(Rammala, 1987: p.5) 
As pressure from township groups intensified, councillors were attacked or even 
murdered (Umkhanyiseli.No.42.1987; Hendler, 1991; Wentzel, 1991). The fearful 
method of death by 'necklacing,19 began during this violent period (Gardner, 1997; 
Shubane, 1991). Many councillors resigned and joined the UDF call for the total 
rejection of BLAs as non-representative structures, some joining the civics (Heymans 
& White, 1991). According to Grest & Hughes: 
19 A public method of execution developed by the youth during the township uprisings of the 1980s 












"Councillors began to feel sandwiched between the growing popularity of 
the civics and the hard line attitude of the boards ... With decision-making 
by-passing them from both ends, their attempts to assert credibility 
became more desperate and the level of violence associated with township 
violence rose. Bomb attacks on councillors, death threats (even deaths), 
court cases alleging fraud, murder, theft, and assault punctuated the 
business of many councils". (1984: p.54) 
However, in spite of the inherent dangers, there were still those who were prepared to 
continue to work within the BLA framework (Humphries & Shubane, 1989). A retired 
Town Councillor conceded in an interview that. although he had been attacked on 
several occasions, he did not resign due to his strong conviction that the local authority 
system would eventually lead to major political reforms, and that he could improve the 
lives of township people more effectively by being positioned 'inside' the state. 
De Jongh recorded similar sentiments among councillors that he interviewed, who 
justified their refusal to resign in terms of bettering the lives of their people and their 
belief in the government's reform programme (2000). Moreover, research by Heymans 
& White established that many councillors were genuinely dedicated to uplifting their 
communities, feeling that they were better placed to be able to negotiate housing deals 
and facilities for their communities from within the system (1991). This is reflected in 
the results of my own research discussed in chapter six. 
Rammala suggests that the intimidation of African officials prevented many capable 
participants from joining the system: 
"Even worse the social ostracism and censure which follows the label of 
'sell-out' or 'collaborator' have robbed the local authorities of the 
essential local talent which might have guaranteed a better standard of 
administration and lent greater credibility to these institutions". 
(Rammala, 1987: p.7) 
Thus, the tainted image of African officials prevented other more capable and worthy 












The violent campaign against African collaborators continued from 1984 until 1989, 
during which time many BLAs were disbanded, only to be resurrected during the States 
of Emergency (Heymans & White, 1991). However, this had the effect of intensifying 
African political aspirations (Rammala, 1987). 
The struggle for legitimacy continues: Institutional changes, elections, and 
community resistance 
By the late 1980s, the BLAs were variously positioned in transitional stages between 
their original Community Council status and fully-fledged Town Councils. so that five 
different forms of BLA existed concurrently, each with varying degrees of authority: 
Greater City Councils, City Councils, Town Councils, Town Committees and Local 
Authority Committees.20 In order to address this institutional complexity, the Black 
Local Authorities Amendment Act (Act No.58, 1986) awarded all Community 
Councils the status of Town Councils. However, despite the fact that the new Act made 
local authority structures more autonomous. it failed to enhance their credibility in the 
townships where support for alternative civic structures continued to grow. 
Due to the failure of their local government reforms and in an attempt to fe-centralise 
control over the same local authorities it had recently granted greater autonomy to, the 
state dissolved the Provincial Councils in terms of the Provincial Government Act 
(No.69 of 1986), replacing them with multi-racial Executive Councils under the 
leadership of the Provincial administrators. These were appointed by the State President 
and Provincial Administrators, and were directly accountable to Parliament. 
Administrators received extensive executive powers giving them increased control over 
BLA areas. This created a crisis of identity for the BLA officials whose authority was 
disregarded both by the township communities and the Provincial authorities. 
Simultaneous to these political developments the ANC had begun moving from its 
preparatory phase of resistance into open popular confrontation with the government 
20 The confusion caused by the changing status of local authority structures was evident in the Ikapa 
archive, where correspondence with the BLA was variously addressed to either the Cape Town 
Community Council, the Cape Town Town Committee, the Cape Town Town Councilor the Ikapa Town 












(Pottinger, Cape Times 27/4/86) spurred by their belief that the new RSC system was 
yet another guise through which the government could entrench apartheid. Tambo, 
(1986) insisted at an ANC rally in Lusaka that: 
" ... the system which these councils are meant to address, namely the 
provision of services to all the group areas in each urban centre does 
not answer the primary question of the right of residents to exercise 
political control over their towns and cities as a whole. We are not 
fighting and are not dying in order to have a better system of waste 
disposal!" (Tambo' s message to the National Executive Council of the 
ANC. Lusaka. 8th January 1986: pIO) 
Clearly, local government reforms to provide resources for township development were 
not sufficient response to the grievances and political aspirations of urban Africans by 
this time. There was no genuine process of devolution of power to local levels of 
authority, merely a reshuffling of the status quo in order for the state to control and 
guide their own reform process. 
In October 1988, despite continuing rent boycotts and violent resistance to the BLAs, 
local government elections were held in Black local authority areas, coinciding with 
stricter security measures (Humphries & Shubane, 1989). The government's 
information campaign made use of the words 'lawfully resident' to describe those 
qualified to vote in township areas. The Black Sash questioned the perpetuation of this 
'legal' term: 
"Lawyers do not understand what is meant by 'lawfully resident'. Since 
the pass laws and influx control went there is no such thing as unlawful 
residence in a black township by a black person who is a South African 
citizen". (Black Sash, BC668 Special Projects. 6/5/88) 
The continued use of Section 10 terminology acknowledged the realities of the election 












while few of those who did exercised this right.21 It further entrenched the unnatural 
divisions already created among township dwellers by polarizing residents as 'legal 
insiders' or 'illegal outsiders'. The unrealistic polling percentages claimed by the state 
also ignored the fact that less than half the wards actually held elections (Humphries & 
Shubane, 1989). 
Determined to strike at the foundations of township resistance to the elections, the state 
banned many organisations, among them the UDF and the Council of South African 
Trade Unions, also denying township dwellers the right to hold political meetings. A 
new wave of detentions added many popular local leaders to those already incarcerated. 
The actions of the state effectively undermined the township leadership that was 
coordinating resistance to the elections. A retired councilor had this to say about the 
failed Ikapa area elections in which he was reinstated 'unopposed': 
"You can't say we didn't have elections just because people didn't 
vote. They didn't vote because no one stood opposed to the eight 
candidates that presented themselves. Hardly [enough] cause for an 
election!"(Lobi, pers. comm. 6 April 2005) 
The state claimed that the reinstatement of unopposed candidates was an indication of 
their popularity among township communities (Humphries & Shubane, 1989), 
However, fear of community reprisals contributed to the lack of potential opposing 
candidates (Rammala, 1987), while the application of heavy-handed tactics by some of 
the councillors themselves to intimidate rivals also ensured that their candidacy went 
unopposed. The Black Sash recorded some of the coercive tactics applied by the state 
to 'encourage' township dwellers to vote: 
"We are starting to get some curious reports about steps the State is 
taking to try to 'persuade' people to vote in the elections for black 
local authorities. I have now heard of two different places widely 
21 Section 10 of the Native (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923 prescribed a grading system according to 
which Africans could only 'legally' reside in the townships in terms of their rating. It is this particularly 
divisive policy that I will argue helped to create the social stratification that later underlay the identities 












separated where municipal police have gone house to house In the 
depths of the night and made people sign things. People have the 
impression that they were being forced to register as voters". (BC668. 
E. Special Projects. Local Government. 10/8/88) 
These were desperate attempts to increase voting percentages in order to claim the 
BLAs as 'legitimately' elected structures. 
By 1990 more than 100 out of a total of 258 BLAs had collapsed, due both to 
resignation of significant numbers of councillors and staff as well as financial 
incapacity, and had been taken over by government appointed administrators (Du ToiL, 
1995). The responsibility for BLA administration often became that of policemen and 
military staff, drafted into service in the townships but unschooled in public 
administration. Their presence aggravated the already tense situation in the townships 
and contributed to the ongoing rejection of the BLAs (Du Toit, 1995). 
In the second half of 1991, Provincial Administrations suspended the bridging finance 
they had been providing in order to keep many BLAs afloat. Instead, they responded to 
non-payment for services with cuts in essential services such as water supply, sewerage 
and electricity. Once again the BLAs were powerless to stop such decisions by higher 
tiers of government and became the scapegoats for the actions of other state agents 
(Atkinson, 1994). 
The nationwide response of township communities to local government 'reforms' led to 
significant changes in state ideology as it acknowledged the inevitability of change. 
From 1990 the speed of reform increased with the establishment of the Local 
Government Negotiating Forum, a voluntary, non-statutory body established to 
research local government reform (Ismail et aI, 1999). Evidence from the Ikapa archive 
reveals how the state was debating the merits of devolution of power at this point: 
"The current fragmentation of authority presents such grave problems, 
that the system of providing for the demands of urbanisation is in the 
process of collapsing. Within the system of public authorities there are 












independent powers, for urbanisation to be handled at even a 
maximum level of efficiency ... the system is unwieldy, uncoordinated 
and ill-equipped to cope with the demands of urbanisation ... the only 
possible way in which this problem can be dealt with .. .is at the level 
of regional government". (Ikapa file 7/3/1/8. Report on Strategy for 
Urbanisation dated 17/6/91) 
On the 12 July 1991 the Interim Measures for Local Government Act, No. 128 of 1991, 
was promulgated to give local authorities the opportunity to begin to work together and 
to obviate the duplication of services. By this time the government, serious about 
comprehensive political reform, had initiated political negotiations with the ANC. It is 
at this point in the early 1990s, as the state began to focus its efforts on creating viable 
local government capable of promoting legitimate political reform and equitable access 
to resources that this discussion of the BLA period ends. 
Concluding remarks 
'Devolution of political power to autonomous local government capable of 
realising the values of liberty, participation and efficiency is a critically 
important principle, especially in a deeply divided society'. 
(Bekker, 1988: p. 32) 
The introduction of the BLAs signalled a rethink by the government of their 
urbanisation strategy. The state came to terms with the inevitability of increasing 
African urbanisation and the failure of their influx control policies to reverse what was 
essentially a national and global trend. The apartheid state believed that the solution 
was to create a process of controlled and 'orderly urbanisation' (Royston, 2002: p176). 
Although seemingly attempting to address the racial imbalances of political power by 
ostensibly devolving political power to local authority structures at the township level, 
the apartheid regime undermined these new local government structures from the outset 
by failing to empower them to realise the three critical values that Bekker highlights 
above. The BLA system was never financially viable as it lacked a sufficient resource 
base upon which to levy taxes due to the imbalances in economic infrastructure 
engendered through separate development policies. Although the introduction of the 












political manoeuvre by the state to re-entrench their control over local authorities, 
positioned both to the left and right of the government, and was used as a means of 
integrating the state's National Management System at the regional level. 
The introduction of the BLAs failed to realise the aspirations of urban Africans for 
legitimate and representative government and with it control over the resources so 
crucial to their lives. The growth of the Black Consciousness Movement and the rise of 
civic movements nationwide mobilised township communities at grassroots level to 
contest the legitimacy of the state, co-ordinating their resistance towards local 
authorities at the municipal level of government, where the state was most vulnerable. 
The Black Local Authorities essentially formed the state's frontline in the ensuing 
battle of urban Africans for political rights. 
Although at a general level township residents identified local authority structures with 
the apartheid regime, I argue it is critical to examine the strategic responses of township 
residents and organisations and local government officials at the local level, to explore 
the social divisions and the interactions that evolved between township 'insiders' and 
'outsiders' as they sought legitimacy in the urban landscape of the townships. 
The next chapter traces the BLA period within the narrower context of the Ikapa area of 
the Western Cape, investigating area-specific responses to changes in local government 
structures and legislation. I examine how local actors from the state and the 
neighbourhood communities interacted, forming strategic relationships and 
interchangeable identities in order to circumvent the constraints of state policies in the 
Lagunya townships of the 1980s and early 1990s. This analysis facilitates a more 













THE 'l,AGUNYA LACUNA': IKAPA BLACK LOCAL AUTHORITY 
STRUCTURES 1983 - 1991 
" ... the local state ret1ects the contradictions and strife within the state as a 
whole, albeit from particular local perspectives. The nature of relations 
between the central and local tiers of the state are shaped by the complexities 
of their continuous interaction within particular contexts and over time". 
(Nieftagodien, 2002 p. 3) 
Introduction 
While Nieftagodien has recognised the fundamental importance of local government in 
society (2002), Mabin and Parnell suggest that the local state's role in 'mediating 
conflicting ideological and material imperatives' has been understated (1995 pA6). 
Acknowledging the critical role of local government in South Africa, this chapter traces 
the history of changing local administration in one particular African urban area 
exploring local responses to changing state strategies during the 1980s. 
Central government efforts to find acceptable local authority structures to govern 
rapidly expanding African urban communities had area-specific responses. The Cape 
Province had a history of liberal local government structures, such as the Cape City 
Council, which had always attempted to resist or to thwart repressive apartheid 
legislation (Cameron, 1991; Heymans, 1988). 
During the time period under discussion, the Ikapa area, which is the focus of this 
chapter, was comprised of the three large African townships of Langa, Guguletu and 
Nyanga, also known collectively by local residents as 'Lagunya'. After 1980 it came to 
include New Crossroads, and temporarily also the Khayelitsha area, which 
subsequently became the independent municipal area of Lingelethu West. 
Analysis of the Ikapa local government's history has largely been overlooked in the 
literature, with the exception of the comprehensive history of Nyanga from 1946 to 
1970 focusing on housing administration by Fast (1995a) and a paper on the Cape 
Town Community Council by Kahanowitz (1988), both valuable secondary sources for 
this research. To respond to this lacuna in academic knowledge this chapter traces the 












government and community exchanges and interactions during the BLA period. I 
examine how area-specific responses shaped various identities and changing 
relationships in the complex political landscape of the Lagunya townships during the 
1980s and early 1990s. Although the institutional dynamics driven by central 
government, discussed in chapter two, are an important element, this history can only 
be properly understood by examining it at the scale in which it took place, drawing out 
the ways in which particular local outcomes were shaped by these various and changing 
relationships and identities. 
In this chapter, therefore, I discuss the introduction of the BLA system in the Ikapa 
area, explaining how it was constituted and what were its functions. I describe the trials 
and tribulations experienced by the council in these early years of its administration and 
the failure of both the first and second local authority elections to establish the 
legitimacy of the Ikapa BLA. The next section traces the history of civic resistance in 
the Lagunya townships and the ramifications of this for the local authority, describing 
how the rent boycotts initiated a violent period of reaction to the local council. I explain 
the introduction of the Western Cape Regional Services Council, what this effectively 
changed or failed to change in terms of capacitating the Ikapa local authority, and how 
this affected the local authority'S relationship with the Lagunya communities and other 
levels of the state. I show how the identity of the Ikapa local authority was further 
compromised by its integration into the local branch of the National Management 
System. I conclude the chapter by describing the chain of events that led to the ultimate 
demise of the Ikapa Town Council in the early 1990s as it gradually lost the battle for 
legitimacy and its agency was diminished under pressure from both the state and the 
local communities. This chapter forms the context for the history of housing 
administration that follows in subsequent chapters. 
Questions of state legitimacy at the local level: Positioning the Ikapa Black Local 
Authority 
The Black Local Authorities Act, NO.102 of 1982, came into effect in 1983. It made 
provision for the introduction of two categories of Black Local Authorities (BLAs), 
Village and Town Councils, which were given substantially more power than the 












Authorities. In the Cape area four BLAs were established: Ikapa, Crossroads. Mfuleni, 
and later Lingelethu West. 
However, unlike elsewhere in the country, none of these BLAs were raised to a 
municipal level because upgrading of the original Cape Community Councils to Town 
Councils would have meant acknowledging the permanence of African people in the 
Western Cape and therefore their rights to live and work in the area (Kahanovitz, 1988: 
pA8). This would have conflicted with the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (CLPP), 
which denied the rights of Africans to employment and permanent residence in the 
Cape (Humphries, 1989; Kahanovitz, 1988), that was only rescinded several years later 
(Fast, 1995b). The Ikapa local authority therefore continued to be referred to as the 
Cape Town Community Council.:!2 This created an identity crisis for the Council as it 
seemed to the local communities as though nothing had changed, in spite of the fact that 
the administrative powers of the Council had been somewhat increased. 
Figure two shows the chronology of changes in local authority structures in the Ikapa 
area and the changing institutions that were responsible for them. 2~ 
1979 - Cape Town Community Council 
1986 Cape Town Town Committee 
1988 - Cape Town Town Council 
IKAPA TOWN COUNCIL 
1995 - lkapa Transitional 
Substructure 
1971 - Western Cape 
Administration Board 
1984 - Western Cape 
Development Board 
1986 - Community Services 
Branch of Cape Provincial 
Administration 
Cape Metropolitan Council 
Figure 2. Chronology of Ikapa authority structures 
22 The failure to raise the Cape BLAs to the municipal level of government meant that the 1983 local 
elections for these new local authority structures in the Western Cape were held under the 1977 
Community Councils Act and not under the Black Local Authorities Act, and the name Cape Town 
Community Council was retained until later when the Council was upgraded. (Ikapa File 7/3/1147) 
D The Ikapa archive shows that these institutional changes confused those corresponding with the Ikapa 
local authority as the incorrect name was often used. This initially confused the research as well until the 












The local press commented on the seeming perpetuation of the Community Council 
system in the Cape: 
"The fact that in most cases the same persons stood for elections as those 
who served under the previous system of Community Councils 
contributed to this credibility crisis by giving the impression that little 
had changed in the system". (Cape Times 13/9/85) 
Indeed, several of the Community Councillors and officials had a long track record 
working for the state under the earlier Urban Bantu CounciL The offices of the Cape 
Town Community Council were initially situated in Goodwood, a 'white' suburb some 
distance from the Lagunya townships, physically emphasising the distance of the 
councillors and the officials from the township residents (Todes, Watson & Wilkinson, 
1986). The building also housed the offices of the Western Cape Administration Board, 
renowned in the Lagunya area for its harsh enforcement of the Pass Laws and Influx 
Control regulations (Cole, 1987). This contributed to the local authority officials being 
firmly identified as 'puppets' of the regime, 'rubber stamping' Administration Board 
decisions (Kahanovitz,1988: p. 43 )?4 
The Ikapa jurisdictional area was divided into administrative wards represented by 
'elected' councillors (Elias, 1983). To demonstrate community support for the new 
BLAs, claiming them as legitimate local authority structures, the state wanted a good 
voting poll in the first elections in November 1983. Kahanovitz (1988) explains how 
the state resorted to a form of gerrymandering in the Ikapa area, expanding the 
municipal area with four extra wards prior to the elections. According to Kahanovitz 
the state claimed that reason for the additional wards was to accommodate internal 
population growth and to separate the hostel dwellers from other township dwellers in 
recognition of their essential division of interests (1988: p.47). 
However, the new wards encompassed the areas in which the hostel-dwellers and 
informal settlement dwellers lived (Kahanovitz, 1988). These groups had historically 












been denied the section ten qualifications necessary to assure them legal rights to reside 
in the city. and the access to formal houses and employment associated with these 
rights. Thus, previously considered 'outsiders' by the state. the extension of voting 
rights to these groups constituted an upgrade in their status and the potential for 
increased access to critical resources such as residential legitimacy and housing. Also 
considered 'outsiders' by the established township communities, this offered them 
some measure of acceptance and recognition, albeit from the state, within the hostile 
Lagunya environment. In an interview Michael Fadana, a founding member of the 
Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). explained that the these residents were 
really being wooed by the state with voting rights in order to increase statistical voting 
percentages (Fadana, pers. comm. 8 April 2005). 
However, low voting polls during these first elections presented the new Cape BLAs 
with a credibility crisis. The Survey of Race Relations (1983) quoted the poll for Cape 
Town Community Council as 11,6% of the 46 000 registered voters. A poor show in an 
area calculated to contain more than four times the registered number of inhabitants! 
Table one compares the number of registered voters in the lkapa area to the de facto 
population. and serves to illustrate the meaninglessness of the election results. 
! Wards: 21 
Candidates: 40 
Uncontested wards: 3 
I Registered voters: 46 000 
I Percentage poll: 11.6% 
. De jure population in area of jurisdiction: ] 43 700 
Table 1: Results of tbe 1983 Cape Town Community Council elections 
Source: (Survey of Race Relations. 1983) 
The 1983 elections coincided with the founding of the U niled Democratic Front (UDF), 












effort to undermine the substantial influence of the UDF, the Ikapa mayor, Lubelwana, 
banned all township meetings prior to the elections (Kahanowitz, 1988).25 
There was a general sentiment among township residents that the Community 
Councillors themselves were corrupt and misused their positions of power (Heymans & 
White, 1991). Intimidation by councillors was reported in the local press: 
"Community Councillors are warning people that if they do not vote in 
the November 24 elections they will be thrown out of their homes". 
(Grassroots, Vol. 4 No.9. November 1983: p.1) 
Such actions by individual councillors served to taint the image of the local authority 
structure, drawing township residents increasingly to look to their own civic 
organisations as their 'legitimate' representatives. In this way the civics gained agency 
through community support, and were able to position themselves as alternative 
leadership structures acceptable to the township dwellers, contesting the legitimacy of 
the Ikapa local authority to govern the Lagunya townships. 
Rasool records the rapid growth of civics and youth groups in the Western Cape (1992), 
Grassroots, a local township newspaper, reported (October 1983) that members of 
these organisations went door-to-door in the Lagunya townships with pamphlets and 
newsletters deriding the Community Council elections, while street meetings were held 
and even churches gave their support as the civic movement grew. The Western Cape 
Civic Association (WCCA), founded in 1982, led the opposition to local government 
elections in the Western Cape (Seekings, 1992), supported by other youth, women and 
student organisations affiliated with the UDF (Grassroots November 1983, p.l). 
It was against this background of civic organizing that the Cape Town Community 
Council tried to validate its authority to administer the Ikapa communities. Kahanovitz 
(1988) comments that although the lack of legitimacy of the Cape Town Community 
25 Lubelwana was a most unpopular man in the Lagunya townships. According to Elias (1983) he was at 
one time the chairman of the housing portfolio on the Council. Two of my interviewees. who shall 
remain anonymous for their own security, explained that Lubelwana was in the habit of using any means 
at his disposal. often cruel and violent ones, to avail himself of other people' s houses for his own ends. 












Council differed little from that suffered by other BLAs throughout South Africa, the 
level of militancy among the civic groups co-ordinating resistance to the BLAs was 
comparatively little in the Ikapa area until later in the 19805. He suggests that this was 
perhaps because the Cape Town Community Council had not been upgraded to a Town 
Council, leading people to disregard it as a fairly powerless entity. 16 
Interrogating the realities of running a BLA: No mandate, no money, no muscle 
The Ikapa local authority retained the status of a Community Council until 1984. Thus, 
for the residents of Lagunya the introduction of a new local authority meant that 
effectively there was little change. In addition, the new Council remained answerable to 
the Western Cape Administration Board. Cooper and Kaplan comment that: 
"In practice what seems to have happened is that the Administration 
Board continues to control and manage the townships. The powers of the 
Cape Town Community Council are limited, both by statute, and by 
their ability to exercise them." (1983: p. 25). 
So, the new Council was regarded as an ineffective and unempowered administrative 
structure controlled by the Administration Board. 
The Council consisted of a number of departments: Business and Finance; Works: 
Transport and Roads; Housing; Community Development; and Personnel and 
Education (Ikapa file 2/2/2). The number of staff was decided by the central 
government, but not all the envisaged posts were actually filled. From the outset a 
shortage of staff and a lack of expertise undermined the Council's effective 
administration of the Ikapa area. By 1988 less than a thousand people worked for the 
Council although it was administering an area calculated at that time to contain more 
than a quarter of a million people (Ikapa file 7/311125). 
In many instances Board officials were seconded due to the Council's lack of capacity, 
and many became permanent Council members. This was a source of contention for 
26 I argue. however, that perhaps the lower levels of violence are in fact significant in light of my findings 
in chapter six in which I interrogate the complex relationships that underlay interactions between various 












many years, as evidenced by a letter from the Urban Councils Association of South 
Africa (UCASA)27 to Councillor Njoli of the Cape Town Community Council in June 
1985 recommending that: 
"UCASA affiliates be encouraged to refuse to accept the transfer or 
appointment of former seconded Development Board officials to the 
staff establishments of the councils, but instead to let them remain 
seconded". (Ref. Ikapa 7/3/1/11) 
The permanent appointment of seconded officials perpetuated the Board's control over 
the Ikapa local authority. Clearly, the Cape Town Community Councillors themselves 
resented the intrusion of the Board officials in their affairs and the damage that being 
closely identified with the Board had on their relationship with Lagunya communities. 
Inheriting the legacy of the Western Cape Administration Board and later the 
Development Board that replaced it, the Cape Town Community Council as all other 
BLAs, lacked substantial sources of revenue.28 The Cape BLAs had inherited the worst 
annual deficit in the country from the Western Cape Administration Board, which from 
1977 until 1985 was unable to enforce rent increases in order to address the financial 
shortfall due to resistance from local communities (Kahanowitz, 1988). This forced the 
Ikapa local authority into a spiralling accumulation of debt that seriously impeded their 
effective administration, a situation from which they were never to recover. Although 
the budget varied annually, records from the Ikapa archive illustrate how the Council's 
expenditure consistently outstripped incoming revenue (Ikapa file 12/1/22)?9 Such 
financial restraints constrained administration and development in the Ikapa area, and 
27 The Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA) was established as a national body of BLA 
councillors in order to make representation to central governments on national issues of relevance to the 
functioning of BLAs. It was intended as an expression of the councils' solidarity and to counter 
intimidation of councillors by anti-council elements (Ikapa file 7/3/1/11). 
28 Records from the Western Cape Development Board's accounts show that 41'1( of their township 
revenue had accrued from the sale of alcohol in the townships i.e. beer halls and liquor outlets. The 
decision by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (DCDP) to dispose of all liquor 
undertakings belonging to the Development Boards (File 7/3/1/11 Ikapa Archive), and instead to 
privatise them, constituted a huge loss of revenue for BLAs (Kahanowitz, 1988). 
29 198617 Expenditure R74 153 740, revenue R45 462 592 
1987/8 During initial development of Khayelitsha, expenditure RIll 042 250, revenue R85 845 730 
1988/9 After excision of Khayelitsha from Ikapa, expenditure R 95 446 643, revenue R47 795 780 












eventually induced the Council to increase rent and service charges, provoking an 
immediate response from local communities. 
The local authority'S need for additional revenue became dire after the influx of urban 
Africans following the rescinding of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy in 
September 1984, the eradication of Influx Control in 1985, and the abolition of the Pass 
Laws later in 1986. Large numbers of people moved into areas throughout the province, 
especially in Khayelitsha and existing squatter camps (UWC, 1989). Fast maintains that 
contrary to popular belief, there was no large in-migration from the Eastern Cape but 
rather an influx from other areas in the Western Cape (1995b: p.36). New informal 
squatter areas began emerging in the Ikapa area, placing an immense extra burden on 
the already under-capacitated local authority structures. 
The Cape Provincial Administration, aware of the Cape Town Community Council's 
general unpopularity in the Lagunya townships, circumvented the lack of 
communication between the state and grassroots structures by establishing their own 
communication channels. This made it clear to both the Ikapa officials and local 
township residents that the state was prepared to undermine the township authority in 
order to gain some community buy-in, further reducing the credibility of the BLA 
(Ikapa file 2/2/2). Evidence of the dilemma this posed for the Council was found in a 
letter it sent to the local branch of the Department of Constitutional Development and 
Planning in Cape Town demanding adherence to the State President's directive in May 
1985 that: 
" ... government functions be executed at the lowest possible level of 
government and that higher levels of government should as far as 
possible only be policy-making and monitoring levels of government". 
(lkapa file 212/02) 
The undermining effect of communications between the Provincial authorites and local 
residents is further illustrated in the minutes of a meeting in the early 1990s between 












"Mr. Stuurman [the Nyanga Civic representative] objected [when 
asked to deal with the councillors directly] ... claiming that councillors 
did not exist and the only person they would like to meet with is the 
Administrator". (lkapa file 7/3/1/70) 
Thus, it appears that semor officials, aware of the communication problems on the 
ground between the township communities and the local authorities, began 
circumventing the Ikapa structure in contravention of stated government policy. 
Lagunya society begins to earnestly contest the legitimacy and the power of the state 
In January 1985 the rent campaign that had been proliferating across the country finally 
reached the Western Cape and civic resistance to the state moved up a scale. The initial 
rent protest in the Ikapa area came about in response to an announcement by the Cape 
Town Community Council of prospective rent increases of R6.00 a month in New 
Crossroads just as the New Year dawned?O The response of the New Crossroads 
community reflected the general feelings of anger and frustration that had grown within 
Cape Town's African townships (Cole, 1987). In the climate of resistance that prevailed 
the Council was deemed responsible for the decisions and actions of the state. 
From this point the Lagunya residents began to challenge the authority of the local state 
using a range of strategies. In his thesis on the Black Local Authorities Du Toit 
suggests that this period formed the first phase of a nationwide resistance campaign to 
destroy the apartheid regime by weakening the economic viability of BLAs using the 
rent boycotts as a weapon of resistance (1995). He further proposes that non-aggressive 
action, a form of Ghandian 'satyagraha', was consciously being incorporated into 
community resistance strategies (1995). Hall reiterates that there were 'long-established 
traditions of protest politics in the Cape metropolitan area' (1986: p.9). He describes the 
30 Several civic associations gathered to co-ordinate resistance to the proposed increase, namely the New 
Crossroads branches of the Western Cape Civic Association under the chairmanship of Johnson 
Ngxobongwana, the Cape Youth Congress and the United Women's Organisation. After the meeting a 
deputation of 200 women from New Crossroads marched to the Nyanga offices of the Western Cape 
Development Board to protest the increases, calling for reductions on their existing rents (Cape Times, 9 
January 1985). The women claimed that in spite of damp and overcrowded conditions in their houses, 
they were paying more rent than the people living in other townships in the Ikapa area (Cape Times, 9 
January 1985). Timo Bezuidenhout. the Chief Commissioner of the Western Cape Department of Co-
operation and Development. granted the community a reprieve until the matter could be referred to 












range of passive strategies that were adopted such as holding meetings in 'white' areas, 
which did not contravene the existing state prohibitions against public gatherings in the 
townships. hunger strikes among detainees, candle light vigils and marches (Hall, 
1986).31 In addition Haysom and Kahanovitz recall the successes of human rights 
lawyers as they began to contest the legitimacy of the state in the courts on behalf of the 
'voiceless' majority (1987: p.187). 
However, the level of violent confrontation increased dramatically in the Western Cape 
after 1985 (Hall, 1986). In the Lagunya townships there were petrol bombings and 
many reports of arson (Kahanovitz, 1988). In response to the increasingly violent nature 
of township resistance, a State of Emergency was imposed in the Western Cape in 
October 1985, which was only lifted briefly in March 1986 before being reinstated 
again in June of that year (Hall, 1986; Kruss, 1987). The townships were placed under 
continuous security force surveillance, aggravating community resentment towards the 
local authority structure that fOimed an integral part of the state' s N ationa1 Management 
System that was co-ordinating the State of Emergency. While Du Toit explains that this 
action was calculated to address not only broader national security issues but to ensure 
the survival of the BLAs (1995), Kruss believes that the state had lost control and 
responded 'wildly' in order to crush political resistance (1987: p.I73). Indeed, by this 
time only two of the four Cape BLAs were still fully functional, namely Lingelethu 
West and Mfuleni. The Community Services Division of the Cape Provincial 
Administration had taken over the administration of the Ikapa and Crossroads Town 
Councils. 
The Cape Times reported that two Cape councillors had resigned due to their fear of 
being regarded as enemies of the people, stating that they had become powerless to act 
in their official capacity (18/1/85). It is evident that councillors feared retaliation and 
felt morally challenged, being Africans themselves. They suffered a contradiction of 
dual identities simultaneously positioned as agents of the state and township 
3] It was recorded that several days after the New Crossroads protests those arrested on charges of arson 
began a hunger strike in prison (Cape Times, 28 January 1985). showing that small community groups 












residents. In Ikapa the confrontations and physical violence intimidated councillors, 
several of whom requested extra personal security. 32 
On 12 June 1986, the eve of the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, a second State 
of Emergency was imposed nationwide (Kruss, 1987: p. 174). As the state attempted to 
squash all opposition and to promote the BLAs as legitimate local authorities, security 
force action was greatly increased and popular organizations were ruthlessly crushed 
and prevented from meeting (Kruss, 1987). There were mass detentions, road blockades 
into the townships, and forced removals (Hall, 1986). Kruss records that Board officials 
confronted residents at night in their homes, threatening them with eviction from their 
houses (1989: p. 179). 
Meanwhile, in spite of escalating unrest in the townships and the often-violent rejection 
of the BLAs, the government doggedly continued with its local government reform 
programme. In a bid to enhance the credibility of the Ikapa local authority and to 
seemingly empower it as a more effective administrative body in the Lagunya 
townships, the state upgraded the Cape Town Community Council. 
A new Ikapa local authority: The Cape Town Town Committee and the continuing quest 
for legitimate local government by the state 
According to the provisions laid down by the Black Local Authorities Act, the old 
Community Councils were to be gradually upgraded until they became fully-fledged 
Town or City Councils. The Cape Town Community Council was upgraded to the Cape 
Town Town Committee on 1 July 1986. Following the dissolution of the Western Cape 
Development Board in 1985, the Cape Town Town Committee became the 
responsibility of the Community Services Branch of the Cape Provincial 
Administration. 
However, upgrading to a Town Committee did not realistically provide any benefits to 
the residents of Ikapa due to ongoing administrative incapacities. The Committee 
bemoaned the futility of its newly given and long-awaited raised status, which fell short 
32 These included the installation of burglar bars, security lights, fences, first aid supplies, and security 












of their expectations. In a memorandum to the Cape Provincial Administration, the 
committee voiced its concerns at not being granted Town Council status: 
"The Town Committee is of the opinion that the legislator 
introduced town committees as an intermediate step to the higher 
status of town councils. The legislator was apparently unaware of 
the decided material differences between the various community 
councils. Most of these Councils were relatively small (seven 
members) whereas the Community Council of Cape Town had 21 
elected members and a population in excess of 300 000 people in 
its area of jurisdiction ... It is inconceivable that a town committee, 
evidently designed for a small area of jurisdiction could effectively 
control an area of jurisdiction the size of the Black residential areas 
of Cape Town". (Ikapa file 7/311125) 
Thus, the Provincial Authority was either unaware of the realities of administering the 
Ikapa area, or was not serious about the proposed incremental devolution of power to 
BLAs prescribed by the central state. 
The new Committee remained constrained by a chronic lack of financial and other 
resources. The next controversial step in the state's reform programme was intended to 
address this critical issue of access to resources for the BLAs. 
The fUllction of the Western Cape Regional Senices Council: Representation and 
resources or extended state control? 
Central government recognised that a lack of revenue and resources was seriously 
undermining effective administration by the BLAs. In an effort to allay this problem 
they introduced the Regional Services Councils (Regional Services Council Act, Act 
109 of 1985) as an intermediate regional level of local government. The multi-racially 
constituted Western Cape Regional Services Council became operational in July 1987. 
Representation on Regional Services Councils of the municipal structures was 
calculated according to their expenditure on sewerage, water, refuse, civil defence, 











industrial areas). Due to their higher expenditure, 'white' local structures therefore 
received more representation, while in contrast, BLAs as the poorest and least 
resourced areas, had little influence. The Cape Town Community Council had 10.96% 
voting power on the Western Cape Regional Services Council and initially had one 
representative, compared to the Cape Town municipality's 35,32% voting muscle and 
four representatives (Driver, 1992: p. 4; File 7/3/1/8 Ikapa Archive). 
Undeterred by its inferior position the Ikapa BLA requested funding for large 
infrastructural projects. These included high mast lighting, an electrification network 
for Nyanga, a community centre for Langa, basic services for the crowded KTC 
informal area, the upgrading of streets in Langa, as well as storm water drainage and 
pavements (File 27/3/1/8 Ikapa Archive). 33 The Regional Services Council approved 
most of these projects and, apart from circumstances where the Ikapa authority was 
constrained by a lack of staff and/or equipment, most of them were actioned (File 
7/3/1/8 Ikapa Archive). 
Thus, the Ikapa local authority's inclusion on the Regional Services Council provided 
tangible material benefits for the Lagunya township residents. In 1989, for example, the 
it awarded the Ikapa local authority over R20 million in grants and loans for 
infrastructural development costs such as surveying, street upgrading. water 
reticulation, sewerage and electricity upgrading, high mast lighting, storm water 
drainage and the building of a community centre (Ikapa file 12/1/2/2). Driver reports 
that in 1990 more than fifty percent of the Regional Service Council's budget was 
allocated to the two BLAs of Ikapa and Lingelethu West, but she comments that the 
upkeep for these new developments had to be financed by the BLAs themselves (1992: 
p. 14). This was of course impossible for the cash-strapped township authorities, who 
were inevitably accused by township residents of poor administration. Rasool asserts 
that in the townships the councillors were considered to be the exploiters responsible 
for rent increases while not providing adequate services (1989: p.21). 
33 It is interesting to note that the Council also applied for a loan of R2m to upgrade their offices at 
Fezeka (lkapa file 121112/2), This exceeded the amounts requested for all but two of their other projects 












The Regional Services Councils also served to reduce the influence of White Local 
Authorities not compliant with the state's 'reform' strategies. According to Cameron 
(1991) the Western Cape Regional Services Council was specifically structured to 
minimize the influence of the politically liberal Cape City Council by strengthening the 
Cape Provincial Administration's influence, in order to facilitate the government's own 
political objectives. This contrasts with Nieftagodien (2001), who suggests that the 
Nationalist government depended heavily on the co-operation of municipalities in the 
implementation of its policies in the major urban areas. It would seem that, in the Cape, 
the state relied more upon the Provincial authorities to institute and guide reforms. 
However, the Regional Services Councils were also the regional components in the 
state's security mechanism. Boraine (1989) explains that the National Management 
System formed an integral part of the state's urban strategies, acting as another control 
mechanism for safeguarding its interests. 
Seeking agency in the African townships using force and favours: The role of the 
National Management System in the lkapa area 
The introduction of local government reforms was contradicted by the simultaneous 
introduction of a more-centralised security establishment in the townships. The Ikapa 
local authority became incorporated into the National Management System through the 
local Joint Operations Centre. The South African Police re-established their control 
over the municipal police force at the end of 1988 (lkapa Agendas and Minutes, 
December 1988) so that the Ikapa local authority lost the direct control it had 
previously wielded over this local force. The Chief Executive Officer of the Cape Town 
Town Committee, at that time a seconded Provincial Administration official, was 
tasked to liase with the Commander of the Municipal Police and the District 
Commander of the South African Police. This effectively kept the African local 
authority officials at a distance from the decision- making and planning processes. 
According to the Ikapa records, which lacked details about the role of the Ikapa local 
authority in the Joint Operations Centre, a Law Enforcement Committee was 












Mayor/ Administrator of Ikapa, the Commander of Municipal police, and the Town 
Secretary, and other persons co-opted for specific tasks34• 
The Ikapa archive held records of inappropriate actions by the local municipal police 
among township residents. Frequent misconduct hearings were held for recruits who 
became a law unto themselves, both on and off duty (Ikapa Agendas and Minutes, 
September 1988). The Ikapa records show that the 'kitskonstables' and the municipal 
police were accommodated in the Langa hostels where they provoked the other hostel-
dwellers with their guns (Ikapa Minutes March 1989). The WCCA demanded the 
removal of the police and especially the 'kitsconstables' (Ikapa file 7/3/1170), while the 
Cape press voiced concerns for the heavy-handed actions of the new 'kitspolisie', 
recruited from among members of the African community: 
"A trend which has caused concern among human rights activists and 
victim communities alike is the induction of vigilantes into the State's 
formal law and order machinery. A more prevalent form of this may 
well take place through the appointment of community guards, a form 
of municipal police under the control of the community councillors". 
(Cape TimBS 16/10/89) 
Indeed, 'community guards' were later introduced to safeguard several of the Ikapa 
councillors. Councillor Lobi had two such armed guards placed on duty twenty-four 
hours a day after several attempts were made on his life (Ikapa file 1817/P). Township 
residents responded by threatening the guards, attempting to disarm them, and even 
burning down their houses. 
Several years later, Jan Van Eck a Member of Parliament warned that there was a 
'boere mafia' within Ikapa, but the Administrator disregarded the information, even 
though the African security officers at Ikapa were quoted in the press as claiming that 
their White commanders were members of the Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging, a 
militant right wing Afrikaans political organization (South, 29111192). 
34 Councillor Ngo, a long-serving local government official who had served on the Urban Bantu Councils 
and the Community Council system prior to the BLAs, was nominated to attend the meetings on behalf 












In a letter to Brigadier Snyman of the South African Police in the Ikapa region the 
Black Sash reiterated the resentment of the township residents towards the police: 
"It is disturbing to have to report that, at this moment in time, a large 
majority of the community in that area (Nyanga) have no respect for the 
police and perceive them to be biased in their support of the councillors 
and council body guards/employees" (Black Sash, BC1020. Advice 
Office. 30/6/92). 
Thus, the Lagunya residents who often felt the wrath of the police, had experienced the 
uncalled-for actions of municipal police, and saw them defending the councillors, came 
to see them both as the common enemy towards whom they directed their anger. 
Township residents feared the presence of spies during the States of Emergency. In an 
informal interview Thandi Mpambo, a middle-aged woman from Guguletu, commented 
on the state's methods of infiltrating community groups in order to gather information 
regarding resistance activities. She said that after public meetings were banned church 
gatherings were used as opportunities to disseminate information among township 
communities and it was commonly understood that it was in such environments that 
government spies were often at work35 (pers. comm. June 2005). 
These actions of the state generated further rejection of the local authority structures. 
The next section looks briefly at some of the issues and events that led to the eventual 
demise of the Ikapa local authority. 
The failure of the 1988 Ikapa local authority elections: a refutation of state legitimacy 
In 1988 the Cape Town Town Committee was upgraded again and became the Cape 
Town Town Council 36. In October of that year the Council officially changed its name 
35 It a similar fashion. in an interview with Sidina, he informed me that, though he was never a religious 
man, he attended regular church meetings in order to disseminate subversive information on behalf of the 
banned ANC. 
36 The Council now warranted extra staff and therefore bigger and better offices, and requested bridging 












to Ikapa Town Council in time for the national municipal elections, which were held 
despite the ongoing State of Emergency in the townships. Stringent voting 
qualifications denied many Ikapa residents the right to vote in the local elections. These 
included young people living with their parents, domestic workers, contract workers, 
sub-tenants, shack-dwellers, families on waiting lists for houses, and residents living in 
the 'wrong' group areas (Cape Action League, 1988: 9). Once again this created 
divisions between the 'legals' and the 'illegals', those with rights and those denied 
them, an artificial separation of 'insiders' from' outsiders' to the state system. 
Many political and other community organisations were banned prior to the elections, 
while curbs effectively gagged the media (Humphries & Shubane, 1989). Many local 
leaders were in jail, unable to co-ordinate resistance to the elections. Michael Fadana 
recalled that in his ward, Section Four in Guguletu, all the chairmen of the Civic were 
detained during the elections, making a mockery of the process of representation (pers. 
comm. 8 April 2005). Nevertheless, a resistance campaign was launched and many 
heeded calls for a boycott of the elections by the civics. The anonymous flier on the 
next page bears testimony to ongoing resistance to the elections. 
Only eight Jkapa candidates were nominated for the twenty vacancies on the Council 
(Cape Action League, 1988: 9)37, therefore no elections were held in the Lagunya 
townships. This necessitated an appropriate interim arrangement so that the Ikapa Town 
Council could 'legitimately' continue to function, and it was proposed that additional 
Provincial personnel be seconded (Jkapa Agendas and Minutes, September 1988). 
Having no mandate from the Lagunya communities to govern the Ikapa area, the Ikapa 
Town Council was increasingly confronted by township community groups openly 
contesting its legitimacy. The WCCA challenged in a flier circulated early in 1990 that: 
"" .as long as the authentic people's structures are not consulted before 
any decisions are taken, conflict will be the order of the day". (Ikapa file 
7/311170) 
37 Councillors pointed out that the reason for not obtaining sufficient nominations wa<; because of the 
stipulations that Councillors putting themselves up for nomination had to be up to date with rent 
payments, and in light of this, outstanding rate and service charges were waved for at least one of the 












Figure 3: Flier distributed in Guguleu on 10 March 1988 












Thus, by the early 1990s tensions in the Ikapa area were running high as civil society 
became increasingly politicised, questioning their lack of rights and the legitimacy of 
the local authority structure. 
The collapse of the Ikapa Town Council 
In March 1991, due to increasing political pressure and intimidation, as well as 
financial and administrative chaos, the Ikapa Town Council collapsed. An administrator 
appointed by the Provincial Administrator managed the council to keep it functioning. 
The Council was in chronic debt and mal-administration became rife, especially among 
seconded officials who took advantage of the chaos in order to run scams and embezzle 
money (Ikapa file 7/3/1111; Cape Argus 2412/94; Cape Argus 28/6/94; Cape Times 
2511194; Cape Times 2513/94; Die Burger 13111/93 )?8 
Communities in the lkapa area were developing a growmg number of grievances 
against the Ikapa Town Council and were increasingly by-passing the Council and 
dealing directly with the Provincial authorities, a trend that had already been 
established in the mid 1980s. A letter from the 'concerned residents of Lagunyakha', a 
civic body representing residents of Lagunya and Khayelitsha, left no doubts about 
their perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the Town Council: 
"As you have been placed, or placed yourselves in charge of our lives in 
the African townships ... you have been placed in power so fight for the 
rights of the townships ... Town Councillors do not represent the 
community so why not keep the Administrator only and forget about 
Councillors who cause trouble for themselves but stay because they are 
greedy". (Ikapa file 7/3/1/63. Dated 22.10.90) 
This illustrates the township residents' continued preference for negotiating with the 
Provincial authorities due to their inherent distrust of the councillors. 
By 1993 these irregularities had come to the attention of the Administrator of the Cape, Mr. Kobus 
Meiring, who called for a formal commission of inquiry into allegations of corrupt tendering systems. 













The three informal settlements of Browne's Farm, Black City and Miller's Camp would 
only undertake to move into a fully-developed 121-hectare site in Philippi, which had 
stood vacant for 6 months, if they fell directly under the jurisdiction of the Cape 
Provincial Administration (Cape Times, 19/311991). They feared becoming controlled 
by the councillors whom they did not trust (Development Action Group case files). 
In another case, residents of Three Squares lost faith in the Ikapa Town Council after 
six years waiting for services. (Development Action Group Case Files). Although the 
Council had made promises of upgrading these had not been kept, and there were long 
intervals when the Ikapa authority failed to communicate with the Three Squares 
community at all. Eventually the residents created blockades to prevent the Ikapa 
housing assistant from surveying and numbering their shacks, saying that they preferred 
to carry out this task themselves. Thus, the perceived remoteness of the Council was 
answered by physical distancing from the Council by the residents. 
Thus, by the early 1990s the Ikapa communities had begun consistently to take matters 
into their own hands and to openly confront the Council officials and staff. The Cape 
Times reported for example that Council staff were sent horne after two of their drivers 
were forced to stop their cars which were then set alight by protesting residents (Cape 
Times 16/10/93). In July 1992, hundreds of chanting ANC members marched on the 
Council offices, demanding the improvement of township conditions and the provision 
of more houses (Cape Argus, 2217105). The Weekend Argus (317/1993) observed "the 
tide is turning against the local authority system and a 'people' s voice' is around the 
comer". 
In May 1993, in response to increasing pressure from the community and media 
reports, President De Klerk appointed a commission of inquiry into alleged corruption 
and embezzlement of funds by members of the Ikapa Town Counci1.39 A story of bad 
management came to light. Many incidents of corruption by both councillors and 
officials were discovered. Significant misuse of leave privileges and constant 'no-
39 A full investigation was launched to discover the extent of the corruption and how much money had 
been wasted. This resulted in the immediate suspension of six local councillors (Cape Times, 28/5/93)39. 
Numerous press reports of the time covered the scandal. The investigati ve report stated that: "Ikapa' s 
financial position is still such that, unless State funds are made available soon, the provision of essential 
services and administration will collapse". (Ikapa Mintes, June 1993. Report by Eric Fry to the 












shows' at important meetings (Ikapa file 4/2/2) were the manifested responses to the 
stresses of working for the township administration by this time. 
The lkapa Town Council had descended into administrative confusion, with a financial 
deficit of about Rl, 7b (Argus, 20/10/94). The Cape Town City Council began helping 
with the administrative and service functions of the Ikapa Town Council (Cape Times 
24/5/94), immediately adopting a hard line approach to the non-payment of services by 
cutting off the power supply to all public amenities in the Ikapa area and threatening to 
reduce water pressure to private consumers should the need arise (Ikapa file 12/21212). 
At the end of 1994, Wallace Mgoqi, an attorney seconded from the Legal Resources 
Centre, was appointed to rescue the ailing council 'from its corruption ridden past' 
(Weekend Argus 15110/94). He remained at the helm until the Council was finally 
officially dissolved on the 1 February 1995, when all its assets were transferred to the 
Ikapa Transitional Metropolitan Substructure. 
By this stage the Ikapa local authority had endured more than a decade attempting to 
administer the Ikapa townships within the changing framework of apartheid ideologies. 
It had borne the brunt of political resistance campaigns, finally succumbing to gross 
internal corruption and financial ruin. 
Concluding remarks 
The undercurrent of political resistance and the turning tide towards political reform 
created a complex environment in which the new Black Local Authority structures, 
introduced after the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act, struggled to gain legitimacy. 
However, this research has shown that in the contested political space of the turbulent 
1980s and 1990s, these were difficult times for the officials too as they endeavoured to 
administer poor, under-resourced urban areas, against a background of political 
resistance, CIVIC organizing and the undermining influence of the Provincial 
Administration that challenged their authority. 
Despite the introduction of the Western Cape Regional Services Council, which 
provided capital and resources for development, the Ikapa BLA was unable to maintain 












System from the mid-1980s undermined the legitimacy of the local authority still 
further, engineering divisions between township residents. The failed 1988 elections 
denied the Ikapa authority a mandate from the township communities, increasing its 
legitimacy to govern the townships, while mandating the alternative civic structures. 
BLA history in the Ikapa area has illustrated that the frustration of township residents 
was often triggered by grievances related to housing. Access to housing was tied 
inextricably to rights to the city and issues of legality and legitimacy that positioned 
people either inside or outside of the state system. In the next chapter the scale of 
research shifts back to the national level, exploring the general political, ideological and 
policy changes that shaped housing administration under the BLAs. This focus is 
critical in order to understand the particular local-area experiences of housing 
administration explored in later chapters, where I examine the realities of policy 













HOUSING POLICY & ADMINISTRATION IN AFRICAN URBAN AREAS: A 
BRIEl<' HISTORICAL EXPLORATION 
Introduction 
After 1948, housing policy was used as a means to implement the Nationalist 
government's social development strategy (Wilkinson, 1998). Couched within the 
Group Areas Act of 1950 (Mabin, 1992), the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952, 
and the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act of 1970, this legislation effectively denied 'non-
White' people rights to reside in the urban areas by tying access to accommodation with 
rights to reside in the city (Chaskalson & Duncan, 1984). Housing rights were also 
linked to Influx Control policies first introduced under the 1952 Native (Urban) Areas 
Act (Grest, 1988; Planact, 1989), which drastically reduced the rights of Africans to 
live in or even visit urban areas and limited their access to 'approved' accommodation, 
allowing only a minority to qualify for permanent residence (Chaskalson & Duncan, 
1984). Failure to find accommodation meant endorsement out of an urban area. Thus, 
government housing policy effectively divided township dwellers into 'legal insiders' 
with access to state housing and 'illegal outsiders' denied these same rights and access. 
African housing was also historically administered separately by the state. Thus, 
although the Housing Act of 1957 established a general Department of Housing, it 
created a separate housing mechanism, the Bantu Housing Board, in order for local 
authorities, welfare institutions and housing utility companies to administer housing for 
Africans, funded by the National Housing Fund (De Loor, 1992). 
State-housing construction for African urban dwellers reached its peak in the 1950s and 
1960s (Mabin & Parnell, 1984). However, from 1968, the Department of Bantu Affairs 
halted any further provision of African family housing in the cities (Grest, 1988; 
Wilkinson, 1998). In terms of the state's separate development policy, all further 
housing construction for urban Africans was restricted to the Bantustan areas (Parnell, 
1992), in an attempt to stem the influx of 'illegal' migrants from the rural areas. These 
policies created a chronic shortage of housing in the urban townships with which 












Prior to 1971 white local authorities were responsible for housing urban Africans. Grest 
(1988) remarks, however, that in several large traditionally liberal metropolitan areas 
central government tenets were undermined and the official policy line was often by-
passed. Heymans (1988) and Todes and Watson (1986) show that the City Council of 
Cape Town, for example, strongly resisted the state's separate development policies. 
Many local government officials in such areas were morally compromised in appJying 
rigid apartheid doctrine and the conesponding state policies when executing municipal 
functions such as housing administration. It was inevitable therefore, that the state, 
wary of the ability of local authorities to obstruct or compromise efficient policy 
implementation, such as Influx Control and the Pass Laws, would eventually re-
centralise control of African urban areas and administration of housing away from local 
authority structures (Rasool, 1984 ; Wilkinson, 1998). 
There is a large body of research on African urban housing. Parnel1 and Mabin (1984; 
1995) have described apartheid policies relating to urban rights and housing that 
provide substantive background information. This is complemented by Goodlad (1996), 
Hendler (1991), Seekings (1990) and Wilkinson (1984) among others, who offer 
general observations around housing policy, and Mazur and Qangule (1995), Elias 
(1983; 1984) and Fast (1995a; 1995b) who have focused on housing in the Cape 
townships. The aim of my research is to trace an historical account of African housing 
administration during the BLA era, exploring the realities of implementation at this 
turning point in South African political history. This was a time when apartheid 
ideology was in a state of flux and African township communities were beginning to 
contest the legitimacy and agency of the state, resulting in major institutional and 
legislative changes that impacted directly on township housing administration. 
This chapter provides a background to the local-area study in chapters five and six. It 
begins with a brief description of the housing conditions prevailing in African urban 
areas prior to the inception of the BLAs. I describe the permit system that effectively 
divided township communities between those with legal rights to live and work in the 
urban areas, the 'insiders', and those lacking rights and legitimacy, the 'outsiders'. My 
intention in providing this brief historical introduction is to contextualise the changes in 
housing policy and administrative practice that were introduced during the BLA period. 












interrogating the nature of changing government ideology regarding African urban 
rights to permanent residence in the city, and the corresponding shift in state strategy 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. 1 show how this engendered new legislation such as 
home ownership schemes, and changing administrative systems. as the state gradually 
began to acknowledge the rights of Africans to permanent residence in the cities and to 
provide more secure forms of tenure for 'legal' urban Africans. 
The nature of the housing crisis inherited by the BLAs: Backgrounding the 
housing issues 
The state's strict adherence to apartheid ideology caused a growing fiscal crisis 
(Swilling, 1988b). Nowhere was this more evident than in the realm of African urban 
housing (Seekings, 1988a). From the late 1960s the state withdrew from the provision 
of African housing, constructing no further rental accommodation (Watson & 
McCarthy, 1998).40 De Loor (1992: 62) reports that the government concentrated 
instead on stimulating development in the self-governing territories to discourage the 
influx of poor rural dwellers to the cities. Rasool (1984) asserts that the right to live in 
an urban area became tied increasingly to the availability of housing. 
The shortage of urban African housing was exacerbated by increasingly stringent 
control over access to urban accommodation using a permit system controlled by the 
local authorities (Rasool, 1984). Under this permit system Township Superintendents 
were placed in a powerful pivotal position in township life, responsible for allocating 
rental accommodation and issuing residential permits. Meer (1984) describes this 
permit system demonstrating the grading process that established varying degrees of 
legitimacy to urban Africans. 
The 'apartheid permit system 
During the 1970s and 1980s several permits were available to African urban dwellers: 
40 By the 1980s government expenditure on housing amounted to a paltry 39, of the GDP, often even as 
low as 2.61k according to the World Bank figures. By 199011 it had reduced further to only 2, J o/c, 












• Residential permit - In terms of Section 38(8) (a) of the Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945),41 this meant that an African person could 
rent a dwelling in a township area if they qualified as a 'legal' resident. Permit 
holders had to supply the personal particulars of everyone living in the house, 
except lodgers, who were separately classified. Rental was payable to the 
Administration Board.42 
• Certificate of Occupation of a Board Dwelling - upon payment of a deposit 
the holder of such a certificate could 'buy' a dwelling. The certificate holder 
was granted a housing loan by the Board in respect of the unpaid balance of the 
purchase price and had the right to occupy and use the dwelling and the site on 
which the dwelling was situated with his dependants. The certificate indicated 
the personal details of the holder and all persons residing with that person, 
excluding lodgers. A certificate holder could let the dwelling to another person 
who had satisfied the Superintendent that they qualified to remain in the area in 
terms of The Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act Section 10(1) (a) or (b). 
• Lodger's Permit enabled a person to lodge with a registered occupier. To 
qualify for a Lodger's Permit the Superintendent had to be satisfied that the 
person had not previously refused to accept accommodation in a dwelling, 
hostel or other accommodation provided by the Board. A dependent of a 
prospective lodger who was accommodated in a building or dwelling on the 
residential site concerned did not need to obtain a lodger's permit. The pennit 
was valid for as long as the permit fees were paid monthly in advance, or until 
the permit was withdrawn in terms of the regulations. A lodger's pennit could 
not be transferred and was cancelled when the permit holder changed residence. 
• Hostel permit was available to people over 18 years of age, through 
application to the hostel superintendent, who would issue a hostel permit if a 
bed was available and he was satisfied that the applicant was a 'legal' resident, 
was employed in the area, and agreed to be examined by a doctor. The applicant 
had to make an advance payment to the superintendent of an amount determined 
41 According to Regulation 7 of Chapter 2 of the Regulations Governing the Control and Supervision of 
Urban Bantu Residential Areas and Relevant Matters, published in Government Notice 1036 dated 14 
June 1968. 
-12 In 1979. a new revised Regulation 7 offered a slightly more secure fonn of tenure to 'legal' residents, 
providing that anyone already holding a residential permit under the previous Regulation 7 was entitled 












by him before a bed was allocated. Thereafter every hostel resident had to pay 
the prescribed amount for his accommodation to the hostel superintendent.4~ 
• Accommodation permit - issued to a person with no legal right to residence in 
the township, who wished to enter and remain in an African urban area, 
excluding a hostel, for more than 72 hours. A fee was payable to the 
superintendent. A person would only be issued with an accommodation pennit 
if the superintendent deemed that person was a fit and proper person to be in an 
African residential area. 
• Site permit - for erection of a private dwelling. The superintendent of the 
residential area allocated the permit. Applicants had to prove that they qualified 
to live in the area in terms of Section lO(1)(a) or (b), and give proof of their 
financial ability to build a dwelling. A person could, however, be granted a site 
permit on the Board's recommendation and with the approval of the Chief 
Commissioner, even if he did not qualify on other grounds. The township 
manager gave instructions to the permit holder regarding the method of 
construction, materials that could be used, and once the building plans had been 
approved, the superintendent would issue a permit. 
The township superintendent had the power to withdraw any of the above permits at his 
own discretion, without furnishing reasons for withdrawal (Meer, 1984). 
The permit system thus firmly established African people as 'outsiders' in urban areas, 
requiring them to have 'legal' rights if they wished to reside in the townships, which 
were peripherally situated far from the urban centres. The grading of the permits 
introduced a form of stratification among African urban dwellers, which I will argue 
created perpetual divisions not only between the holders of different permits but also 
between those who 'legally' qualified for permits and those informal dwellers who 
remained 'illegal' by not qualifying to hold pennits. This had profound ramifications 
for the life styles and coping strategies of urban Africans. 
43 This system was open to abuse by corrupt officials. For instance. an Ikapa councillor was found to be 
overcharging for hostel space and pocketing the difference himself (Cape Times, 25/1/94). He was later 












The permit system formalised the state's artificially created divisions between township 
residents, giving access to state housing to those with more legitimate rights to the city. 
So, for example, those who were 'borners', Le. born in the city, had more rights than 
the 'amagoduka', those who came from the rural areas and had no legal rights to stay in 
the city. Amagoduka frequently could therefore only live 'illegally' as invisible 
'outsiders' in the informal settlements on the urban periphery. Such divisions, I argue, 
became entrenched in the minds of township dwellers and administrators, stratifying 
African urban society into groups such as: 
Legal residents with access to state houses 
Backyard shack dwellers with residency rights, but no access to state housing 
Hostel-dwellers, considered temporary sojourners, with rights only to the 
migrant labour hostels and not to permanent residency 
Informal settlement dwellers with no rights at alL suffering constant harassment 
from the local authorities and situated for the most part peripherally to other 
township dwellers. 
Lawrence, a retired Director of Housing in the Western Cape township areas, spoke of 
the frustration of local officials trying to deal with the clash of interests between the 
state's ideological stance on curbing African urbanisation and the reality of the acute 
housing shortage and how local housing officials circumvented legislation of their own 
accord: 
"There was a moratorium placed on housing ... there were no 
state funds made available for housing for Blacks. It was the 
policy that no state funds were made available. You had the 
dilemma already of overcrowding and natural increase of 
population. So, we tried to devise a legal way to overcome it. It 
was a project that I am particularly proud of. .. we converted the 
whole of Langa hostels into married quarters" (Lawrence, 
pers.comm. May 2005). 
It would seem therefore that some local officials, frustrated with the housing situation 












However, the state's ideological framework could not accommodate the concept of 
African home ownership, which would have acknowledged permanent residency rights 
for urban Africans. The Minister of Co-operation and Development in the early 1980s 
stated categorically that the government would not consider freehold rights for urban 
Africans, despite the Grosskopft Commission's recommendation to the contrary in 
order to effectively address the housing crisis44 (Survey of Race Relations, 1981). The 
Croesser Working Group later made similar recommendations regarding the 
introduction of 'African' home ownership as a means to develop a financial base for the 
new BLAs after 1982 (Survey of Race Relations, 1983). 
In spite of these and other similar recommendations from the private sector the state 
still necessitated a gradual ideological shift before it could accommodate the idea of 
permanent tenure rights for urban Africans. 
The state's quest for legitimacy: changes in housing strategy and policy 
Growing discontent among African urban communities from 1976 to the 1980s, forced 
government to concede that new housing was essential to maintain 'quiescence' in the 
townships and to 'depoliticise' the issue of housing (Seekings, 1990). Open resistance 
prompted an ideological paradigm shift acknowledging the inevitability of African 
urbanisation and the importance of controlling and directing the process (Royston, 
2002: p. 197). This change in attitude pre-empted the government's decision to provide 
finance for the provision of additional township housing for the first time since the late 
1960s. 
Seekings (1990) believes that it was at this moment in the late 1970s that the state 
began to accept that it lacked adequate resources to address the housing shortage alone. 
It slowly opened up opportunities for the involvement of the township residents 
themselves, then their employees, and later construction companies in the provision of 
township housing. The establishment of the Urban Foundation in 1977 reflected the 
growing awareness and concern among the business community that their profits 
44 Although delivered to government in May 1981, the Grosskopft report was in fact never made public 
because it was contrary to the state's official stance at that time on African rights 10 permanence in the 












related directly to the social well being of their work force (Boaden, 1979). The private 
sector had for some time expressed a keen interest in becoming involved in both the 
financing and construction of houses for its African work force. It had been constrained 
from so doing by government policy, but was finally invited to participate in the 
process (Wilkinson, 1984; 1998) as the state began to relinquish some of its 
autonomous control over African housing. Seekings (1990) suggests that the 
involvement of other role players in the provision of housing was a calculated effort to 
depoliticise housing by disassociating it to some extent from the state. 
The government wanted to limit its own involvement in urban African development to 
the provision of basic infrastructure and services, and the provision of housing for only 
lower income groups, with the private sector playing a bigger role in other housing 
provision (Survey of Race Relations, 1983), placing increasing responsibility for 
housing onto the individual township residents (Rasool, 1984). According to 
(Wilkinson, 1984): 
" .. .it was clear that the machinery of the conventional housing 
delivery system, built up over a period of some thirty years, 
had already been adjudged to be too costly and too 
cumbersome for the task that lay ahead ... the future direction of 
African housing policy would be dictated by the concept of 
'self-help' rather than that of 'state responsibility'" (Wilkinson, 
1984p.19). 
Changes in the administration of urban African housing reflected changing political 
ideologies, as township administration shifted on a continuum between strongly 
centralised systems and independent local government controL The state had begun to 
acknowledge the necessity for more substantial local government reforms 
encompassing fundamental changes to African urban housing policy, specifically with 












First attempts at 'Black' home ownership: Letting some of the 'outsiders' in and 
engineering 'class' difFerence in township society 
Up until mid-1978 the only form of 'home ownership' available to urban Africans had 
been a thirty year leasehold title which carried no transferable rights and was subject to 
stringent conditions (Wilkinson, 1984). In June 1978, however, the 99-year leasehold 
system was introduced in terms of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act (No. 97 of 
1978), an amendment to the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (No. 25 of 1945), 
in order to concede more security of 'tenure' to disgruntled township residents seeking 
increased residency rights.45 
In terms of this new legislation, a 'qualified' person was able to obtain the right to 
occupy land owned by the State and to erect, alter and demolish buildings on this land 
for a period of 99 years. The 'owner' was given a 'Certificate of Right of Leasehold' 
that constituted an effective title (Boaden, 1979). To stimulate community buy-in for 
this leasehold scheme, potential purchasers were not required to use a conveyancer or to 
pay stamp or transfer duties. Up to that time building societies had been minimally 
involved in the financing of African housing because they had only been permitted to 
make loans against security of freehold title, which had historically been denied to 
African people. However, building societies had always expressed the desire to fund 
Black housing if the tenure regulations could be changed, and they were now given the 
right to grant mortgage loans (Boaden, 1979). In spite of these changes, the new 
leasehold scheme was only accessible to those who could raise financial assistance. 
Loans from building societies were not available to low-income earners because they 
were considered to be high risk. 
Wilkinson (1984) explains that one of the subtle intentions of the 99-year leasehold 
scheme was to develop a moderate African middle class of 'homeowners' in the 
townships, offering the state a degree of legitimacy from an influential sector of the 
African community within the townships. However, this rudimentary form of 
homeownership held little appeal for the majority of township dwellers. 
45 Allhough this replaced the previous 30-year leasehold scheme, no provision was initially made for the 
many homeowners who already owned their houses under the 30-year regulations. At a later stage, 
people who had bought homes under the 30-year home ownership scheme were able 10 convert to 99-












Wilkinson (1984) remarks that, in terms of increased security of tenure, leasehold 
offered a questionable improvement to prospective 'homeowners' as, despite 
simultaneous and substantial rent increases, it remained cheaper to rent a house than to 
purchase one under the leasehold scheme. Ownership on such terms offered little long-
term benefits to households already living on the breadline (ibid). The Survey of Race 
Relations (1982) suggests that the slow pace of the 99-year leasehold scheme was due 
to three specific factors: 
(1) Psychological resistance of Africans to the offer of leasehold when freehold rights 
were available to other race groups, once again setting Africans apart from other 
race groups with greater tenure rights; 
(2) Increased initial and monthly expenditure was beyond the means of most urban 
Africans; and 
(3) Uncertainty about the potential of home ownership with regard to inheritance, 
occupation rights and investment, the former which had great cultural importance to 
the amaXhosa people of the townships. 
In response to the failure of township residents to accept the new tenure option, the 
government decided that they needed to make homeownership more appealing by 
making rental options less so, raising rental s to 'realistic' levels, while reducing the 
costs of homeownership as far as possible (Wilkinson, 1984). The rent boycotts that 
followed in the BLA period were triggered by the increase in rental introduced under 
their administration. Mabin & Parnell (1984) suggest that tenants in the townships were 
therefore faced with the dilemma of either buying their homes, which were beyond the 
means of many, or accepting increased rentals, which would impoverish them anyway. 
Failure to accept the offer of homeownership reflected an inherent and historic 
suspicion of government motives and sincerity, particularly as no corresponding 
amendments had been made to the hated 'Section 10' regulations, which governed the 
rights of Africans to live in the urban areas. These legislative shifts can be better 
understood within the context of the changes that were happening simultaneously at 













The failures of housing administration under the Black Local Authorities 
'Of all the problems of development confronting the black local authorities 
none is as crucial as the challenge to house their inhabitants. Because the 
possession of a house is so intimate to the individual, affecting as it does the 
well-being, social status and the stability of the family unit. the housing 
backlogs which exist in almost all the black areas are potentially a very 
explosive issue' (Rammala, 1987: p. 14). 
As Rammala, a BLA official with personal experience of local township administration, 
has expressed, housing was a critical issue for both local communities and the local 
authorities, representing the fuse capable of igniting further community protest. 
Shubane & Madiba (1992) assert that by the time of the BLAs, the gradual erosion of 
control by local authority structures due both to their own incapacities and because of 
the informal strategies established among township residents to circumvent official 
housing policy, had led to an almost total breakdown of formal housing administration. 
It was said that BLAs seldom knew themselves who occupied each house in their 
jurisdiction (ibid). 
In response to the stringency and unfairness of the apartheid laws, contingency 
measures had developed within the townships, such as passing houses on from 
generation to generation without informing the local authorities (Shubane & Madiba 
1992). Therefore, records in local authority offices became outdated and inaccurate 
resulting in confusion, a legacy that has continued to muddle registration of legal tenure 
until today. 
Residents' distrust of the township housing administration system stemmed from the 
days of the both the Urban Bantu Councils, euphemistically referred to in the townships 
as 'Useless Boys Clubs' (Swilling, 1988), and the Community Councils under the 
control of the Administration Boards, when corrupt officials could be bribed to re-
allocate houses (Cornell, 1983). In her thesis Fast (1995a) describes the duplicity of 
local officials in the Nyanga township.46 Kahanovitz (1988) suggests that the 
reappearance of officials with previous reputations for corruption, undermined the 
46 Fast refers to 'an epidemic of bribery' in Nyanga during the era of the Urban Bantu Councils, while 
Administration Boards officials later gave preferential treatment to people belonging to the Ciskei or 
Transkei Independence Parties. "[This 1 scandal reverberated in the years that followed, for administration 












credibility of new local authority structures in the townships. The Survey of Race 
Relations reported that there were: 
" ... frequent allegations of bribery in connection with the allocation of 
houses as well as complaints of unfair competition. with councillors 
allegedly allocating business sites to themselves or their relatives." 
(Survey of Race Relations, 1985: p. 87) 
The story of a New Crossroads resident illustrates the kind of corruption that residents 
were experiencing. Ndzumeka, an elderly man who was one of the founding members 
of the Old Crossroads settlement and deeply distrustful of local government officials 
even today, recalls that having heard stories about a government official called Basson 
illegally 'selling' houses in order to make money, he himself went to the housing office 
to trick the official. Posing as an interested buyer he proceeded to buy his own house in 
New Crossroads. Little realising that Ndzumeka was already the legitimate 'owner' of 
the house, Basson began to fill in the paperwork and to go through the motions of 
'selling' him the house, whereupon Ndzumeka confronted him asking him: 
"How many times [have] you sold this house before you sell it to the 
ownerT' (Ndzumeka, pers. comm. 23 April 2005) 
Ndzumeka further explained how the officials took advantage of the confusion resulting 
from new leasehold legislation: 
"People did not know the laws of the pass of the ownership, so they 
[the officials] were also using the people to extend their pockets 
(pers. comm. 23 April 2005) 
Similar observations were reflected in a government survey conducted among township 
residents in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area in 1988 (Department of 
Public Works and Land Affairs, 1989: p. 24). 
In 1983, the government announced its intention to sell off more than half a million 












discounts in their 'Great housing sale' (Wilkinson, 1984). Mabin & Parnell (1984) 
suggest that this scheme should have been referred to as the 'right of occupation' 
scheme rather than 'homeownership' because in reality it only gave the purchaser 
indefinite rights to occupy a house as opposed to the earlier 'leasehold' scheme which 
had given the purchaser rights to the land for 99 years. The Department of Public 
Works and Land Affairs annual report of 1984 reveals that the cadastral surveying of all 
the existing African townships that this necessitated, in order to officially register 
properties to their 'owners', created a huge increase in the work load of the offices of 
the Surveyor General, further compromised by the severe shortage of skilled 
technicians (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs, 1984: p 51). Mabin & 
Parnell (1984) suggest that the government's motives for offering home-ownership 
were not realistic becausc many new homeowners would be forced for economic 
reasons to sell to profiteering landlords. Township residents did not take up the offer 
with any alacrity.47 
However, the government reform programme changed gear following the abolition of 
Influx Control and the Pass Laws (Fast, 1995a). These groundbreaking changes in state 
urban policy then allowed for the subsequent lifting of the prohibition on African 
property buying and housing development in the townships. 
To create and normalise the housing market in African areas, prevIOUS 99-year 
leasehold rights were upgraded to statutory rights under the Black Communities 
Development Act of 1984 (Latsky, 1987a). From 1986 these could be registered at the 
Deeds Office (Latsky, 1987b), granting Black urban dwellers full freehold ownership 
rights for the first time, converting previous tenure forms to ownership. Latsky (1987a) 
explains that in 1986 the Black Communities Development Amendment Act 
represented a comprehensive change to the original act, offering a choice of title forms: 
either a 99-year leasehold right to an erf, or the conversion of an existing leasehold 
47 Sales started off slowly and this led to an extension of the opportunity to take up the 99-year leasehold 
offer until the end of June 1986 with special incentives added. such as the sale offered at between 3SO/C to 
409( of the selling price with government financial assistance (Cape Times 16/4/8S). a 2SO/C reduction for 
a cash sale for houses priced at R2 500 and upwards. while those costing less could be sold only for cash 
at a 30O/C reduction. A 5o/c reduction was offered to people who had occupied thc dwelling as tenants for 













right to one of ownership. In effect a form of incremental tenure was offered, with 
leasehold a cheaper stage en route to full title. 
A township establishment process similar to the process that already existed in White, 
Coloured or Indian areas was legislated. Another amendment to the Black Communities 
Development Act in October 1987 was introduced to simplify and speed up the process 
of opening township registers. This made the preliminary consolidation and sub-
division of underlying farm portions unnecessary (Survey of Race Relations, 1987). 
The identification of local area boundaries, which were an integral part of the township 
establishment process, often caused delays in the opening of township registers, which 
were critical to the process of transferring ownership (Royston, 2002). Although the 
fault of the Provincial authorities, irate township dwellers blamed their local township 
authorities for these hold-Ups. Another delay was often due to a missing conveyancing 
step in the township establishment process as Latsky explains: 
"Prior to 15 September 1986, townships were established in Black 
areas for the purposes of leasehold only. Since the leasehold is 
granted in respect of land, and is not land itself, it was deemed 
sufficient to comply with land survey requirements only ... 
consolidation diagrams and general plans were prepared and 
approved but. .. the corresponding conveyancing steps were often not 
taken.,. ,[and] land cannot be transferred in ownership nor.. , can the 
relevant leasehold be converted into ownership."(1987b 18) 
It is evident that the registration process was not held up by bureaucratic ineptitudes at 
local government level, but by the tardy or non-existent application of the essential 
. 48 conveyancmg step. 
Meanwhile, because the state had made no adequate financial provision for their new 
local authority structures it was inevitable that the BLAs would be forced to resort to 
increases in rents and service tariffs in order to raise the funds, prompting rent and 
48Later fieldwork establishes that current tenure issues in the Ikapa area are still related to conveyancing 
hold-ups and the blame continues to be placed at the door of the local authorities (Dyantyis, pers. 












service boycotts in the mid-1980s. In response township communities initiated rent 
boycotts, beginning in late 1984. 
In spite of the political call to challenge the BLAs and orchestrated resistance from the 
civics, Shubane & Madiha (1992) believe that the majority of the poor saw the rent 
boycotts as an 'economic necessity' more than a means of political expression, 
obviating the need to pay rent. Thus, when settlements were later negotiated at local 
level by the civics, the boycotts did not end. Many township residents were already in 
arrears prior to the rent increases due to their struggle to survive in the economically 
stressed township environments.49 The boycotts also undermined the government's 
homeownership scheme (Survey of Race Relations, 1988/9). 
The introduction of the Conversion of Certain Rights to Leasehold Act (No. 81 of 
1988) provided tenants with the additional option of converting to leasehold or to a 
common law lease and for the first time placed no restrictions on who could gain access 
to housing (Todes & Walker, 1991). Thus, the artificially created divisions of African 
society that had previously denied many sectors of the township population access to 
housing were gradually relaxed. The Act also established a formal review process 
whereby tenants could appeal against the allocation decisions of the township 
authorities through the courts (ibid). In practice the old systems were for the most part 
retained, continuing, for example, the practice of re-allocating a house after the death of 
the registered occupier to another family member once this had been agreed upon in 
negotiation with the family concerned (ibid).5o 
The inadequacies of the official processes to increase tenure security for township 
residents during the 'Great Housing Sale' (Lamont, 1985) were compounded by the 
lack of support for the campaign despite an intense media campaign launched by the 
government to overcome apathy and opposition from the township residents (Mabin & 
Parnell, 1984). According to the Race Relations Survey (1988/9), by January 1989 less 
than one percent of sales of houses to African urban dwellers had taken place under 
49 As an example within the Ikapa area, the rems in New Crossroads had risen by an average of 6% per 
annum so that between 1982 and 1993 rents had effectively been increased by R29.00 per month and the 
water rates were added to this (Kaplan, 1997). 












freehold. However a government report produced in 1989 records the 'success' of the 
leasehold scheme: 
"Good progress is still being made with the registration of 99-year 
leasehold rights in Black townships, and since the third quarter of 
1988, when the 10 000 mark per quarter was exceeded for the first 
time, this level of performance has been maintained ... The 100 oooth 
transaction was registered during the first quarter of 1989" 
(Department of Public Works and Land Affairs, 1989: p. 32). 
These figures mask the failure of the campaign to sell over half a million state houses. 
This was due to a large degree to the politicisation of the housing sale by the civics, as 
well as to the administrative incapacity of the township authorities, many of which were 
staffed by untrained Defence Force personnel after the collapse and subsequent revival 
of many of the BLAs during the State of Emergency. 
Recognising that access to credit was crucial in order for tenants to buy their homes 
(Boaden, 1979), the government began providing a limited capital subsidy to 
prospective buyers through the establishment of the Independent Development Trust in 
1991 (Goodlad, 1996). By 1991 about a third of the national housing stock had been 
sold off under 99-year leasehold (Gardner, 1997; Goodlad, 1996). 
Meanwhile. in a further reshuffling and restructuring of government departments, the 
Department of Planning, Provincial Affairs and National Housing was rationalized in 
1991. Responsibility for provincial affairs and the coordination of urbanization was 
awarded to the newly created Department of Registration and Land Affairs. Housing 
administration became a separate affair under the new Department of Local 
Government and National Housing. Housing affairs were further divided between those 
considered to be general i.e. for all popUlation groups, and those reserved specifically 
for African housing. Thus, even at the dawn of the 1990s, African housing 
administration was still considered a separate entity, set apart from general housing 
administration. The African Housing Division of the central state co-operated with the 
four Provincial Administrations to formulate guidelines for the development of the 
African townships. coordinating township development programmes at national level. 












housing through the Provincial Administrations (De Loor, 1992). The Department of 
Local Government and National Housing was empowered to provide finance to the 
National Housing Fund and to fund the first-time homebuyers subsidy scheme for 
Africans. 
These institutional and legislative changes were taking place against the background of 
political resistance and escalating confrontation in the townships, forcing the state to 
concede increasing concessions to township residents. Acknowledging that housing 
grievances underlay much of the township communities' resentment towards the state, 
and had initiated the rent boycotts, the granting of new housing and residency rights 
was expected to diffuse some of the frustrations of the urban residents. 
Thus, on 1 September 1991, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (No. 112 of 
1991) provided for the conversion of all leasehold to freehold rights as soon as 
township registers had been opened (Ikapa file 2/3/1). The opening of township 
registers, which were legal documents laying down conditions under which owners 
could make use of their land (Royston, 1998) was a lengthy process and necessitated a 
proper survey approved by the Surveyor General. Thus, policy decisions were not 
reflected or experienced on the ground very quickly, being subject to long bureaucratic 
delays. Added pressure from civic associations ensured that occupants were not charged 
fees for the privatisation of state rental stock, known as the Transfer of Housing Process 
(Royston, 1998, 2002). 
The inability of townships dwellers to raise adequate finance to purchase their own 
homes was impeding housing reforms. Therefore, in November 1992, the Discount 
Benefit Scheme was introduced (Ikapa file 6/51211 ). The Minister of Local 
Government, National Housing and Manpower explained the motivation for this new 
deal in a press statement: 
"By taking this decision, the Government also reaffirms its commitment 
to wiping out the growing housing backlog within the shortest possible 
time. This can only succeed if all the role players in the housing field 













To the state the granting of urban rights and substantial housing concessions to urban 
Africans were the panacea for diffusing township resistance to the state. 
Mofokeng (1996) explains that, as before with the granting of leasehold rights, the 
implementation of freehold rights was hampered by administrative incompetence, 
suspicion and mistrust of residents towards their local council, previously unreported 
deceased estates, disputes between families. numerous unrecorded informal sales or 
changes of tenancy, and confusion among residents themselves.51 
Slowly the state was moving towards major political reforms. The National Housing 
Forum was established in 1992, in response once again to several housing-related 
issues: the increasing mobilisation against the state's adoption of a site-and-service 
approach to addressing the housing backlog, as well as the violence sparked by the 
appalling living conditions of hostel-dwellers (Royston, 2002). The ANC, SANCO as 
well as worker's unions and representatives from the business sector were included in 
this body, which, Royston (2002) explains, became a forum for the negotiation of a new 
h . 1· 51 OUSIng po lCy.~-
This brief history of housing policy and administration ends here, at the dawn of the 
new South Africa, with the formulation of the Housing White Paper, which clearly 
stated that security of tenure would in future guide the government's approach to 
housing provision for the poor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed housing policy and administration for urban Africans during 
the apartheid era. It has illustrated how government policy successfully set urban 
Africans spatially and legally apart from other urban dwellers, establishing them as 
'outsiders' in peripherally situated townships, where they were denied legitimate rights 
51 Problems were also experienced in the Ikapa area, and no doubt in others as well. with the completion 
of people·s identification numbers on their applications forms. Many Ikapa residents did not possess 
identity books and had only their old 'pass books· or 'green books' with which to identify themselves. 
Although these were accepted as proof of identity, people were encouraged to apply for identity 
documents in order 10 speed up the process (Ikapa File 18171P). 
5:: The policy that resulted from their deliberations became, in fact, the blueprint for the housing white 
paper in 1994. Baumann (1998) suggests that the negotiating process did not truly represent all South 












to urban residence or accommodation. Strict adherence to apartheid ideologies resulted 
in a critical shortage of housing, appalling conditions of overcrowding, and the 
proliferation of squatter settlements in urban areas. 
The acceptance of the inevitability of increasing African urbanisation caused 
fundamental changes in state ideology, driven by increasingly voluble township 
resistance orchestrated by the civics and political organisations, and motivated to a 
large extent by housing grievances in the townships. This resulted in the gradual 
introduction of legislative concessions granting urban Africans increasing rights to the 
city. However, the introduction of home-ownership failed to address the lack of 
legitimacy and the plight of the 'illegal' residents in urban areas, for whom this was not 
a viable option due to financial constraints, while the critical shortage of housing and 
chronic overcrowding among 'legal' established township residents was not assuaged. 
Having drawn the legislative and political background to the administration of housing 
in poor African urban areas, this chapter has set the context within which to understand 
the manifestations of changing housing administration at a more detailed scale in the 
next chapter, which unravels the nature of housing administration under the Ikapa BLA. 
Research at the local level is critical in order to understand the realities of implementing 
state housing policy, to interrogate the relationships that developed between township 
residents and the local authority officials carrying out their administrative duties during 













A HISTORY O}~ CONTESTED AGENCY: HOUSING IN LAGUNY A UNDER 
THE IKAPA LOCAL AUTHORITY 
, ... the local state may find itself tom between central government 
policy and the pressure emanating from local social relations in 
response to local-specific housing conditions.' (Kemeny J, 1992: 44) 
Introduction 
Housing was employed as a form of social control by the apartheid regime (Fast, 
1995a; Planact, 1989). Although historically housing policy was formulated at central 
government level, local authorities had area-specific impacts on the provision and 
administration of housing within the boundaries of the national policy framework 
(Driver, 1992). This concurs with Dickens et al (1985: p 238-41) who theorise that 
local government functions to mediate between the central state and the local area 
around housing issues particular to that environment. Local government was situated at 
the interface between the state and local township communities, adapting to localised 
situations. 
This chapter traces the administration of housing in the Lagunya townships during the 
BLA period. The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards were responsible for African 
housing administration prior to and during the BLA era; therefore I begin this chapter 
with a brief account of housing administration under the Western Cape Administration 
Board, before exploring that of the Ikapa local authority system. I explain the particular 
circumstances in which the Council found itself. and then investigate the manifestations 
of changing housing policies in the Lagunya townships and how local communities 
responded to the actions of the Council. I explore the roles of the Ikapa local authority 
both as a state institution and as a neighbourhood organisation, investigating how state 
housing policy was reshaped not only in local contexts, but in particular 
neighbourhoods, such as New Crossroads, through official practice and engagement. 
Exploring the introduction of home ownership options within the Ikapa context, I 
discuss the shortcomings of new processes that were established to give greater security 
of tenure 10 registered occupants in Ikapa. This chapter thus explores the realities of 












level, analysing the expenences of a local authority with no public mandate to 
legitimate its administration and thus the ways township organisations contested local 
government agency to allocate housing in the Ikapa area. 
I begin with a brief record of housing administration under the Western Cape 
Administration Board, painting a background to housing allocation in the Ikapa Black 
Local Authority (BLA) structure that followed. 
Housing administration under the Western Cape Administration Board 
In an att~mpt to re-centralise control of the African townships away from the local tiers 
of government, the new Bantu Affairs Administration Boards were introduced in 1971. 
Although twenty-two boards were originally established, this was later rationalised to 
fourteen jurisdictional areas. The introduction of the Boards marked the peak of the 
apartheid regime and the entrenchment of apartheid doctrine, manifested in the 
Verwoerdian idealism of many government officials.53 
The Western Cape Bantu Affairs Administration Board was established to oversee all 
the townships of the Western Cape. In an interview Lawrence, a retired local 
government official, recalled the institutional headaches that the introduction of 
Administration Boards brought about for local government officials as the 
administrative areas were reconfigured into new jurisdictional zones: 
"[The rationalisation of the Administration Boards] brought about the 
first amalgamation. Then Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga formed one, but 
they were still, for the purposes of influx control, in terms of the Black 
(Urban) Areas Act No. 75 of 1945, they were still two separate 
prescribed areas. So we had the situation that someone with a Section 
10(1) permit to live in Nyanga couldn't get a house in Langa because his 
rights only applied to the prescribed area of the Divisional Council, and 
53 Lawrence spoke of his suggestion when still a young official to upgrade the informal settlement of 
KTC in situ to provide much-needed additional housing for Africans. He was rewarded for this 
innovative thinking with a suspension of his local government licence for six-months when senior 
officials took umbrage at his suggestion. He insists that this was the conservative type of thinking that 
was pervasive at that time, and that failure to tow the strict party line led to severe reprimand (Personal 












the City Council only had rights in this area". (Lawrence, pers. comm. 
20 May 2005) 
Thus, two different forms of jurisdictional area existed simultaneously, causing 
confusion for local government officials because of conflicting areas of interests 
between Influx Control regulations and local authority boundaries. 
During the administration of the Western Cape Administration Board, a significant step 
was taken by the central government in addressing the rights of urban Africans to 
permanent residence in the city. For instance, negotiation between the leaders of the 
Old Crossroads informal settlement and the Department of Co-operation and 
Development led to an agreement in 1979 to provide housing for some of the Old 
Crossroads squatters at a new township called New Crossroads, to be developed in 
several phases on the site of the original informal settlement of Browne's Camp. The 
first phase of the housing development, during which 1 500 homes were built, was 
completed in 1980 (Kaplan, 1997) and was coordinated by the Western Cape 
Administration Board. Although this negotiated process marked a benchmark in urban 
African struggles for rights to legitimacy and residency in the city, it did not engender a 
change in government policy around African urban rights at this stage. 
In 1981 the Administration Board officially acknowledged that the housing backlog had 
reached critical proportions in the Lagunya townships (Cole, 1987). Official housing 
statistics from June 1982 as quoted by Elias (1983) illustrate the severity of the housing 
shortage.54 However, because of the 'illegal' status of so many urban African people, 
many remained invisible to official census at that time, it can also be assumed that these 
statistics were far off the mark. 
After a long moratorium on the building of houses for urban Africans, the Western 
Cape Administration Board began erecting additional family units in the Cape during 
54These statistics give a total availability of accommodation in the Lagunya townships as 12 955 family 
units with hostel accommodation for a further 28 009 people. while official waiting lists at that time only 
recorded 3 215 applications. Elias (1983) believes that this was probably the first official approximation 












1981/2 (Survey of Race Relations, 1983).55 The Urban Foundation launched Uluntu, a 
non-profit utility company headed by leading members of the African community. 
tasked by the state in the early 1980s to acquire land for housing construction from all 
the Administration Boards on a 30-year lease renewable for a further 30 years (Survey 
of Race Relations, 1981). There were plans for the construction of family homes in the 
Ikapa area to be completed by 1985 to be jointly financed by the Uluntu Utility 
Company, the Cape Town Community Council, the Urban Foundation and the Western 
Cape Administration Board (Survey of Race Relations, 1981). However, in 1982 the 
government suddenly announced a cutback on funds for African housing (Wilkinson, 
1984), refusing to accept tenders for new projects. The building of additional housing in 
the Cape Townships came to an abrupt halt.56 
In this same year the state introduced the Black Local Authorities (BLAs) to administer 
the urban African townships. In Ikapa, the existing Cape Town Community Council, 
retaining its original name until it was upgraded in 1986, became the 'new' local 
authority structure in the Ikapa area. The next section traces the fortunes and fate of the 
ill-fated BLA. 
Exploring the realities of housing administration under the Ikapa Black Local 
Authority 
In terms of the Black Local Authorities Act. the Council was to assume much of the 
responsibility for housing that had previously been the task of the Western Cape 
Administration Board. The duties of the Council's Housing Department included the 
administration of the letting of dwellings and other structures under the control of the 
local authority. It was also tasked with the keeping of waiting lists, the control of 
allocation of new houses, the re-allocation of existing houses and hostel-beds, and the 
setting of service charges (Ikapa file 2/2/2). 
However, there were no regulations laid down in the act for the administration of 
housing specifically. Therefore the Council continued to app]y the Township 
)' Of these 209 were new family housing units in New Crossroads, while another 250 were provided in 
Langa due to the conversion of hostel units. The rent at Langa was R33.83 per month with services, 
while at Nyanga and New Crossroads it varied between R23.50 and Rl 17.19 per month with services 
included, depending on the type of house and the income of the tenant (Survey of Race Relations, 1982). 
56 Apparently, this cutback was linked to the prevailing economic climate. and was due to a drop in the 












Regulations laid down in terms of the old Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 
1945, which had already been repealed.57 
A report by Batt, the Acting Control Administration Officer of Housing, stated that by 
1988 the demand for housing in the Ikapa area was so great that residents had stopped 
putting their names on the waiting lists or enquiring about the allocation of dwellings at 
the Council, considering it a waste of time (Ikapa File 18171P. Report dated 28/12/88). 
Indeed, due to the chronic conditions of overcrowding in the Lagunya townships, the 
number of families occupying one dwelling and site meant that any re-allocation was 
usually made to a family already on the site, obviating the use of the waiting list (Ikapa 
file 18171P). Indeed, Shubane and Madiba (1992) record an informal practice that had 
developed in all the African townships by this time whereby houses were passed from 
one generation to another without official sanction or record. In this way access to a 
house was not lost to a family through the official re-allocation process. Morape 
reiterated that as Township Superintendent of Guguletu he had been aware of this state 
of affairs, which caused many administrative headaches (pers. comm. 5 April, 2005). 
Thus, housing records and the waiting lists became confused and outdated.58 
During the early 19805 the Cape Town Community Council introduced a committee 
that dealt with the allocation of houses, and especially with disputes after divorces. 
Known as the Appeal Committee (Ikapa file18171P), it consisted of the Chief 
Superintendent of Housing who acted as chairman, the three Township Superintendents 
from Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, as well as the Mayor of the Cape Town Community 
Council. Meetings were held every week and the parties involved in the allocation of a 
dwelling. plus their legal representatives could state their claims to the dwelling. The 
Committee would then reach a decision based on the evidence (ibid). 
This process continued until 1985 when a new housing policy was developed for the 
Council and a new Housing Allocation Committee was established. At this time the 
57 This continued until 1988 when the Council began to draft its own by-laws and develop a more area-
specific housing policy (lkapa file 1817fP). 
5sIn response to the disorder of the official allocation process, Fadana claims that the Western Cape Civic 
Association began compiling its own waiting lists and allocating houses accordingly, ignoring the 
Council system completely (Fadana personal Communication, 8 April 2005). This further confused 












housing officials were not represented on the committee, which consisted only of 
councillors who took uninformed decisions (ibid). According to Batt's report: 
"These [allocation] decisions were for obvious reasons seldom accepted 
and made a mockery of housing administration. Housing officials got 
disillusioned and lost their respect for management and the system." 
(Ikapa file 1817/P) 
It is evident that there was some animosity between the housing officials and the 
councillors as each sought agency in the allocation process. For instance, apparently the 
Director of Local Government had not approved this allocation committee, and 
declared its decisions invalid. 
In 1988 the Ikapa Town Council established a new housing sub-committee to deal 
specifically with the backlog that had accumulated in the allocation of houses. The new 
Housing Allocation Committee was chaired by the head of the Housing Department, 
supported by the Control Administration Officer of the same department, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Council, the township managers and several councillors. 
With the accumulating rent deficit in these closing years of the 1980s, applications for 
the allocation of a house required not only information pertaining to the original 
allocation of the house, the composition of the family of the registered occupant, but 
also a Town Secretary's report on outstanding rent and service charges. The Ikapa 
Housing Allocation files record that although the allocation of houses to new tenants 
was subject to the payment of a monthly rental, arrears were often carried across, even 
when the new occupier admitted to being unemployed. 
The Housing Allocation Committee was also responsible for the allocation of vacant 
land and business sites. At this point it is useful to include an observation by Rammala 
(1987) that: 
"The dominance of the Councils by businessmen and teachers is of 
interest. It is quite possible that the large numbers of businessmen on the 












within townships ... as presenting an opportunity for involvement in civic 
affairs relevant to their personal affairs". (1987: p.9) 
In his brief history of the Cape Town Community Council and the Black Local 
Authority that followed, Kahanovitz (1988) reiterates this saying that access to the 
process of allocation, particularly business sites. drew members of the African business 
fraternity to positions on the local authorities in order to further their own personal 
agendas. Indeed, when the Council later advertised vacant land within Guguletu and 
Nyanga to those who wanted to build their own houses. wealthy individuals began to 
scramble for land in order to establish their power bases, among them several 
councillors involved in housing allocation.59 
This evidence hints at corruption on the Housing Allocation Committee. Indeed, several 
powerful men on the committee had previous histories of corrupt allocation practices 
pre-dating the BLA structure. involving allocations of bed spaces to hostel dwellers and 
formal housing allocations (Fast, 1995a).6o Much of the reported lack of faith in the 
housing allocation system among the Ikapa residents stemmed from these historic but 
unforgotten allegations (Fast. 1995a; Cape Times 25111/82). 
Corruption in the allocation of houses was also found elsewhere on the Council. An 
administration clerk in the Housing Section of the Town Secretary's department was 
caught taking cash payments from people who wanted their names put on the waiting 
lists (lkapa minutes, March 1991). Although only two isolated incidents were actually 
reported to the police, fifteen subsequent calls received over several days when the 
clerk was absent proved that the clerk's illegal dealings had been fairly extensive, 
involving several agents working for the clerk in the field. Strangely the clerk did not 
work with the waiting lists in the course of his daily duties, implying that others within 
the housing office were involved. The actions of the councillors and the officials, who 
lived in the Lagunya townships themselves. often incurred the wrath of their 
communities. 
59 The allocation in 1990 of several residential sites in Langa was decided by the drawing of lots. 
However. of the thirteen bidders eight were identifiable as councillors and members of their families 
(lkapa Housing Allocation file, September 1990). 












The Ikapa allocation files reveal that housing applicants often used township 
organisations such as street committees, burial societies, and even next-door 
neighbours, to substantiate their claims to houses.61 In cases where wives were unable 
to provide death certificates for their deceased husbands, they obtained affidavits from 
their local police station.62 Councillors were often affiliated with street committees 
(Ikapa Minutes August 1989). This gave both the councillor and the members of the 
street committees power to influence allocation decisions. When quizzed about such 
alliances Morape agreed that they had existed but was reluctant to say more (Morape, 
pers. comm. 5 April 2005). 
Civic organisations became increasingly involved in allocation decisions towards the 
end of the 1980s. After 1992 an official process was developed between the Ikapa 
Town Council and SANCO. The civic then became an official component of the 
Housing Allocation Committee and the Dispute Resolution Committees, and was 
tasked to resolve allocation disputes between rival applicants that the Council could not 
solve (Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005).63 
However, the responsibility of local housing officials for other more onerous tasks such 
as forced evictions and increases in rent and service charges concurs with Lemon's 
(2002) suggestion that the role of local government is often to deflect the blame for 
central government actions to the local level. Thus, the Ikapa local authority became the 
target of community dissatisfaction with local administration, particularly with regard 
to rent increases. 
Contesting state legitimac.v at grassroots level 
Local civic organisations in Ikapa were among the first in the country to contest the 
local authority's right to increase rent and service charges. Kaplan (1988) records that 
from as early as 1977 the Western Cape Administration Board was unable to increase 
rent charges due to resistance from Ikapa residents. These ongoing confrontations 
compromised effective administration by the Ikapa local authority. 
61 One lady used her burial society to write a letter on her behalf pleading with the Council to re-register 
the property in the name of her new husband, while another went to the Cape Peninsula Black 
Pensioner's Organisation who drafted a letter requesting the transfer of the house from her deceased 
husband to herself Okapa Housing Allocation files). 
6:: This was often the case where registered occupants had died in a 'homeland' area. 












Civic associations in the Lagunya townships encouraged local communities to confront 
the Ikapa local authority over their housing issues. They not only orchestrated 
resistance but kept township communities informed by distributing flyers and sending 
letters to the local authorities on behalf of their communities, voicing public concerns.64 
For example, in March 1982, residents of Langa, led by the Langa Residents 
Association, sought legal representation and won an urgent action in the Supreme Court 
for the Western Cape Administration Board to set aside intended increases. It was 
submitted that the Board did not have the power to increase rentals as this fell to the 
Minister of Co-operation and Development. This encouraged further confrontations 
with the local state, establishing local civic organisations with a mandate to represent 
local interests, engendering a sense of solidarity and increasing agency among Lagunya 
residents. 
According to Cole (1987), the small New Crossroads community in Nyanga became the 
first African township in the Cape to consistently challenge the local authority 
structure, continuing a rent boycott from as early as December 1984. The legacy of 
successful negotiation with the state for houses and urban residency rights from their 
days in Old Crossroads65 encouraged the New Crossroads' community to confront the 
local authorities over proposed rental increases and to negotiate special dispensations. 
This prompted other Lagunya communities to pressure the council to make similar 
allowances for them. For example, the Nyanga Civic Association in a meeting on 16 
September 1991 with the !kapa Town Council to discuss proposed rent increases in an 
area called White City stated that: 
"The people want Council to reach an agreement with them in a 
similar manner which was reached with New Crossroads" (lkapa file 
7/311170). 
64 Much later, in 1992, one such letter from the Langa Civic Association to the Ikapa Town Council 
challenged the Council about the lack of housing and specifically their corrupt allocation practices: 
'We want to convey this message to the Ikapa Town Council "Enough is enough". We are not going to 
be divided by the Apartheid structure like the Ikapa Town Council. We have the right to houses, security 
and comfort. We therefore demand that the Ikapa Town Council: Give' back the hOllses to the rightful 
owners: Stop giving criminals hOllses that belong to other people: Stop being corrupt; Build houses that 
people can afford to rent. (lkapa Archive File No. 7/311/1 02) 
6) The New crossroads residents came originally from the Old Crossroads settlement. Their negotiated 
deal with the state for residency rights and the provision of houses was mentioned earlier in this chapter 
and is referred to again in chapter six. This history has been recorded in detail by Boulton (2002), Cole 












The New Crossroads example thus illustrates the importance of smaller localised 
housing issues and how the responses they provoke can be instrumental in shaping 
broader neighbourhood housing histories that can only be discovered during research at 
the neighbourhood level. 
From the mid-1980s the CIVIC organisations In the Lagunya townships began to 
confront the Council more aggressively. An Ikapa housing official and a councillor 
recalled during interviews how the civics coerced staff of the Ikapa cleansing branch to 
drop truckloads of garbage outside their houses in protest at the rent increases and the 
lack of a concomitant improvement in services. The councillor recalls the ordeal that 
lasted: 
" ... for quite a couple of months [the garbage was] as high as the 
gate, the car couldn't come in. nobody could come through the small 
gate". (Lobi, pers. comm. 6 April 2005) 
The housing official was not quite so glib about his experiences of the protest actions as 
people marched outside his house with placards labelling him 'a white man in a Black 
skin' (Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005). His response was to call a community 
meeting during which he confronted a crowd of local residents and explained his own 
stance on the matter. For some officials these were clearly emotionally charged times of 
self-questioning around ambiguous personal convictions.66 
After several years of huge accumulated rent deficits, the Community Services 
department of the Cape Provincial Administration decided that the only solution to the 
shortfall in revenue was to evict registered occupiers with outstanding rents. For this 
onerous task designated housing officials were empowered to serve eviction notices on 
residents in their homes. These posts were filled by housing officials appointed by the 
Cape Town Community Council, thus identifying the council officials as the agents of 
66 When plans to forcibly remove people from established areas of [kapa to Khayelitsha became known 
in \984 even the mayor of the Cape Town Community Council, Mr. R. Njoli, was forced to rally behind 
his community and was quoted as saying that the people were prepared to fight the government over such 












the Provincial authorities and thus supporters of the apartheid regime (Ikapa Agenda 
and Minutes May 1988). 
Driven by various civic organisations, local residents began to counter these evictions. 
There were physical stand-offs in Guguletu when the sheriff or housing official arrived 
at a house with an eviction notice to be confronted by a deputation from the civic 
organisation together with local residents. Fadana recalls: 
"If the sheriff comes in we tell him in a nice way that he better 
move out or else, and then he had to because there wasn't a way of 
doing that (evictions). [The eviction officials] were helpless 
because the force, the comrades were ruling in the townships". 
(Fadana, pers. comm. 8 April 2005) 
The Council thus became powerless to evict the Lagunya residents in the face of 
increasingly politicised contestations. Two Ikapa councillors threatened to resign saying 
that they too were affected by the increases and did not want to be regarded as enemies 
of the people (Cape Times, 1811/85). Others left fearing for their lives: 
"Mrs Florence Mahono .,. In an interview at the Nyanga home of 
veteran community leader, Mr. Oscar Mpetha, she said she had 
resigned because the community did not support the Community 
Council system, She said she intended joining the organisations 
supported by the majority of the people. Her house had been stoned 
during the township disturbances earlier in the year and she been 
threatened that action would be taken against her if she did not resign". 
(Staff reporter, Cape Times, 24/4/85) 
Fadana recalls how the township residents disregarded other Council directives: 
"These operations were just ignored... these rentals, an-ears, 
electricity everything we never paid attention to, and then if you 













Indeed, Roxo, the Township Manager of Nynaga reported that stone throwing and 
intimidation prohibited the collection of rent in September 1989 (Ikapa Minutes of 
General Meeting 16110/89). The mounting arrears and the continuing accumulation of 
rent deficit was beginning to seriously undermine its financial viability, causing further 
staff and operational cutbacks that in tum began to compromise service provision and 
the job security of the Council's own staff. Effectively, the officials were caught in a 
'Catch-22' situation, in which they could not raise sufficient finances, and without such 
resources they could not adequately service their communities. The communities seeing 
no improvement refused to pay for services. 
Meanwhile, hoping to undermine nationwide resistance to their BLA system by 
responding to what was seen as one of the essential housing grievances of township 
residents, the government introduced new housing legislation that empowered the local 
township officials to address the lack of tenure security in the townships directly. 
The introduction of leasehold legislation: State attempts at housing refonn 
In terms of the Black Communities Development Act, No.4 of 1984, BLAs could grant 
leasehold rights to Council-owned or controlled land. However, in the Western Cape 
the 99-year leasehold facility introduced by the new Act could not be implemented 
because it essentially conflicted with the ideology that underlay the implementation of 
the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (Fast, 1995a; Humphries, 1989). This policy 
denied the permanent residency of Africans in the urban areas of the Western Cape, 
perpetuating the relationship between access to accommodation and permanent 
employment in order to safeguard employment for the Cape Coloured people, This 
policy was only revoked in 1984. 
Thus, the right of leasehold was only applied in October 1984 in the Western Cape, 
prompting the Cape Town Community Council to insist on an extension of the 
leasehold option (File 14/4/P Ikapa Archive). Following this late start, it required a 
considerable amount of time to establish the correct administrative machinery, while 












leasehold scheme until ] 987.67 Once again the local officials were severely constrained 
to act by circumstances beyond their controL 
Due to the failure of township residents to accept the new leasehold offer, a rebate was 
introduced nationwide to induce them to 'purchase' their properties. The Cape Town 
Community Council claimed that it was unfair to apply the same closing date in Ikapa 
due to the delays in launching the leasehold scheme in the Western Cape. It appealed 
for an extension of the deadline in the Ikapa area to the end of 1988 (File 14/4/P Ikapa 
Archive, Letter dated 30/4/88). 
The Cape Town Community Council also contested the stipulation that only people 
who had occupied a dwelling for more than 5 years could be offered a 5% rebate. They 
described the particular difficulties faced by Ikapa residents where the acute shortage of 
housing had historically forced families to accept whatever kind of accommodation 
they could find, frequently occupying cramped single or two-roomed dwellings. They 
argued that it was not in the nature of African people to move from dwelling to 
dwelling unless forced by circumstances to do so, but that when conditions were so 
intolerable any opportunity to relocate to a larger house was immediately taken. It was 
therefore unfair, they claimed, that the criteria for the granting of the rebates were so 
stringently applied where families had taken opportunities to move to larger homes 
within the Ikapa area. The Council suggested instead that a rebate of 5% be granted to 
prospective purchasers whose period as registered occupiers in a particular township, 
instead of a particular house, exceeded five years.68 
It is clear from the above examples, that the officials were aware of the particular 
housing dynamics of the Ikapa communities and, far from 'rubber-stamping' all 
government decisions as has been suggested, were willing to contest the decisions of 
higher tiers of government in order to fight for the rights of established residents. 
Meanwhile, Ikapa residents regarded the government's attempt to 'sell' state-owned 
houses as an attempt to undermine and break the rent boycott. Guided by the civics they 
67 For example, land surveying of the African townships, which had been underway elsewhere in the 
country from 1982. was only begun in Lagunya in 1984 (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs. 
]989). 












undertook to refuse to buy the houses or to allow rural migrants, regarded as 
'outsiders', to move into the area (Kruss, 1987). The Ikapa local authority tried to 
encourage residents to buy their houses, but residents backed by the civics ignored the 
leasehold offer. Fadana remembers: 
'When Ikapa tried to say, "We want you to buy these houses, we'll 
give you a 99-year lease" we told them "To hell with that! We are not 
going to buy these houses. We are going to get them free of charge"'. 
(pers. comm. 8 April 2005) 
Rasool (1984) explains that civic organizations in the Western Cape believed that there 
were ulterior motivating factors behind the state's seemingly altruistic new housing 
policies for the urban poor. In response they began 'Anti-sale of Houses' campaigns, 
creating awareness among thousands of township dwellers of the political ramifications 
of the new housing laws. This is clearly illustrated in this extract from an anonymous 
pamphlet discovered in the lkapa archive: 
"We regret the attempts by the ruling class to pass the burden of 
the economic and housing crisis onto the backs of workers as 
well as their attempts to divide us ... We reject the state's new 
housing policy in the form of high rents, sale of houses, site and 
service schemes, forced removals, group areas and the 
victimization of squatters. We demand the immediate provision 
of adequate state housing free of rent exploitation". 
(Pamphlet - Resolution adopted at Bishop Lavis. Undated69 ) 
This extract illustrates the range of housing issues tackled by the civics on behalf of 
township residents. 
However, apparently not all Ikapa residents were opposed to the housing campaign. In 
January 1985, some residents of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga formed Umziwonke, a 
housing interest group drawn from residents of these three areas. A report in the Cape 













press claimed that they welcomed the 99-year lease proposal (Cape Argus 26/2/85). 
However, Michael Fadana questions the existence of this 'so-called' community 
organisation, which stood in opposition to 'the Civic', suggesting that it was actually 
engineered by the government and did not represent real support for the government's 
housing initiative in the township (Fadana, pers. comm. 8 April 2005). 
In mid-1987, representations from several local authorities in the Western Cape were 
received by government asking for a review of the conditions of sale of existing 
housing units. Many houses were old and in disrepair, many having structural defects 
and it was decided that such houses warranted a larger discount of up to 65% of the 
previously calculated purchase price, where the maximum discount had been 20%. 
Any rental arrears were to be included in the loan amount, and tenants who had 
regularly paid rent during the previous three years were able to purchase without a 
deposit. Thus, in answer to community apathy to the sale of state houses, the terms and 
conditions were constantly improved upon in an effort to drive the process of home-
ownership. 
In 1988 the Ikapa local authority was upgraded to Town Council status, making it 
increasingly autonomous and thereby giving it more legitimate right to act as the agent 
for the Ikapa township communities. 
Legal but not legitimate: Institutional and legislative changes 
(Ikapa Town Council finally gets its name, but not a mandate) 
In 1988, the Cape Town Town Committee was upgraded. Initially renamed the Cape 
Town Town Council, it officially adopted the name Ikapa Town Council in October of 
that year (Ikapa File 7/311/8). In a bid to reinforce the status of the Council the Cape 
Provincial Administration insisted that township residents in future conduct all housing 
negotiations through the town councillors (Centre for Development Studies, 1989). 
The Conversion of Certain Rights to Leasehold Act (No.8] of 1988), which came into 
operation on 1 January 1989 provided for the conversion of certain occupational rights 












This offered greater security of tenure for township residents because the local authority 
could no longer terminate their leases, while it allowed lessees the right to terminate 
their leases with three months notice. The repeal of the old legislation and the 
promulgation of the new act led to administrative nightmares at the Ikapa Town 
CounciL7o 
The tardy transfer of the ownership of state land from the Cape Provincial 
Administration to the Ikapa Town Council was a cause for concern for the Council as 
this delayed the opening of township registers, the necessary first step, which preceded 
the registration of 'ownership'. According to the Demarcation Board, the hold-up was 
due to a pending decision on whether or not to excise Khayelitsha from Ikapa's 
jurisdictional area. However, this did not explain why the transfer of land in the other 
Ikapa townships was not being processed. Despite the backlog in property registration 
that was beyond their control, the Ikapa Town Council was faced with the introduction 
of further legislation by central government in an already under-staffed and under-
resourced environment. 
The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (No.Il2 of 199]) followed, enabling 
residents to claim full ownership rights of their properties. However, the townships 
registers for Langa and Guguletu were being processed and were only scheduled to be 
ready by June 1993, a delay of nearly two full years, while in Nyanga the delay was 
caused by a dispute over several erven belonging to the Western Cape Provincial 
Administration, which fell within the boundaries of Crossroads and not Ikapa.71 The 
70 An urgent request was made to the Western Cape Community Services branch for help so that the 
Ikapa Town Council could commence drafting their own by-laws regarding matters of housing 
administration (Ikapa file CCT 1/3/1 Letter dated 30/1/89). 
71 In September 1990. the Administrator of the Ikapa Town Council had made an agreement with the 
Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) to transfer certain sections of land from the CPA to Ikapa. The 
land to be transferred was known as the Consolidated Areas of Langa and Guguletu. Only parts of the 
consolidated area of Nyanga, namely erven numbers Cape Town 113161, 113162, 113163 and 113164, 
were omitted from the agreement as they did not form part of the Development Area according to the 
Black Communities Development Act, Act 4 of 1984. Cape Town erven 136605 and 136603 were also 
excluded because they extended over Mahobe Drive, which was taken as the natural boundary between 
Ikapa and Crossroads. Therefore, parts of these erven fell under the area of Crossroads (lkapa Executive 












Ikapa Town Council was therefore powerless to move ahead with the registration 
process.T2 
The Development Action Group estimated that by the early 1990s the shortage of 
housing for Africans in the Western Cape stood at more than 100 000 dwelling units 
with more than three quarters of the African population living in sub-standard 
conditions (Driver, 1992b). By 1993, Morape recalls that in the Lagunya area alone 30 
000 backyard households were waiting for housing (pers. comm. 5April 2005). 
In spite of this housing shortage, and concesslOnary legislation introduced for 
established township residents the government responded drastically to the proliferation 
of informal settlements, establishing 'Hut Squads' under the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act, which gave local authorities wider powers to demolish shacks 
(Development Action Group Press Statement July 1991) and to 'nip fresh squatter 
settlements in the bud' (Cape Times 16/7/91). Morape, for instance, recalls how 
wardsmen were employed to support officials working among informal communities: 
" ... Barcelona, an informal area along Landsdowne Road, near 
Borchards Quarry. It was an old dump area, then Council decided that 
area should be used for sporting facilities. It was not very good for 
habitation you know there were poisonous gases and whatnot. So I went 
there to tell the people when the first structures were put up there. I took 
some of my people, wardsmen. Do you know what wardsmen were? 
They were like security guards working for Council. I took some of 
these men and went to Barcelona ... they are like security policemen 
within the Council. And they told me they are not going to move. I must 
stay in my Sea Point, they are used to staying in areas like this, and they 
started just building, building ... It was a rubbish dump that whole area.". 
(pers. comm. 5 April 2005) 
The extract above illustrates the animosity that officials felt towards the informal 
settlement dwellers. Morape was clearly disgusted that people were prepared to live in 
7'2 Eventually Township Registers were opened for Langa and Guguletu and existing leaseholds were 
convened to ownerships, enabling the Council to affect the property transfers on the basis of ownership 












such a filthy environment. Officials, already powerless to proceed with newly legislated 
processes, were also helpless to deal with the speedy and haphazard proliferation of 
informal settlements, confirming remarks made by Royston regarding the ineptitude of 
'peripheral administrative structures such as the black local authorities' (2002: p.l67). 
Meanwhile, the state's Discount Benefit Scheme was introduced in 1992, to make 
financial resources available to prospective homeowners in the established townships. 
Meetings between the Ikapa Town Council and local civic organisations resulted in the 
formation of an 'inclusive forum' to decide upon a collaborative process to identify 
lkapa housing stock for sale and to establish who had rights to buy them. Registered 
tenants were invited to visit their local housing office for information and any disputes 
were referred to Dispute Resolution Committees set up by in the three major Lagunya 
townships (lkapa Minutes. Executive Committee Meeting 20/3/95). Veto, the Nyanga 
Township Manager headed up the Nyanga committee, pictured below in the mid-1990s. 
Mr Veto, Ikopa Township Manager . Nyonga, sel!n film? with m(>mbers of tfll~ original Nyongo Disp,J(f Resolution 
Commi1!ee • Mr William MOlyl.'sile, Ms Nokul oia Dyantjie, Mr Mefford Stuurman" Mr George Nde.si Gnd 
Mr Emmanuel Ng,\omngxc;, Ab$ent Ot; the piUure is Mr johnson Tam, 
Figure 4. Changing times in Ikapa. Community participation in the 1990s. 












However, the Ikapa Town Council could not drive the project alone due to staffing 
constraints and the time consuming and complex process involved in transferring a 
house or a site to an individual.73 An extract from the Ikapa Executive Committee 
minutes emphasizes this reality: 
" ... the Provincial Administration found itself in a situation that they 
must activate the process through the local authorities but the 
administrative capacity of local authorities such as Ikapa totally lacked 
the capacity to drive the project departmentally with existing staff. The 
situation worsened as pressure was brought upon staff structures of 
Ikapa". (File Exco Minutes March 1995 Ikapa Archives) 
Once again, central government policy makers had not appreciated the realities of the 
operational capacity of their local authority structures.74 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated that although BLAs have traditionally been blamed for their 
incompetence and seeming indifference to the townships communities they were tasked 
with administering, it is clear that they were severely undermined from their inception, 
not only by a lack of financial and other resources, but also by powerlessness caused by 
bureaucratic ineptitude and stalling tactics at higher levels of government. 
Contributing to the existing body of knowledge on the BLA period in South Africa, this 
history of housing administration under the Ikapa Town Council in many respects 
mirrors that of many other BLAs, trying to cope with continual revisions to legislation 
and changes in institutional structuring as the central state attempted to diffuse the 
tensions that had arisen in the townships, particularly around housing. However, the 
scale of this investigation has also exposed how added to the moral and political 
dilemmas of the officials was their inability to cope with a daily confusion of rules and 
paperwork and the realities of life in the townships under their jurisdiction, all of which 
7'. It was later decided to appoint consultants to help the transfer of property process run smoothly, 
accurately and efficiently, financed by the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape (PA WC), 
through the National Housing Board. 













were further undermined by the personal agendas and underhand actions of particular 
officials. 
The next chapter changes the scale of the research to record in more detail the realities 
of housing administration under the Ikapa Town Council. It interrogates the competing 
discourses and interactions that existed at community level, focusing specifically on 
housing allocation strategies in New Crossroads. Chapter six thus interrogates the 
complex, often inter-related levels of meaning that inform a comprehensive 
understanding of housing allocation in the BLA era, tensions that continue in housing 













CONTESTATION OF HOUSING ALLOCATION STRATEGIES: 
Old Crossroads legacy, New Crossroads disjuncture 
' ... [A] study of social institutions has to go beyond formal rules, to 
also consider actors outside the state and how they interpret, use and 
challenge formal rules, as well as the source of their power to do 
so' . (Rakodi & Leduka, 2003: 11) 
A case of complex relationships and competing identities 
Allocation of houses is fundamentally really about allocation of resources. In 
environments of poverty resources are precious commodities representing economic 
and social opportunities. The urban poor have always been pawns in political power-
games around access to such resources. Ewick & Silbey (2003) suggest, however, 
that resistance has the capacity to radically alter power relations and social structures 
when relatively powerless people struggle to protect their own interests and identity. 
In the Western Cape the way in which the Old Crossroads community strategised in 
order to circumvent their lack of rights and access to housing, forced the state to 
make major ideological and policy changes (Cole, 1987). Their resistance became the 
benchmark for many other poor urban communities struggling for basic citizenship 
rights. Correlating with the observations of Rakodi and Leduka (2003) above, my 
research acknowledges the importance of investigating the centrality of both formal 
and informal processes. 
While the previous chapter traced a general history of housing administration in the 
Ikapa area, this chapter now focuses on the case study area, New Crossroads, 
unpacking the competing discourses that developed around the right to allocate 
houses there. My research investigates the disjunctures in allocation systems, in an 
attempt to unravel the complexity of the interrelationships between formal and 
informal allocation systems, exploring how these relationships were established and 
how they transformed over time. I will analyse the changing power dynamics related 
to control over housing allocation processes, both formal and informaL discussing the 












allegiances and enemies changed as agency to allocate housing was contested in this 
politically charged terrain. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the official allocation processes administered 
by the Ikapa Town Council, describing the official policies that shaped the 
implementation strategies of the Council, determining who the role-players were, 
their particular functions and personal inputs. It also attempts to capture on a more 
psychological leveL some of the emotive responses that were played out by a variety 
of government role-players in the everyday functioning of the Council. For example 
the officials' frustrations at the lack of resources, fear of community reprisals, 
alienation from and rejection by the township communities, and even the egotistical 
or aggressive nature of some councillors. 
The history of the Old Crossroads community underpins a comprehensive 
understanding of the subsequent history of the New Crossroads residents, their sense 
of entitlement to and their expectations regarding their rights to houses (Boulton, 
2002; Cole, 1987; Isaacs, 1989). The second section therefore describes the Old 
Crossroads informal housing administration system, exploring the allocation 
processes established there, and how these were later employed in allocating the first 
houses in New Crossroads to members of the Old Crossroads community. I will show 
how this system helped to shape the processes that evolved within New Crossroads. 
The chapter then describes the informal mechanisms established to administer 
housing in New Crossroads from the time of its establishment in 1980 and how the 
community, together with the local authorities, instituted a collaborative allocation 
process. The discussion explores the shifting power bases within the community 
explaining the changing dynamics and local housing politics, examining the critical 
role of neighbourhood and civic organisations in this history. 
The strengthening of civic movements nationwide had major ramifications for local 
organising in the Ikapa area and in New Crossroads in particular, where the 'battle of 
the civics', as it was referred to by an elderly community leader (Mene pers. comm. 9 













During the course of my fieldwork residents and government officials alike made 
frequent reference to the significance that the amaXhosa people, who form the largest 
ethnic group in the Western Cape townships, attach to their houses due to their 
traditional ancestral beliefs. I conclude this chapter therefore by exploring the 
significance of culturally embedded beliefs and practices, showing how these have 
influenced the acceptability of different allocation strategies, relating this to the 
concept of African 'retraditionalism', or as Oranje (2003) has recently suggested the 
evidence that traditional African practices never really went away but were 
overlooked by many in the fervency of new political dialogue and democratisation. 
Traditional values, it will be shown, were nevertheless acknowledged by most of the 
role players and came to underlay both the formal and informal allocation processes. 
For the record: Official Housing Allocation· Policy and implementation 
During the turbulent 1980s, local government departments together with the Black 
Local Authorities (BLAs) were challenged with administering housing in the 
townships (Cameron, 1991; De Jongh, 1991; Hendler, 1991). The moratorium on the 
building of houses for Africans within the city made the allocation of existing 
housing stock a nightmare of opposing interests. The availability of dwellings 
gradually diminished due to the increasing numbers of people living in the townships, 
both from natura] increase and in-migration from other areas. Overcrowding 
increased dramatically with several families often occupying each site (lkapa file 
18171P). 
A retired Director of the Community Services Branch, Lawrence, spoke of the 
frustrations he experienced administering township housing in an era in which policy 
makers sitting behind their desks in Pretoria failed to understand the realities of life in 
poor urban areas. In particular, they drafted unrealistic laws which officials then had 
to implement at grassroots level within the constraints imposed by the shortage of 
housing. He emphasised: 
" ... [There was] nothing new so you just had a bottle that just 












people ... hundreds of people who need houses and there is no 
more housing being built". (Lawrence, pers. comm. 20 May 
2005) 
Lawrence described local government officials trying to work according to 
prescriptive apartheid policies, adhering to a multitude of rules and regulations. He 
produced in the interview, as an example, the huge 'Manual of Bantu Law' published 
in 1971, insisting that allocation strategy became effectively a case of 'politics versus 
reality'. Moreover, he asserted that it was impossible for local government officials to 
'stick to the book' when allocating houses because township dwellers interpreted 
their right to a particular house in terms of ritualised traditions. He insisted that 
officials made allowances for such 'cultural' considerations so as to legitimise 
decisions in the eyes of both the communities and their own African staff. 
The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 stipulated that the new local authorities 
would be responsible for the allocation and administration of the letting of dwellings 
under their control, but did not lay down any other specific regulations around 
housing administration. Such was the state of confusion and disorder around the lack 
of a comprehensive housing policy, that the existing 'Regulations Governing the 
Control and Supervision of an Urban Black Residential Area and Relevant Matters' 
made in terms of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (25 of 1945) were 
retained even though the Act itself had been repealed. In spite of these measures 
officials also made other efforts to eradicate the potential for bias in the decision-
making process as this extract from a general meeting of the Ikapa Town Council on 
the 9 December 1988 shows: 
"Mr. Naude [then Administrator of the Ikapa Town Council] held 
the opinion that the allocation of sites should be done by lot: He 
said that this will enable Council to justify the allocation of sites". 
(lkapa archive. File No. 14/3/1/1) 
Thus, the officials even resorted to primitive methods, because the legitimacy of their 
decisions was frequently contested in the general climate of opposition to BLAs. 












The regulations made Township Superintendents responsible for aIJocating houses 
and maintaining the waiting lists. The Superintendents were also tasked with issuing 
registered occupiers and lodgers with permit books and maintaining separate housing 
files for each legal resident. Veto, a retired Ikapa township manager, was quite 
emotional about the responsibility he felt as a housing official and the associated 
dangers involved: 
"It is very much political. When you are an official people mustn't 
know what party you support, because once you attend to their 
matter and the matter doesn't please them, they will say it is 
because you belong to ANC, that is why you have treated us like 
this. You get blamed! ... That was when I decided not to be a part 
of that [the allocations] because I knew that at the end we would be 
blamed, the way the allocation was, because there is favouritism". 
(Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
By the early 1980s the compilation of waiting lists for housing had become a futile 
exercise. Morape, a retired Ikapa Township Manager spoke of the long waiting lists 
and the concomitant lack of new housing: 
"There was a waiting list but no land allocation for 
development.. . [so] they stopped using them. You can also only 
allocate existing houses to immediate families. [They] must be 
considered first and then the next person", (Morape, pers. comm. 5 
April 2005) 
Thus, registered occupation was usually transferred to another member of the same 
family so that houses seldom became vacant and the waiting lists hardly moved. 
A report drafted in 1988 by the Acting Control Administration Officer of Housing of 
the then Cape Town Town Committee, Batt, documenting allocation practices during 
the early 1980s reiterates Morape' s statement and illustrates the dilemma that faced 












"Due to the number of families occupying one dwelling and site, the 
dwelling can only be re-allocated to a family already on the site and 
the waiting lists can seldom be used. Residents gradually realised 
that it was fruitless reporting to the Superintendents to place their 
names on the waiting lists or to enquire about the allocation of 
dwellings and stopped doing so, with the result that the existing lists 
were outdated ... Due to a large number of divorce cases in the 
townships, the ex-wives of tenants who were given custody of their 
children usually approached the Superintendents with the request to 
cancel the tenant's occupancy and to transfer it to the wife and 
children ... the parties involved usually instructed their attorneys to 
act on their behalf to fight for tenancy of the dwelling as well. 
Superintendents had to be very cautious and had to act correctly in 
deciding on the future tenancy of dwellings .. .In many instances the 
party who lost made allegations of corruption with fingers pointed at 
the Superintendents". (Ikapa Housing Allocation File March, 1988: 
p.2/3) 
Clearly officials as decision-makers were precariously positioned between contesting 
applicants. 
The Chief Superintendent of housing later introduced a committee that dealt 
specifically with the allocation of houses, chaired by him and made up of 
superintendents from Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga and the Mayor of Ikapa. As far as 
possible preference was given to accommodating families, defined as a husband, wife 
and children [i.e. in the Western sense of the word]. Russell however suggests that: 
"Households can be taken for granted in the West because the 
nuclear family system with its bilateral descent system ensures a 
fairly standard pattern of co-residence, with predictable patterns 
of pooling resources. In contemporary South Africa, the tradition 












of options for co-residence as relatives disperse to make a living 
in the new global economy". (2003: p.5) 
Such assumptions about households did not therefore mirror the realities of township 
life. Moreover, in the official policy preference was given to males while single 
persons, male or female, did not qualify and their tenancy was terminated if 
discovered. 
The allocation policy determined that in cases where no one had a pre-emptive right 
to a house, the house could be allocated to a resident according to a pre-determined 
allocation list sanctioned by the CounciL These were referred to as 'Class B' houses. 
Superintendents or any other person authorised to allocate houses were not permitted 
to deviate from this list unless under circumstances of extreme urgency, such as when 
damage to a house was severe enough to result in evacuation of the tenant, or where a 
divorce resulted in a split of the household, with minor children on both sides. 
However, some houses were referred to as 'Pre-emptive' or 'Class A' houses when 
they became available for re-allocation in ways that negated the use of the waiting 
lists, for example when the registered occupier died, when the registered occupier or 
spouse deserted the home, when there was a divorce or when the occupier was 
relocated elsewhere. Under these circumstances the Council had to allocate the house 
according to a set of guidelines contained within the policy: In deceased estates the 
tenant's wife or children had a preferential claim to the house. The wife had a 
stronger claim to the house, but where the wife could not succeed the children would 
be given preference according to age, and male descendents would be given priority 
over female descendants. When children were already registered as tenants elsewhere 
they would lose their rights to their father's house. The policy stated that each case 
should be treated on merit and each claim considered. It will be shown how this 
clashed head-on with traditional decision-making practices of the township dwellers. 
In terms of a divorce, as a general rule the party with custody of the minor children 
would be given preferential claim to a house. Subsequent changes to the marital 












rule was that the party who elected to leave the home or caused the desertion forfeited 
their rights to the house. Again each case was determined on merit. 
Morape claimed that generally only families could be allocated houses and that men 
often hastily remarried just to keep a house. He further explained how local residents 
circumvented these rules in order to gain access to a house: 
"Where there was a divorce both husband and wife claimed 
occupation. The matter had to go to Council for a decision ... the 
allocation was done on the strength that it must be a married 
couple ... But I'm telling you there were fake marriages. That was 
very common in the early days in the sense that brothers and sisters 
married each other". (Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005) 
This evidence of strategies adopted by residents in lkapa reiterates the observations 
of Todes and Walker (1991) in two Durban townships that there was a perception 
among women that one had to be married in order to be allocated a house. Although 
it was officially recognised that lodgers lost the right to remain in a house if the 
registered occupier died, it was also acknowledged that as many lodgers had often 
lived in a house for a long period of time they too had preferential rights during a 
reallocation. Therefore, if a wife or child of a deceased person did not have a stronger 
claim, and if the lodgers had an uninterrupted period of tenure of at least five years in 
the same house, they were to be given preference during re-allocation. 
The new housing policy identified the necessity for appointing an official body to 
deal specifically with allocations. In 1988 a new officially sanctioned Housing 
Allocation Committee was established for this purpose, under the auspices of the 
local authority, recently renamed lkapa Town Counci1.75 
75 The Cape Town Town Committee had been upgraded to a Town Council in that year. It was briefly 
known as the Cape Town Town Council before being officially renamed the Ikapa Town Council. See 












Strategies of the Ikapa Housing Allocation Committee: The quest for legitimacy 
and acceptance among Ikapa residents 
The Housing Allocation Committee was tasked with drawing up a housing allocation 
list from the names of residents in the same order that they appeared on the waiting 
lists submitted by the superintendents. The list could have a maximum of thirty 
names at any time and was compiled by the superintendent after a personal screening 
of the applicants. The list was to be submitted by the Housing Allocation Committee 
to the Council for approval, thereafter becoming the official allocation list to be 
continuously reviewed and circulated to all Councillors and Ward Committee 
chairmen, and also posted up in public. Any deviation from the list by either the 
Allocation Committee or the Superintendents was to be reported to the Council 
(lkapa Housing Allocation File March 1988, 1988). Well, that was the intent anyway! 
The Housing Allocation Committee was to be comprised of the following members: 
o Chairman: either the Town Secretary or the Assistant Town Secretary of the 
Housing Portfolio of the Cape Town Town Committee 
o Vice-Chairman: Assistant Town Secretary 
o Chief Resident's Officer 
o The Township Managers 
(lkapa Housing Allocation File March 1988, 1988) 
A councillor in whose ward a dispute was to be considered was entitled to attend a 
meeting of the Allocation Committee during consideration of the case, but was not 
permitted to vote. The Committee was given the right to call to the meeting any 
additional person or party who in the opinion of the committee could further inform 
the dispute. The records in the housing allocation files reflected the presence of a 
variety of representatives who attended these meetings on behalf of the applicants, 
such as burial societies, civic associations, street committees, and old age groups. 
Morape describes the Housing Allocation Committee as he remembers it: 
"We had representatives from Council, councillors and then 
representatives from the officials, nonnally the senior housing 
officials ... because they more or less know the history of the area, 












happening ... whenever there is to be a reallocation of that nature. 
then they will report the nature of the case, how do they know the 
history of this house and what recommendations do they bring". 
(Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005) 
Lobi, an ex-Ikapa Councillor who was very involved in housing allocations, 
confirmed Morape's statement, insisting that officials and councillors knew residents 
in their wards personally and endeavoured to create a case to present to the officials 
in order to influence an allocation decision. He argued: 
"It was a question of the officials. You as councillor you have got 
to put your motivation there, points and the letter being submitted 
as an application for a house ... depending on the person who is 
wanting the house you got to find out from this person 'How long 
have you been there? What happened at such and such a time?' 
And so on, and from that you build, you build something to present 
to the officials, because they haven't got the time to talk with these 
people as individuals ... [the officials on the Housing Allocation 
Committee] they wouldn't have time for thaC. (Lobi, pers. comm .. 
6 April 2005) 
The Housing Allocation Committee was obliged to meet on a weekly basis to address 
the backlog in the allocation of houses, but this became hard to maintain as Morape 
recalls: 
"We [the Allocation Committee] had weekly meetings, not the 
general council [where] the allocations were monthly, but when we 
have pending cases it can take more than a month to resolve 
because it was useless really bringing the matter to Council when it 
is not resolved yet. So during that process we are trying to resolve 
that issue, that is why it used to take so long. Maybe the councillors 
as politicians they were also throwing their weight around, but it 
was impossible at times to resolve such cases, more especially 












interested in the house in the sense that he may have his own 
children and knowing very well that the children of the house, most 
of them are useless, he will try to bribe them so that he can get that 
house for his own children". (Morape, pers. comm. April 2005) 
His reference to the personal interests of councillors hinted at corrupt allocation 
procedures among Ikapa councillors, a national trend that was reported by Atkinson 
(1984: p.5). It can be presumed that membership of the Housing Allocation 
Committee provided Councillors with an opportunity to influence the decision-
making process around access to housing. An ex-Councillor expressed the prestige 
and power that he believed was associated with being involved in housing allocation: 
"There was something very important to be known by the 
people all over, that if they approached fme] about a house I 
would fight, listening to the arguments of the person concerned, 
I would fight and put the names of such people to the 
officials .. .If you were popular among the housing allocation 
nothing could happen to you .. .it is something of long standing 
for a number of years ... as a councillor you would have to 
struggle ... even going to the extent of confusing the council 
officials who do the allocation". (Lobi, pers. comm. 6 April 
2005) 
Lobi also refers here to the adoption of underhand tactics by councillors to influence 
allocation decisions. 
Indeed there was much evidence for duplicity among the Ikapa officials in the 
numerous housing allocation files where I found many references to multiple 
allocations of houses to officials, their friends and family. In an interview, Sidina, a 
long-time resident and civic leader in the Ikapa area reiterated this: 
"The officials in the administration of !kapa they played a dirty 
role. They were giving houses to those who were related to them 












is a young woman, they will go and have an affair with that 
woman. 'You are mine as of now you are going to get a 
house' ... Let me tell you Ikapa was corrupt". 
(Sidina, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
Sidina introduced another interesting historical process in which personal housing 
grievances often underlay seemingly political actions: 
"Those days count against the officials '" the people were so angry 
against those people ... it was a problem because people went to 
those they hated most and they would destroy their properties". 
(Sidina, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
Stated differently, decisions around housing had such a profound impact on people's 
lives that individual vendettas against officials related to contested allocation of 
housing were sometimes played out on a personal level, subsumed and often 
unnoticed within the general political climate of resistance to the local authorities. 
The Housing Allocation Committee had to adjudicate many allocation disputes, 
documenting them in monthly reports. Officials adapted formal dispute resolution 
strategies to make them more acceptable to the township residents. Morape was the 
first to draw my attention to the influence of typical African values and behaviour in 
the decision-making process around housing allocation disputes. He explains: 
"The Black concept is that children always remain children; even if 
they are over aged they will stay there. They will always claim that 
this is their home ... So if a man's wife dies, he remarries and the 
wife comes to live with that man, and immediately when that man 
dies these children will tell the woman 'Now you have to go. This 
is our home'. At times they are on good terms and they can talk it 
over, but mostly that doesn't happen. In some cases ... the children 
will leave when the stepmother comes in and they will be living 
elsewhere. Others are maybe married and got their own house, 












immediately when the father has died, naturally they will come to 
bury their father, they will come to Council and start claiming and 
saying 'This is our home"'. (Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005) 
Morape explained that street committees became involved in the process and would 
help to decide to whom a house should be allocated. He said that there was no clear-
cut process whereby, for example, an oldest son was given preference as was 
previously the official given policy: 
"Y ou may find that that the oldest son may be useless and the 
youngest son may be the hard working one, or neither of the sons 
may be worth it, maybe one of the daughters ... The street committee 
will recommend 'Listen now this girl has been the one who has been 
looking after the parents, who has been maintaining the house, and 
who has been co-operating with the street committee' ... Good 
behaviour! They will recommend and we will accept the 
recommendation of the street committee. It doesn't really matter if it 
is sons or daughters. Whoever has been co-operative then they will 
recommend that person ... When there was a controversy they would 
ask somebody to come in and assist them, somebody who would 
know the history of the family to come and give as much input as to 
how much does he know about that particular person". (Morape, 
pers. comm. April 2005) 
This provided further evidence of the traditionally social nature of African decision-
making and the acceptance of this by the African housing officials themselves. 
However, the involvement of street committees did not ensure a fair decision. 
Morape, as an official, was aware that street committees would even collaborate with 
an influential Councillor to obtain an allocation decision in their favour if they had 
vested interests in the allocation of a particular house themselves, throwing the 












''There will also be a wrestle between Council and the street 
committee because some members of the street committees will 
want it [the house] for themselves". (Morape, pers. comm. April 
2005) 
There were therefore many times when the family did not accept the decision of the 
street committee either, often seeking professional legal advice.76 
However, the Housing Allocation Committee also became involved in less socially 
mandated decisions associated with the rent boycotts. During the riots and rent 
boycotts of the mid-1980s the number of rent defaulters in the Ikapa area increased 
dramatically. The accepted practice prior to the riots had been to serve eviction 
notices on rent defaulters, but this had been discontinued during the violence that 
erupted in the townships. From May 1988, however, it became the added 
responsibility of the Committee to keep abreast of any intended evictions of rent 
defaulters. The three superintendents of the townships, namely Langa, Guguletu and 
Nyanga, which included the New Crossroads area, were nominated as the official 
eviction officers. Morape was one of these officials and expressed his anguish at the 
situation he was placed in: 
"It was terrible .. .it was hon·ible ... when they refused to pay the 
Council cut off the electricity. That is the day they came with 
placards and what did they call me this time? 'Morape, White man 
in a Black skin!'" (Morape, pers. comm. 5 April 2005) 
For the officials who lived in the townships themselves these were difficult times, 
positioning them in opposition to the communities among whom they lived. Although 
many officials were indeed corrupt and abused their positions, many others were 
genuinely concerned for the development of their communities and were often 
compromised in having to implement apartheid policies. 
76 This was borne out during an interview with J.J Brink of the attorneys Brinkmann and Hayward 
(17/8/04) as well as in a telephonic interview with D. Landu. a retired legal assistant from Vivian 












The New Crossroads experience: A collaborative relationship with the state 
It was an inherent distrust of the official allocation process that shaped the coping 
mechanisms that developed in New Crossroads. Together with the community's 
determination to ensure the continued process of relocating Old Crossroads residents 
to the houses in New Crossroads, this stimulated the formation of a collaborative 
allocation procedure that was peculiar to New Crossroads at the time of the 
establishment of the community in the early 1980s. This strategy had developed from 
the legacy of the Old Crossroads community, which had found spaces for interaction 
and engagement with the local state. 
The next section briefly describes how the Old Crossroads community established a 
collaborative process with the local authority for the allocation of houses in New 
Crossroads to Old Crossroads residents in the late 1970s. This was to shape the 
processes that later evolved in New Crossroads. 
Informing Net'.' Crossroads history: housing administration in Old Crossroads 
The Old Crossroads community's struggle against the state is a key to understanding 
the housing history of New Crossroads. It influenced the ways in which the New 
Crossroads community later organised and interacted with local government in the 
allocation of houses. 
Old Crossroads was established in response to repressive influx control measures. 
The 'illegal' status of many of Cape Town's African population together with the 
shortage of housing for 'legal' residents and the demolition of several other informal 
settlements by the state, drove thousands of people to establish an informal settlement 
bordering the Ikapa area (see figure 1 on page 4). The residents of Old Crossroads, 
determined to acquire rights to remain in the city, engaged in negotiations with the 
state over a period of several years. Finally, in 1979 Minister Koornhof brokered a 
deal with the leaders of Old Crossroads to provide the community with houses in an 
attempt to move them off the land (Cole, 1987). Situated within the Ikapa area, the 
new houses were to be built for the community in three phases in an area between 












Although the history of the Old Crossroads community has been discussed from a 
variety of perspectives in the literature (Cole, 1987; Boulton, 2002; Hewatt et ai, 
1984; Isaacs, 1989; Maree & Cornell, 1977; Potgieter, 1990), little mention has been 
made of the housing administration and housing allocation processes established by 
the community there. The lack of research on this aspect of organisation in Old 
Crossroads necessitated personal interviews with surviving members of the Old 
Crossroads committee structures, housing officials as well as a community worker 
who had a long term and intimate knowledge of the community?? The history that 
follows has been pieced together from these interviews. 
Between February 1975 and June 1976, from the time when the people first began 
moving onto the land until the declaration of the area as an emergency camp, little 
more than a year, the community of Old Crossroads managed to develop a well-
organised community (Cole, 1987). Under the control of a community-based interest 
group a process evolved to control the way in which houses were shifted and moved 
around, a locally adapted administrative structure was developed, linked to an old and 
trusted Transkei system but with an 'urban twist' (Cole, pers. comm. 20 May 2005). 
Cole explains: 
"There was always an allocation system that was going on 
informally that was sanctioned and it worked up to a point.. . Over 
time obviously corrupt issues entered in, so by the time it came to 
the fact that people were dealing with the new settlement. .. the 
stakes became higher once they were given the right to settle. Still 
not everyone was given the right and that was one of the big issues. 
So not everybody was going to be allocated a house, there was a 
split already from the beginning". (Cole, pers, comm. 20 May 
2005) 
Allhough many members of the old committees have passed away. I was fortunate to be able to 
interview several key figures. Firstly, Josette Cole of the Mandlovu Development Institute. whose 
thirty-year relationship with both the Old and New Crossroads communities, initially in her role as a 
community worker, but later on a more personal level, was an invaluable asset in the research process. 
Cole was able to help me locate members of the Old Crossroads community, who were willing to talk 
about the ways in which the community had organised itself in terms of controlling the housing process 












Underpinning the authority structures that developed in Old Crossroads were the 
i:ihonda71? (Lawrence, pers. comm. 20 May 2005). Ranking lower than chiefs and 
functioning similarly to the traditional rural headmen or wardsmen, the iz.ihonda were 
an urban adaptation of Xhosa rural authority structures, serving to entrench the 
patriarchal nature of traditional Xhosa society in the new urban environment (Cole, 
pers. comm. 20 May 2005). 
Mene, now an elderly woman living in New Crossroads, who was a member of the 
Old Crossroads Women's Committee, explained that the settlement was divided up 
into four, later five, sections with the residents of each section electing an isihonda, 
or chairman as he was known, and a committee to assist him (pers. comm. 16 July 
2005). Although independent within his own section, the chairman was answerable to 
the Executive Committee, the overarching authority structure also elected by the 
residents. New people arriving at the settlement would approach one of the chairmen 
and request permission to settle within his section, and as such he and his committee 
became responsible for allocating space (ibid). 
In the urban context the function of an isihonda was translated from representative of 
the chief to agent for the leader of the Executive Committee and the mayor of Old 
Crossroads, Johnson Ngxobongwana. The izihonda can perhaps be construed as the 
forerunners of the street chairmen later established in New Crossroads. The power of 
the isihonda was not grounded upon traditional sources, but became based on access 
to money and housing. 
Mr. Veto, who was a Township Manager for many years tasked with administering 
housing in the N yanga area during the 1980s and 1990s, believes that the izihonda 
system became corrupt as much of the money they collected from residents was said 
never to reach the mayor but was used to line their own pockets. Lawrence, who was 
also quoted earlier, expressed great respect for isiXhosa traditions, explaining that: 
"[The isihondaJ is the guy who came to see if all was well with 
your kraal. He brings a message from the chief of the area. And 
78 In the isiXhosa language the prefix 'isi' denotes singular, while 'izi' is the plural. Hence the 











you try and translate that, interpolate that into an urbanized 
society and we call it corruption. [The community] are paying 
the guy!" (Lawrence, pers. comm. 20 May 2005) 
Chapter Six 
He believed therefore, that for those not familiar with them, such urban adaptations of 
traditional rural relationships could easily be misinterpreted as corruption. 
The allocation process that developed for the move to New Crossroads was unique at 
that time representing the first occasion that local government worked closely with an 
African urban community to solve a housing issue. However, Cole observed that the 
Bantu Affairs Administration Board officials purposefully engineered alliances with 
the Old Crossroads gatekeepers in order to align themselves with the power structure 
there, and in this way state hegemony over the housing process was subtly 
established (pers. comm. May 2005). The men had closed ranks against the women 
by this stage and Cole spoke of 'a collusion of the patriarchy', as the government 
negotiating team sided with the men of the community (Cole, pers. comm. May 
2005). 
The strong Old Crossroads Women's Committee with its capacity for organising and 
ordering the community (Boulton, 2002; Cole, 1987; Metzer, 2002), frustrated the 
mens' efforts to meet government officials without consulting them, fiercely 
contesting this patriarchy and forcefully involving themselves in the negotiations and 
the allocation process that followed (Cole, personal communication, May 2005). 
Thus, later during the negotiations with the Western Cape Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board for the New Crossroads houses, two Women's Committee 
members represented the women's interests on the Residents Committee (Mene pers. 
comm. 16 July 2005). The influence of these same women would continue during the 
relocation process and in the allocation practices in the new settlement. 
Johnson Ngxobongwana, the Old Crossroads leader, with the assistance of the 
i;:.ibonda and the Women's Committee, drew up waiting lists of Old Crossroads 
residents who wanted to relocate to the houses in New Crossroads, using the numbers 
that had been painted on the shacks during the 1979 Bantu Affairs Administration 












responsible for the final allocation. Ngqaqu, a housing official working with the Old 
Crossroads community at that time, explained that the allocation system for Old 
Crossroads was different from other Cape townships in terms of official practice: 
"It was quite different. When you do allocations we had a system 
we used to call people into the office for screening ... [Old] 
Crossroads was not on a waiting list. The shacks there were 
numbered systematically. What we did we used to write down 
notices and send these out to Old Crossroads ... On Monday lets say 
we call from number 1 to 160 and then they come into the office 
and then we interview them and we open up files for them, a sort of 
screen sheet. So those people who are called into the office are 
asked to bring their I.D documents and their marriage certificates" 
(Ngqaqu, pers. comm. 4 May 2002). 
Thus, in accepting the Bantu Affairs Administration Board survey as the basis for the 
allocation process, the Old Crossroads residents were in effect acknowledging the 
authority of the state. Although they were given a measure of control over the 
process, they were surrendering their cherished independence and traditional systems 
by submitting to administration by a state structure. 
The Old Crossroads community, which had once stood united and defiant. now 
became divided around the issue of relinquishing their hard-earned independence to 
an apartheid structure. While some residents desired the move, many others preferred 
to remain in a secure and known environment. governed by their own elected leaders. 
When the time came for relocation there was inevitably a great sense of insecurity 
and a lack of faith in the apartheid government's ability to broker a fair deaL because 
this was the first incidence of a negotiated deal, a successful engagement between 
African civil society and the apartheid state to address the urban housing crisis. It also 
served to acknowledge the fundamental rights of African people to reside in the city 
and the state's role as the provider of housing. 
However, the proposed housing could not accommodate the entire Old Crossroads 












remembers that the process was for the Executive Committee to call community 
meetings within the settlement, which only those wanting to move to New Crossroads 
would attend (Mene, pers. comm. 9 May 2005). Compilation of the allocation lists by 
the local leaders led to infighting and a constant realignment of shifting interest 
groups. Many residents including the lodgers were not eligible to be considered 
during the initial allocation process as only the houses of residents who had lived in 
Old Crossroads during the Bantu Affairs Administration Board survey had been 
numbered. Many un-numbered residents subsequently appeared on the allocation lists 
however, and at one point several community leaders were arrested for fraud in 
connection with the lists (Cole, pers. comm. 20 May 2005). 
Veto was aware of corrupt practices involving both members of the Council and the 
Old Crossroads Committees even before the move to New Crossroads. He explained 
the corruption as: 
" ... money because you wil1 find that some of the people were not on 
the waiting list but they were allocated houses ... they got first 
preference". (Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
The power to influence the allocation system inherently offered opportunities for self-
enrichment. This induced changing community dynamics as various interest groups 
sought hegemony over the allocation process, even to the detriment of others within 
the same community. 
This section has explained how the community gained agency in the allocation 
process for the move from Old Crossroads through engagement with the local 
authorities. This perpetuated and formalised a system of continued co-operation 
between civic representatives and local authority structures in New Crossroads. The 
next section traces this evolving co-operative process of housing allocation after the 
residents took occupation of the houses in New Crossroads, exploring the disjuncture 












The allocation of houses in New Crossroads: An exploration into competing 
identities and collaborative relationships 
In township areas suffering an acute shortage of accommodation control over the 
process of housing allocation was a powerful asset. In New Crossroads those seeking 
power continuously contested such control. It was for this reason that the 
community's informal structures and their relationships with local government 
changed over time. The reasons for these changes are interdependent and complexly 
interwoven, related as they are to the changing political climate of those times. 
Early days in Nev.' Crossroads 
The first houses in New Crossroads were completed in 1980 but remained empty for 
three months.79 There were several reasons for this: Firstly, the new residents who 
were giving up their homes in Old Crossroads after many years of struggle against 
the state, feared duplicity on the part of the authorities and became insecure about the 
move, which would alter their social networks and their established coping 
mechanisms. Secondly, there was a great deal of intimidation of the Old Crossroads 
people by residents in the surrounding areas of K yanga and Guguletu who resented 
the negotiated housing deal with the squatter community as residents in these areas 
had been on waiting lists for many years and wanted the houses for themselves. A 
third factor was that Old Crossroads people were worried becausc the rental on the 
new houses was necessarily much highcr than the Old Crossroads residents had been 
used to paying for their shacks. The affordability of the houses had been a big debate 
during the negotiations. Mene, a member of the old Executive Committee from Old 
Crossroads and a founding member of the New Crossroads Residents Committee 
expressed the sentiments of many of the Old Crossroads residents at that time: 
"It is nice to live in shacks. You knew there was no money once 
you come to these brick houses. Then there is going to be a 
problem about paying rent. .. some people thought 'We have no 
money. How can we pay rent? We don't have jobs'''. (Mene, 
pers. comm. 9 May 2005) 
79 According to Lawrence (pers. comm. June 2005), these houses had to be guarded by the authorities 












Eventually several of the women, led by leaders of the Old Crossroads Women's 
Committee, decided that failure to move into the houses would result in them being 
given to people from other areas. As Mene recalls: 
"We held a community meeting. Those who wanted to come they 
showed up because they wanted to come into New Crossroads. They 
are not forced to come to New Crossroads, but they were forced some 
of them because these houses couldn't stay empty here because people 
from other communities wanted to move in. They said these are the 
best houses that have been built in the Western Cape because they are 
bigger and if you compare New Crossroads to Guguletu or Nyanga 
there is a vast difference. So the surrounding communities became 
jealous. It was me on the Women's Committee who said it is best for 
us to move in before the other communities take over", (Mene, pers. 
comm. 9 May 2005) 
The final process of physically allocating each specific house was left to the Nyanga 
Housing Office, under the control of Basson80 and his officials such as Ngqaqu, Roxo 
and later his successor Veto (see figure 5 on page 124). 
Veto explained that there were two ways of allocating a house to a family: Either (1) 
in terms of the size required, as there were several different sized houses in New 
Crossroads, (this meant going according to the number of people in the household) or 
(2) according to personal preference. He remembers that some people physically went 
to New Crossroads and picked out the house they wanted and then approached the 
Council with the erf number and requested it. Thus, engagement with local authorities 
occurred even at an individual level. 
80 Basson and Nqaqu are the two officials pictured in the photograph in figure 5 handing over the keys 












Figure 5.Nyanga Housing officials Basson and Ngqaqu handing over the keys to 
one of the first residents in New Crossroads 
(Source Cape Times) 
Initially the rents varied, scaled according to the size of the house. Mene remembers: 
"They were allocated according to our pockets . . . So when we sat 
at the negotiating team we made it clear that whether you are self-
employed, unemployed or employed we need houses . You were 
allocated according to the family, how full it is. Small families had 
one-bedroomed houses. People like Mrs Yanta were not employed, 
but because she was at the forefront of the struggle she was given a 
five-roomed house .. . so she had to pay less money, RI8.00. So the 
five-roomed houses were R23.00, and the unemployed as well they 













Figure 6. Mene's house in New Crosssroads today 
As residents took up occupation of the first houses In New Crossroads street 
committees were established and the street chairmen became answerable to the new 
Residents' Committee that was established as an informal administrative structure. 
The involvement of the street committees over time became an important aspect of the 
official allocation process. Morape explained how the housing officials came to 
consult these committees throughout the Ikapa area over time: 
"[During] the actual allocation ... you will talk to the entire family 
and they will decide. After they have made their decision you call 
in the street committee, but you only call in the street comrnittee if 
there is a dispute between members of the family. So when there is 
a dispute you call in the street committee" . (Morape, pers. comm. 5 
April 2005) 
A Housing Committee was soon established in New Crossroads and became part of 
the formal process administered by the Council, acting as tt;Ie interface between the 
new community and the housing officials. In New Crossroads the street committees 
underlay the informal processes of housing administration adopted by the Housing 












consisting of a chairman, secretary, treasurer and other committee members. Each 
street chairman would report to the Housing Committee on changes in housing 
occupancy. The new committee compiled allocation lists from the information they 
received from the street chairmen and submitted these to the Council, as had been the 
practice in Old Crossroads. 
The legacy of the struggle of Old Crossroads residents for rights to live in the city 
engendered a fierce sense of entitlement to their new homes in New Crossroads, 
especially among the older women who had suffered endorsement out of the city and 
constant harassment by the authorities. Thus, the Residents Committee tried to ensure 
the continued process of accommodating the people who had been a part of the 
negotiation process by controlling the allocation system and the waiting lists from 
within the community. The local Nyanga Housing Office worked from these lists and 
formalised the process. 
The houses had been promised to the Old Crossroads community and they resisted the 
intrusion of 'outsiders' because many of the Old Crossroads residents had not 
received houses in the new township as Mene explains: 
"We carried on working and waiting for the rest because these 
houses were not enough for the community of Crossroads, it was a 
big community... The Backyard shacks were left behind there 
because we couldn't accommodate them all in our houses". (Mene, 
pers. comm. 9 May 2005) 
The officials were however placed in a position to influence the allocation process 
and override community decisions. 
Veto unwittingly referred to the underhand tactics of the officials when illustrating 
how fiercely the New Crossroads community defended their homes from allocation to 
outsiders: 
"I went to see (an anonymous housing official) at Nyanga at that 












Crossroads). As an official you know because most of the 
officials were not on the waiting list they were given houses since 
they were working for the council. But he said to me, his advice 
to me was, he can give me a house there, but I will suffer the 
consequences of that. .. so he is advising me not to go there". 
(Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
Lobi reiterated the defensive nature of the tightly knit New Crossroads community 
saymg: 
"You wouldn't come to New Crossroads if they know that you 
don't belong there". (Lobi, pers. comm. 6 April 2005) 
Thus the Ikapa officials were well aware of the way in which the New Crossroads 
residents regarded residents from communities other than their own and that of Old 
Crossroads as 'outsiders'. 
However, broader national and Ikapa-based political agendas were to upset the 
localised control over the housing allocation process. 
Contestations of agency: Changes in the New Crossroads allocation process 
As explained in prevIOus chapters, the early 1980s was a time of political 
mobilisation and the politicisation of civil society. The meteoric rise of a strong civic 
movement in the Western Cape was a major factor influencing the changes in the 
allocation process in New Crossroads. The New Crossroads leaders resented the new 
political challenge to their control, which was strongly embedded in traditional 
practices that had been so successful in the older settlement in Old Crossroads. Mene 
explained that the leadership structures in New Crossroads, and indeed Old 
Crossroads had always remained 'non-politicised', in other words non-party aligned 
(pers. comm. 9 May 2005). 
However, the link between the New Crossroads community and the Western Cape 












when Johnson Ngxobongwana, the Old Crossroads leader and then also the self-
appointed representative of the New Crossroads community, was elected as its first 
chairman. Mene insisted that although the Western Cape Civic Association became 
involved in the New Crossroads area, it was never part of the process of allocating 
houses there (pers. comm. 9 May 2005), although elsewhere in the Ikapa area WCCA 
had begun to keep its own waiting lists and direct the allocation process on the 
ground (Fadana, pers. comm. 8 April 2005). At this time in New Crossroads control 
of this process was still in the hands of the New Crossroads Housing Committee 
(Mene, pers. comm. 9 May 2005). 
The Residents Committee had effectively entrenched the hegemony of the older 
women from Old Crossroads in the new township, but the emergence of the civics, 
many of which came under the direction of the United Democratic Front after 1983, 
challenged this authority as they attempted to unify the civic associations of the 
Western Cape. 
In the Jkapa area, during the 1985 and 1986 rent boycotts the ANC-aligned United 
Democratic Front recruited support for the banned political party among aggrieved 
residents. Many of the youth, wooed by the promise of radical political change, 
joined the resistance movements in the townships, becoming known as 'comrades' 
(Isaacs, 1989). Both Isaacs (1989) and Cole (1987) have described the antics of 
young comrades in the Ikapa area as they rooted out non-party supporters. Mene 
remembers open battles in the streets of New Crossroads between 'card carrying' 
comrades and other New Crossroads residents: 
"It was the comrades ... they were jealous of us ... they would lock 
us out and [say] we must go back to Crossroads ... "(Mene, pers. 
comm. 9 May 2005) 
Comrades believed that Old Crossroads residents had no right to formal houses in 
New Crossroads and therefore should be expelled to the informal settlements. 
Mene believes that this was really a fight initiated by the 'civics' and the United 












ANC supporters, using the comrades to evict them from their houses. She recalls that 
while some former Old Crossroads residents defected and joined the new political 
movements, many others fled the township, some never to return, among them 
several Residents Committee members accused of involvement in a fund-raising 
scandal around the collection of bail money for several community leaders arrested 
during the rent boycotts. Ncate, who was once a street chairman in New Crossroads, 
has an informed understanding of the changing community dynamics that have 
occurred within the New Crossroads community. Having lived there during the 
period under discussion, he recalls that: 
" ... for the sake of that boycotting the committee leaders ... were 
locked up ... and the community came together and said 'Let us 
collect money' ... Eventually Bishop Tutu came in to help the 
people of New Crossroads by paying bail ... and then these people 
who were collecting the money they misused this money. That is 
the reason why they have been chased away". (Ncate, pers. comm. 
5 May 2005) 
He recalls that the New Crossroads Housing Committee was dissolved after the 
ejection of many of the community leaders during the 1986 riots, and that a new one 
was quickly constituted among the residents (Ncate, pers. comm. 5 May 2005).81 
Fleeing residents had left many houses vacant, which were subsequently allocated to 
'outsiders', residents from the established townships, by the new committee without 
taking the matter to the Council for approval or dispute resolution. They later 
approached the Nyanga Housing office with the list of these new allocations 
requesting that they be registered officially (Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005). 
The Ikapa local authority, placed in a delicate situation by this 'take-over bid', was 
initially unsure how to proceed, given that a new civic group had come forward 
claiming to represent the New Crossroads community, and given that the Black Local 
81 Neate was born in Old Crossroads and later moved to New Crossroads where he became the 
chairman of his street committee. He later became a local SANCO official before being appointed in 












Authorities at this time were suffering from a legitimacy cnSIS of their own. 
Eventually a meeting was called between the Committee and the housing office 
during which the officials approved the 'illegal' allocations in order to avoid having 
houses remaining empty, which often resulted in vandalism (Veto, pers. comm. 11 
May 2005). Clearly, the officials were under pressure to acknowledge the allocations, 
not only for fear of reprisals such as further destruction of property, but also to 
sustain some small level of legitimacy. 
However, in the dynamic political climate of the early 1990s yet another powerful 
actor, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), was to take control 
of the allocation process in New Crossroads, as part of a broader political agenda 
enacted on the regional level after the organisation's establishment in 1992. 
Further contestations and new relationships: SANCO in Nel1' Crossroads 
'Counter hegemony has to start from that which exists, which involves 
starting form 'where people are at'. Such a conception of counter 
hegemony requires 'reworking' or 'refashioning' of elements which are 
constitutive of the prevailing hegemony'. (Hunt, 1990 p. 316) 
In the early 1990s the Western Cape Civic Association and the Cape Housing Action 
Committee were the two biggest civic organisations in the Western Cape. The 
Executive of the Cape Housing Action Committee was pushing the United 
Democratic Front for the formation of a national civic body. The United Democratic 
Front, then the unofficial voice of the banned ANC, set up an ad hoc committee to 
investigate the dissolution of the Front and the establishment of a single national civic 
organisation. Most of the Cape Town civics sent representatives to attend a national 
conference in an attempt to establish a national body, resulting in the founding of the 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) early in 1992 (Fadana, pers. 
comm. 8 April, 2005; Werge, 1992). 
Reiterating Hunt's remark above, SANCO took advantage of the established street 
committee system to gain a foothold in urban African communities at grassroots level. 
Many street chairmen in those early 1990s became local SANCO representatives. In 
the Ikapa area several old informal authority structures were severely undermined as 












There was an underlying tension among the New Crossroads older residents that the 
involvement of the local SANCO branch, which did not have their localised and 
historic concerns at heart, would lead to the loss of their homes. This low-grade fear 
of eviction dated back both to their days in Old Crossroads and to the 'battle of the 
civics' referred to earlier. Mene expressed her own concerns: 
"1 would never join SANCO because SANCO is a political 
structure ... the people of Old Crossroads we struggled as residents 
not as political structures so we don't want to confuse ourselves or 
involve ourselves with SANCO .. .it is SANCO who gave people's 
houses to other people ... there are a few of us from SANCO that 
came from Crossroads, but they changed totally ... we don't want to 
politicise things because once you politicise things we are going to 
lose our rights here in New Crossroads". (Mene, pers. comm. 9 
May 2005) 
It is apparent from these comments that some residents felt that local bodies could 
best address local issues82 and resented the interference of outsiders. 
During 1993, within a year of the establishment of SANCO, their local branch 
concluded an official agreement with the Ikapa Town Council instituting an official 
process whereby the civic would be consulted on all housing matters in the Ikapa 
area, becoming an integral part of the Ikapa Housing Allocation Committee. This 
undermined the other civil society organisations, such as the New Crossroads 
Residents' Committee, by giving SANCO official sanction to intervene in housing 
disputes. 
Thereafter, the New Crossroads branch of SANCO held monthly meetings, receiving 
reports directly from the street committees, just as the New Crossroads Residents' 
Committee had once done. Veto spoke of the national Civic's official status at local 
government level: 
82 It is interesting to note that during interviews about historical experiences it became evident that 
there is currently a resurgence of these sentiments among residents in the Ikapa townships after many 












"SANCO of New Crossroads requested that any dispute should be 
directed to them so that they can discuss it and solve it. If it is 
difficult for them to solve they will refer it to the office. So even 
the residents of New Crossroads knew that they must go to the 
SANCO members. They are gathering at their hall at Piel Koornhof 
[Street]. They know the time of attending those problems. They 
discuss the matter and after that they go to the office and give me a 
report of that. .. Then I had to look at the report, check the file. If I 
don't understand I have to question them ... The SANCO guys you 
see are street committee leaders, and they are from the upper body, 
SANCO". (Veto, pers. comm. II May 2005) 
Thus, local issues could be directed from a higher authority level within the national 
SANCO structure. The relevance of decisions taken at higher levels in terms of local 
community dynamics is obvious, given that the national body had broader political 
agendas that informed their decision-making. 
By 1994 SANCO were also working with the Ikapa Town Council on the newly 
constituted Dispute Resolution Committees. These consisted of housing officials and 
four members of each section of the local SANCO branches (lkapa file 7/3/11102). 
However, the Ikapa Town Council soon became concerned about evidence of 
individual SANCO officials making unilateral allocation decisions. A letter to 
SANCO's regional office in Cape Town in 1994 states: 
"We have noted that some of these recommendations are made by 
single SANCO officials without any indication that the relevant 
executive of the local civic branch had discussed the relevant 
matter. .. In order to overcome any potential for biased decisions 
which could prejudice some of, or all of the interested parties, it is 
hereby proposed that your regional office should assist in creating 
the necessary transparency pertaining to the need for formal letters 
of recommendations from the various branches of SANCO ... [with] 












branch ... with the letter from the relevant street committee of the 
house under dispute enclosed".(Ikapa Archive. File No. 7/3/1/102) 
Indeed, from the lime of the emergence of SANCO and their involvement in the 
Ikapa allocation process many homes in New Crossroads were allocated to 
'outsiders'. Mene was quite clear about their real objectives: 
"SANCO wanted to be dominant and they did nothing [to earn that 
right] ... they put people in people's houses. That is why they gave 
those people because they gave them ANC cards so they were sort 
of recruiting". (Mene, pers. comm. 9 May 2005) 
In other words, Mene believes that broader SANCO political agendas drove their 
involvement in the local housing allocation process as they created a political base for 
the ANC, giving houses in return for support. 
It has been shown how the New Crossroads Residents Committee had quickly become 
established in the official allocation process, working in conjunction with the local 
BLA, but forced by political events to relinquish their position to a politicised group 
of 'comrades', militant young ANC-aligned United Democratic Front supporters. A 
larger SANCO civic structure later built on the successes of these earlier groups using 
the same street committee system to entrench and legitimise their part in the 
allocation system at the local leveL Clearly changing broader political events 
influenced the changes that occun-ed in the allocation process. 
Before concluding this historical analysis of housing allocation in New Crossroads, 
this final section introduces another significant aspect of the allocation process, 
exploring the influence of traditional value systems on the formal and informal 
housing processes. 
Exploring cultural identities: The significance of a house among the amaXhosa 
The strong emotions associated with the allocation of houses are not only to be 












chronic shortage of houses. The Xhosa family home is generally considered to be the 
home of the ancestors. Links to the urban 'ancestral home' have supplanted many of 
those traditionally held in the rural areas, especially where such links have been lost 
or relinquished due to alienation from rural roots. From an anthropological viewpoint, 
adherence to traditional values and the perpetuation of ancestral beliefs among even 
educated modem urbanites is indicative of the continuing importance of such values 
in a contemporary urban setting. 
All the people interviewed for this research, whether or not they were African 
themselves, alluded to the cultural significance of a house for a Xhosa person, be they 
a 'bomer', i.e. one born and bred in the urban environment, or an 'amagoduka " one 
born and raised in a traditional rural setting. In urban areas it is culturally accepted 
that the person who is registered as the legal occupier of a house represents the 
family, making it crucial that the family secures right of tenure to this house. This 
'family home' never loses its status as the seat of traditional ritual activities. Even Mr. 
Veto, born and bred in Cape Town had this to say about Xhosa tradition: 
"We've got culture; we've got customs which must be observed . 
... For instance maybe we are a family of five, four of us we've got 
our own places, but now this one will remain at home. We will allow 
that the house be registered in the name of this person at Guguletu. 
But when we have got cultural things we come back to that house to 
slaughter and those things". (Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
Veto claimed that until the time of his retirement several years ago he had 
continuously stressed at Council meetings how important an understanding of cultural 
tradition was in drafting future housing policy, especially allocation policy. He 
attached strong traditional values to his family home in Guguletu. even though he had 
a horne of his own in another more affluent suburb of Cape Town. Mene reiterated 
this sentiment: 
"What we know this is a family house, we Xhosas, there are times 
in our culture ... even those married children, there are times when 












customs here. They want to move their ancestors, make beer, and 
slaughter, whatever we do. They will come to the family house, 
and it must remain that family house". (Mene, pers. comm. 9 May 
2005) 
Giving cognisance to this tradition, the first step followed by the Ikapa officials 
dealing with allocation disputes was to summon the whole family to discuss the re-
allocation of the house. Officials understood the position of the occupier as the 
representative of the family and the place of the family home in ritual life over 
generations, and not just as a living space. 
Thus, I argue that the cultural importance of a family house underlay much of the 
emotion regarding access to that home and shaped people's reactions to the threat of 
the loss of that home through changing control over the allocation process. In a sense, 
perhaps the rejection by the township residents of the local authorities can also be 
understood in terms of the latter's alienated position, despite the presence of African 
officials, as cultural outsiders who did not espouse the same ritual practices and 
traditional beliefs. 
Concluding remarks 
'In the endless debates that pose 'structure' against 'agency' and ask how 
much our lives are detennined for us and hO\v much by us, we are apt to 
forget that the balance between the two differs depending on where we 
stand in relation to social power', (BozzolL 1991: p,l) 
This chapter unravels the complex history of changing allocation practices in New 
Crossroads, from the time of the establishment of the township in 1980 until the 
official end of the apartheid regime in 1994. It describes the development of 
competing discourses around the rights to control the allocation process, interpreting 
the interrelationships between formal and informal systems during that time. 
Reiterating Bozzoli's statement above, the contested 'agency' to allocate houses in 
New Crossroads engendered changing community dynamics as various civil groups 













The discussion of the official Ikapa housing allocation processes has explained the 
contradictory nature of government policies set against the reality of conditions within 
the townships, negotiated first hand by local government officials who coped with the 
added dilemma of implementing policies amidst a tense and changing political 
climate. It has illustrated how local government officials understood the nature of 
traditional values and practices in relation to housing and adapted official policy 
implementation accordingly. An historical account of the Old Crossroads 
community'S housing administration and allocation processes facilitates an 
understanding of how the initial systems were developed in New Crossroads after 
1980. The authority structure established by the residents was patterned after the 
previous Old Crossroads system, and controlled by some of the same community 
leaders who had moved from the old transit camp to New Crossroads. A discussion of 
the New Crossroads community organizing around housing shed light on the 
collaborative process that developed with the Ikapa Town Council. 
Apartheid policies of separate development and housing for urban Africans created a 
chronic housing shortage and an environment in which involvement in housing 
allocation meant access to power. Officials and councillors alike abused this power by 
influencing allocations, creating mounting distrust of the local authorities among 
residents who turned increasingly to alternative authority structures. The rise of the 
civic movement created new hegemonic powers desirous of a measure of control in 
the allocation process. This chapter has discussed the formation of local and national 
civics in this regard and the effects of both in the context of New Crossroads history. 
Finally, this chapter has attempted to show how the cultural significance of a house to 
Xhosa people, who make up the majority of the African population of the Western 
Cape, has been directly translated and interpreted into local housing allocation 
implementation by officials and residents alike. 
The process of housing allocation offers control over a precious and limited basic 
resource - housing and, I argue, inevitably creates an environment of competing 
interests. The final chapter will analyse the competing discourses that developed with 
regard to housing allocation and how they speak to the ongoing dilemma of housing 













A LANDSCAPE OF COMPETING RELATIONSHIPS AND IDENTITIES 
'Insiders' versus 'Outsiders': Competing identities in Ikapa: 
The political nature of the township landscape during the 1980s, together with 
changes in civic organising, carried with it the inevitability of contestation over access 
to different resources, not only material resources such as houses, but also those 
establishing legitimacy and legality, such as institutional rights and community 
acceptance. In this thesis, I argue that a range of competing interest groups from both 
the Ikapa local authority and the local Lagunya communities came to contest agency 
in the process of housing allocation. Within this context, my research demonstrates 
how definitions of legitimacy and illegitimacy were constructed and at times became 
interchangeable, shaped by competing and conflicting identities and relationships that 
evolved in the township landscape. Such notions of legitimacy and legality in turn 
spoke to the ways in which officials, councillors, activists and residents were 
variously positioned in space and time as either insiders or outsiders, depending upon 
the relationships they formed and the identities they adopted. 
The apartheid state historically only acknowledged 'legal' African urban dwellers, 
creating legislated divisions between those inside the official system, and those 
considered illegal 'outsiders'. Indeed, in the Ikapa area this created irreconcilable 
differences between the two groups, an artificial division that became spatially 
manifested in residential patterns with the 'illegals' living mainly in the peripheral 
informal settlements while the 'legals' had access to more secure forms of tenure 
within the established township areas. These social divisions among Lagunya 
communities resulted in the creation of competing identities among township dwellers 
in their struggles for rights to live in Cape Town and to access houses. 
The history of the Ikapa Town Council and its administration of housing in the 
Lagunya townships can only be properly understood if the range of relationships that 
existed is explored. Therefore, this thesis reveals the complex multi-dimensional 












period. Relationships between state actors and groups from civil society were 
manifested at various scales: from central state departments, through provincial and 
metropolitan levels of government, down to civil society organisations, community-
based groups and personal interactions between individuals, such as local government 
officials and local residents, in places like Old and New Crossroads. These 
relationships resulted from negotiations of complex contested politicised identities, 
enmeshed in various polemics, such as the 'community' versus the 'state', the 
'bomers' versus the 'amagoduka', politicised residents versus non-politicised 
residents, and local officials ambiguously positioned as agents of the state and as 
township residents themselves. 
These various stakeholders, in their quest for legitimacy or access to resources, could 
simultaneously be seen as either 'insiders' or 'outsiders', depending on the nature of 
the particular intersection of interests. For instance the Ikapa Town Council formed a 
partnership with the New Crossroads Residents' Committee, which drew the local 
authority into the ambit of the local community structure and thus legitimated their 
housing administration, while it gave the community some agency in the allocation of 
houses. Neighbourhood groups competing for access to houses ended up collaborating 
with structures from the apartheid state in order to formalise their rights. 
Competing community groups within Lagunya, and New Crossroads specifically, 
often thus posed more of a challenge to each other than did the state as they contested 
agency in the allocation of houses in a bid to legitimise their authority over township 
communities. However, in spite of its rejection by the township residents, the Council 
was nevertheless the 'legal' route through which to access control over the allocation 
of houses, resulting in relationships developing between unlikely bedfellows such as 
the state and local leadership structures These complexities mirror Kemeny's 
argument that: 
" .. .influence over state apparatuses gIves vested interests 
considerable power to define or redefine the social relations of 













I argue, therefore, that housing issues specific to the Ikapa area shaped the way in 
which community relationships evolved, even though these interactions often 
contradicted the political language of the time in which urban Africans were 
supposedly standing together to resist the apartheid state and fight for political rights. 
In the next section I explore the historical intersection of government and community 
structures and their competition for agency in the process of housing allocation in the 
Ikapa area, highlighting the changing identities of role players in the complex urban 
fabric. I begin by interrogating how the Ikapa officials adopted different 'faces' for 
different 'friends', be they actors from the state or from the township communities, in 
an effort to achieve some measure of credibility and acceptance. 
Suffering an identity crisis: Positioning Ikapa officials 
Ikapa officials were faced with a crisis of identity, employed by the apartheid state to 
implement repressive policies in their own communities. They had to position 
themselves effectively in relation to each of the various stakeholders with whom they 
interacted, from the national and provincial, regional and city authorities they were 
answerable to, as well as to the communities who saw local officials as 'puppets' of 
the apartheid regime and resisted them as legitimate local government agents. 
Exacerbating their identity as agents of the state, officials were also inextricably 
wound up in the National Management System (Borraine, 1989; Phillips et ai, 1988). 
Their involvement with the repressive state security system reduced any prospects of 
legitimising the local authority structure, positioning the Council inside the very 
engine of the apartheid state at that time. This section explores officials' juggling of 
their identities as agents of the state and as community residents of the African 
townships they administered. 
Even among the Lagunya township communities the officials interacted with a range 
of different groups. As many of the officials came from the established townships 
themselves, their attitudes often mirrored those of their own local community, for 
example in their animosity towards hostel dwellers and informal settlement dwellers. 
They were ambiguously situated between the traditional tenets of an African lifestyle 












administration learned in the course of their official duties. The officials therefore, 
juggled a variety of identities that, although existing simultaneously, were very 
different in character. 
Bound by a multiplicity of unrealistic rules and regulations laid down at central 
government leveL officials themselves circumvented many rules in an effort to make 
their administration workable. Their efforts reiterate Kemeny's depiction of the local 
state and housing administration in which: 
" ... the [local] state may find itself torn between central government 
policy and the pressure emanating from local social relations In 
response to local-specific housing conditions". (1992. p 44). 
Reflecting just such a dilemma, the Ikapa officials sought spaces for engagement with 
the township communities, adopting certain traditionally acceptable practices in 
housing allocation such as family 'indabas', also drawing in street committees and 
other local civic groups to aid them in dispute resolution. This contrasted with the 
state's prescribed allocation process that failed to allow for social discussion and 
sanction, the traditional way of legitimising decisions in African society. Such 
'informal' practices helped to ameliorate the stringency of apartheid legislation, 
earning official decisions legitimacy in the eyes of township residents who in this way 
gained some agency in the housing process. 
Generally the literature casts BLA officials in the mould of the 'bad guys.' 83 
Heymans and White (1991) contend that most township residents generally 
considered the officials to be corrupt and indeed this often was the sad reality. In the 
Ikapa area Kahanovitz (1988) reeords stories of councillors awarding jobs and trading 
licences to friends, while press reports in Cape newspapers record the embezzlement 
83 Interviews often felt like de-briefing sessions as the ex-Ikapa officials and councillors availed 
themselves of the opportunity to have their own motivations. sentiments and experiences while 
working for the apartheid state captured for posterity. Indeed as iterated earlier, it was one of the 
intended purposes of this research to be able to interrogate the 'bad guy' image of local government 












of money and the bribery of officials for government tenders (Die Burger 13111/93; 
Cape Times 2815/93; Cape Argus 24/2/94; Cape Times 2511/9484 ). 
In interrogating this negative stereotyping of Ikapa officials, who were precariously 
placed between the competing interests of the apartheid state and the Lagunya 
communities in the 1980s, my research reveals that many Ikapa officials were unfairly 
branded, identified as agents of the state and automatically scapegoated in the often 
violent political climate of the time. While Heymans and White (1991), Shubane 
(1991), Swilling et al (1991) among others have focused on the negative public image 
of officials, they have not examined the personal experiences of the officials 
themselves, and there is little account of the realities of township administration for 
the officials and councillors themselves. 
In addressing this lacuna my research counteracts much previously negative reporting 
by recording the experiences of the Ikapa officials as they struggled to administer the 
townships. Interviews with ex-Ikapa employees provided insights into the nature of 
the administration of the Lagunya townships during the BLA period, the types of day-
to-day problems officials encountered in their interactions with the local residents. 
Some testified to their exasperation with a system fraught with inadequate resources 
and unrealistic policies and unfair practices. Many knew the area and the township 
communities intimately, and were often challenged with contradictions of purpose. 
Others feared community reprisals and felt sadness and terror at the death of fellow 
workers. 850fficials were also often thwarted in their effons to address local issues by 
higher tiers of authority such as the Western Cape Administration Board, the Western 
Cape Development Board, and later the Cape Provincial Authority (Cooper and 
Kaplan, 1983: p. 19).86 This created a crisis for local officials, situating them outside 
both the state and the community, their legitimacy challenged from both sides. 
8. Page numbers are missing from these references because the archives of the Cape Times and The 
Cape Argus that cover this period consist of themed scrapbooks contained in the South African 
National Library in Cape Town in which dales and page numbers are usually not recorded. 
85 Batt remembered sadly the death of two associates in the townships. This was the last straw that led 
him to resign on behalf of his family out of fear for his own life (pers. Comm., 2004). 
86 Even the rezoning of an erf in Guguletu could only be approved in principle by the Council as it was 
subject to final approval by the Community Services branch of the Provincial authority (Ikapa Minute 












Despite their ambiguous position as agents of the state and 'illegitimate' 
representatives of their own communities, which placed them in great personal 
danger, there were three main concerns that encouraged officials to ride out the 
stormy seas of often-violent political change within the BLA structure. 
Firstly, there were those officials who genuinely believed in the process of reform that 
was being promoted by the state and who wanted to be a part of the transformation to 
more democratic forms of local government. A well-placed White official initiated a 
hostel-redevelopment programme of his own III order to supply family 
accommodation, while another African official, concerned with putting the interests 
of his own community first, greatly admired the work ethic of the 'more educated' 
White officials with whom he worked. For him these values and principles were the 
essence of effective administration, essential for improving and developing the 
townships. All the African officials interviewed expressed similar sentiments, having 
established enduring friendships with many of their White colleagues. 
The racial segregation entrenched through apartheid policies was being tested by 
those meant to enforce it, the local government officials themselves, who in their 
everyday interactions were coming to know and understand each other's values, 
thereby developing a mutual respect for each other which endured over the years.87 
Secondly, there were those who, while distrusting the government's reform 
programme, firmly believed that they were better placed within the system to address 
the grievances of their impoverished communities. When questioned one African 
official motivated his reason for becoming a state official saying' Well, what would 
you doT implying that working within the state system was the only course open to 
seriously minded African reformers.88 When asked why he remained within the 
system after a grenade attack that nearly cost him his life, Lobi, a retired Ikapa 
councillor maintained that he had strongly believed that political reform for African 
87 Indeed, the White official mentioned earlier was in the habit of staying with one of the community 
leaders at his Eastern Cape traditional home, and claimed to have reciprocated the favour in his own 
home at a time when this was forbidden by the very laws he was tasked with upholding (Lawrence, 
pers. comm. 20 May 2(05). 
88Morape, a retired township manager who is now elderly, remains a tireless campaigner for the 
upliftment of his own community and continues to work for the Independent Electoral Commission 












people was imminent and that his position as a councillor for Ikapa enabled him to 
promote the interests of the people within his own ward, especially in terms of 
h . 89 OUSIng. 
Thirdly, local government posts represented the obvious benefits of permanent 
employment, access to housing, and other resources for local officials and their 
families. For councillors, who did not receive a salary, there were other motivations. 
Many had personal agendas, such as acquiring wealth and business rights. Officials 
were sometimes well placed within the BLAs to satisfy these aspirations. For 
example, it was 'common' practice for officials to be given houses, one of the 'perks' 
of being local government employees although this was not 'official' practice. In an 
environment in which housing was in critically short supply this was certainly a 
contributory factor in enticing people to become members of the local authority 
structure.90 Membership of the Housing Allocation Committee further empowered 
those officials involved in the process of housing distribution, thus creating 
opportunities for corrupt practices such as bribery and favouritism in order for them to 
amass wealth and prestige.91 
Like Bloch's (1982), Kahanowitz's (1988) and Rammala's (1987) contentions that 
most councillors were drawn from the educated African 'bourgeoisie', who used their 
positions to access houses and business rights for themselves, their friends and 
families, I found evidence of the same in the records of the Ikapa Town Council. For 
example, the tenders for business sites frequently reflected the names of the 
councillors and their family members. Agency in the allocation of housing and land 
meant power in one's community. 
89 Lobi's sentiments are not altogether trustworthy. He was suspended from Ikapa after being 
implicated in a corruption scandal (Cape Argus, 30110/93; Cape Argus, 24/2/94; Cape Times 2511194). 
Comments made by other interviewees suggest that he was far from honest and involved for his own 
ends. 
90 The Ikapa files showed that many officials were forwarding their studies, awarded bursaries by the 
Council, while in the early 1990s many employees were given driving lessons and awarded their 
licences. Clearly there were many such additional perks for employees. 
91 It was common knowledge in the townships that men would even offer their wives' 'temporary 
services' to councillors in return for a house being allocated to them (Sidina, pers. camm. II May 













But it was not only the Ikapa officials who had a variety of motivations for staying in 
positions of power and influence. Township activists in a variety of organisations had 
similar divisions of interest. 
Divided townships: The politics of access to resources 
Township society far from a homogenous, unified group standing in opposition to the 
state, was itself divided into multiple layers of competing interests shaped by various 
histories. Differences were manifested between the 'amagoduka' and the 'bomers', 
the traditionalists and the modernists, and the politicised versus the non-politicised 
residents, creating a complex range of relationships that were often tenuous and short-
lived. The next section explores several of these associations and how they related to 
struggles over access to resources. 
'Down with the State ': Contradictions of faith 
Despite the political rhetoric calling for the destruction of the BLAs, Lagunya 
township residents were nevertheless constrained within a deprived material 
environment in which access to precious resources such as housing was paramount. 
Struggles to access housing underlay the relationships that developed with the local 
authority structures. Political resistance to, and rejection of, the BLAs was one thing, 
but the realities of living in poverty in the crowded Lagunya townships required 
overlapping strategies to gain agency in the state housing process. I refer to the 
strategies of the township dwellers as 'contradictions of faith', for while rejecting the 
local authorities local communities nevertheless chose to associate with them in order 
to access critical resources like housing. 
Township residents in Ikapa, motivated by the larger civics like the Western Cape 
Civic Association (WCCA) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) as well as the 
smaller community-based organisations, while loudly rejecting the BLAs, were 
simultaneously collaborating with those same authorities in order to gain access to 
houses and some part in the housing allocation process. Such collaboration had begun 
during the days of the Bantu Affairs Administration Board. Although disliked and 
despised for their heavy-handed actions, such as shack demolitions, endorsement of 












Crossroads community nevertheless drew the Board into a negotiated deal for 
residency rights and the provision of houses. Likewise, the New Crossroads Residents 
Association maintained what can be described as a symbiotic relationship with the 
Ikapa officials in order to gain agency in the allocation process. Both parties benefited 
from the arrangement, with the Residents' Association gaining a measure of control 
and the council a level of legitimacy and acknowledgement. 
Although at the beginning of the BLA era this collaborative relationship existed 
uniquely in the New Crossroads area, associations between the local authority and 
various community groups were developing in all the Lagunya townships as other 
community-based organisations began to engage in housing disputes. This 
cooperative atmosphere signalled the beginning of community participation in 
township processes that was to become state policy during the Transitional local 
government period of the early 1990s. 
Given the shortage of housing in the Ikapa area, I argue that it was inevitable that the 
power to allocate such a precious resource would cause changes in local community 
dynamics as various role players strove to gain agency in the process of allocation. 
The collaborative process that had developed between the Ikapa Town Council and 
the New Crossroads Residents' Association, which gave partial agency in the 
allocation of houses to members of the New Crossroads community, was later 
contested by other township organisations wanting access to New Crossroads houses. 
The antagonistic relationship between the people of New Crossroads and the residents 
of the established Lagunya townships must be understood in terms of other competing 
identities existing in the African townships at this time. Negative attitudes towards the 
hostel dwellers and the informal settlement by the established township residents had 
been to some extent artificially fabricated by the state through their influx control 
measures and their divide-and-rule strategies (Borraine, 1989), creating tangible 
divisions among African urban society. Wilkinson suggests that the state's 'reform' 
programme generally: 
" ... maintained a clear distinction within the African population 












residence in the 'White' urban centres, and 'outsiders' living in the 
homelands and 'White' rural areas". (1998: p.222) 
These aspects of internal township division are explored within the Lagunya context 
in the sections that follow. 
Animosity between the 'Borners' and the 'Amagoduka' 
There was a perception among the established township residents that the migrants 
were different, still espousing the old traditional behaviour of the rural Xhosa people, 
which was considered out of place in the urban environment, where peoples' value 
systems were different and education had created an awareness of modern 
Westernised behaviours. This 'insider' and 'outsider' polemic had profound 
implications for social structuring within the Lagunya townships, the community 
organisations that were formed, the relationships that developed, and the actions of 
community groups in defence of their positions as 'insiders' or 'outsiders'. The 
animosity of the 'borners', or 'City Blacks' as Fadana (pers. comm. 8 April 2005) and 
Veto (pers. comm. 11 May 2005) referred to them in their interviews, towards the 
'amagoduka' or traditional rural migrants, underlay some of the political agendas of 
the civic movements. 
The derogatory attitude towards the 'amagoduka' can perhaps be interpreted as a class 
issue. The officials that were interviewed believed that in established township society 
the 'amagoduka' beld an inferior status. Todes and Walker (1991) reiterate this, 
suggesting that influx control policies during the 1980s consolidated an 'insider-
outsider' dichotomy, introducing the concept of 'qualified' access to houses (1991: 
p.6) thereby stratifying urban Africans into the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. 
The division of interests between the two groups was highlighted by the omission of 
the informal settlement dwellers and the hostel dwellers from the early civics. This led 
to the formation of strong alternative civic groups such as the Western Cape Squatter 
Association and the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association representing the 
interests of these 'outsiders', whose grievances and interests were in many ways 












Although in their official capacity they had to administer both groups, Ikapa African 
officials exhibited the same bias. My interviews revealed their animosity towards 
informal dwellers who were considered 'outsiders', and spoken of in derogatory terms 
as being 'uncivilised', 'inferior' people from the rural areas with old-fashioned 
traditions.92 Although this may have been a somewhat subliminal and therefore 
unintentional bias, there is no doubt that such sentiments to some extent coloured the 
judgement and decisions of local officials when it came to the fair distribution of 
resources to township dwellers.93 Several interviews with Ikapa African officials 
resonated with these tones of 'otherness'. Veto clear! y expressed his sentiments: 
" ... the way they grew up is different, it is not the same. People who 
were born and grew up in the rural areas, fighting is nothing to them, 
they are used to fighting, grew up fighting you know, playing with 
sticks and assegais". (Veto, pers. comm. 11 May 2005) 
This illustrates that although African society was united in its resistance to the 
apartheid government, stratification among urban Africans nevertheless existed and 
was in some ways a result of the spatial engineering of the state. 
The established 'City Blacks' of Lagunya had been waiting many years for houses, 
partly because of the state's moratorium on the building of houses for urban Africans. 
Their animosity towards rural migrants was intensified by the state's decision to 
provide the people of Old Crossroads with new houses before providing for the needs 
of the established residents in the overcrowded older townships. I suggest that the 
contestation of agency in New Crossroads was, therefore, not simply a neighbourhood 
struggle, but was driven by the larger Lagunya civics such as WCCA and the UDF, 
and later SANCO. Their motivation for challenging the New Crossroads leadership 
9:: The perception that informal settlement dwellers were all rural migrants was a misnomer, which has 
been verified in the research of Fast (] 995a), and Mazur and Qanguly ( 1995) among others. 
9.< After intensive negotiations between the Minister of Co-operation and Development and the Cape 
Town Town Council, 3000 core houses were released in Khayelitsha to residents of Ikapa in August 
1985. Kruss (1987) records that the Ikapa mayor, Njoli, who was in charge of the homeownership 
scheme, acknowledged that these houses had been previously reserved for residents from Old 
Crossroads. Lobi, an ex-Ikapa Councillor also admitted to attempting to accommodate residents from 
the established areas before the informal dwellers (pers. comm. 6 April 2(05). This substantiates my 













was related to their animosity towards the amagoduka from Old Crossroads who were 
living in new state houses. Their jealousy of the 'outsiders' ability to negotiate houses 
motivated the residents of the other townships to oust the leadership structure within 
the New Crossroads community in order to gain access to the houses.94 
However, there was also counter resentment on the part of the informal settlement 
dwellers towards the 'bomers', evident in Veto's remarks about the people of New 
Crossroads: 
those people are from the rural area, their attitude is very 
negative towards people who are born here in the cities". (Veto, pers. 
comm. 11 May 2(05) 
Searching for legitimacy of their own, the informal dwellers, or 'outsiders', had 
gained entry into the official system, becoming 'insiders' within the official housing 
mechanism of the Ikapa Town Council; while Ikapa officials, who were considered 
'outsiders' by the communities they administered, by working with the New 
Crossroads community effectively became 'insiders', receiving community sanction 
and some element of legality. 
The animosity between the 'borners' and the 'amagoduka' can be further explained as 
the conflict between traditional and modern values and practices among township 
residents, which was manifested in social actions and administrative practices. 
'Traditional' versus 'modern '.' A clash of identities in the urban context 
Established township residents regarded the informal dwellers as unsophisticated and 
inferior because of their strong adherence to archaic rituals and traditional practices.95 
9-1 A woman interviewed, who grew up in Guguletu in the BLA period, explained how she and her 
friends were in the habit of taking a short-cut through New Crossroads when walking home from 
school, just to admire the wonderful new houses there, which. she says were the talk of the town 
(Mpambo, pers. comm., June 2(05). 
9:; This is not unique to the South African situation. For instance in the urban environment of Istanbul 
Robins and Askoy (1995) remark that: 'There is a great cultural divide between those who consider 
themselves to be 'western' and 'civilised', and consequently the true Istanbulians, and those who they 












While Veto spoke of the perpetuation of stick fighting in Old Crossroads (pers. comm. 
11 May 2005), Lawrence showed me photographs of the induction of sangomas in 
Old Crossroads (pers. comm. 20 May 2005), to demonstrate the perpetuation of rural 
traditions in the urban areas. 
In contrast, official processes were built on modernist, formal written procedures 
according to legal prescriptive form, that were unfamiliar to many township residents, 
many of whom were uneducated. The research established that in order to administer 
communities who still adopted traditional processes Ikapa officials sometimes 
adopted traditional methods of decision-making.96 This gave their decisions greater 
legitimacy, making them acceptable to township residents, who, although not 
unanimously embracing traditional practices and values to the extent of the 
amagoduka. nevertheless espoused some of them. Once agam, this reflects a 
dichotomy between insider/outsider identities, with the cultural practices of African 
township residents differentiating them from other groups. 
In some ways the African local government officials were trapped between the two 
systems, tasked with implementing 'modern' forms of authority, but having been 
inculcated themselves with traditional methods and values, which they understood to 
be the accepted ways of the township populations. Many African officials came from 
the ranks of the better educated and were keen to espouse new modern practices, but 
were faced with the reality of trying to impose them on an African urban society still 
steeped in tradition. Oranje, for instance, argues that although traditionalism is said to 
be re-emerging in South Africa, there is a counter argument that in fact it never went 
away (2003. p.176). Indeed, during my research the perpetuation of such practices 
among 'modernised' urban Africans came to light. Thus, for example, on moving into 
a new home, it is still traditional among the amaXhosa, to slaughter an animal and 
perform certain rituals (pers. comms. Morape 5 April 2005; Mene 9 May 2005; Veto, 
11 May 2005) (see figure 7 on page 151). 
%This may support Fitzgerald's suggestion (1990. p. 104) that civil society in South Africa is essentially 
different in nature from civil society in other parts of the world because of the intrinsic importance of 












Figure 7. Ceremony welcoming the ancestors, 17 November 2005. 
Indigenous African practices remained important to township residents and were re-
interpreted in the urban setting during the BLA period in the lkapa area, and 
specifically in New Crossroads. Traditions such as family indabas were incorporated 
into local official processes because the state had failed to recognize the importance of 
tradition for urban Africans. I would suggest however, that there were degrees to 
which rural and urban Africans maintained their ancestral traditions that effectively 
set them apart from one another in the urban environment. For example, chapter six 
has discussed how the people of Old Crossroads adhered more vehemently to 
traditional customs than residents of the established Lagunya townships. However, 
complex political undertones created yet other divisions among Ikapa residents. 
PoLiticised and non-politicised society 
By the mid-1980s there was a clash of interests between residents and groups within 
the townships in terms of whether or not they were party-aligned insiders or apolitical 
outsiders. Many community-based organisations became affiliated with the ANC-
aligned UDF. This was to shape the history of the Ikapa area and has been traced in 












essentially divided the community between older apolitical residents and politically 
motivated groups that were predominantly younger. 
The early informal authority structures in both the Old and New Crossroads 
communities had remained politically neutral, believing that this would better ensure 
effective leadership and decision-making (Mene, pers. comm. 9 May 2005). This 
historic neutrality underlay the resentment of the New Crossroads Residents 
Committee towards the local civics that were aligned to the CDF from 1983, and later 
towards ANC-affiliated SANCO in the 1990s. 
This empirical evidence supports the observations of Jacobs (1992) that the earlier 
civics "popularised the idea of non-party political residents' organisations that 
represent ordinary people on matters that affect their daily lives" (p. 23). Thus, it 
appears that the older leaders distrusted the political nature of the civics and did not 
believe that they could represent the best interests of their community in which their 
own hegemony was well entrenched. 
Debates about 'insiders' versus 'outsiders' shaped identities and relationships between 
actors from the state, such as local government officials, and community-based 
organisations and residents in Ikapa. However, issues of contested legitimacy and 
legality also informed these issues. Analytically I argue that role players and their 
actions can be judged simultaneously as legitimate or illegitimate, legal or illegal. 
Questions of legality/illegality and legitimacy/illegitimacy 
The complexity of relationships and identities already discussed, also speak to the 
various ways in which legality/illegality and legitimacy/illegitimacy were articulated 
in housing allocation processes in the BLA period. Although housing allocation was 
determined by prescribed state policy and implemented by the local authorities as 
agents of the state, the Lagunya residents themselves had not mandatcd the Ikapa 
local authority to represent their interests and did not recognise the legitimacy of the 
state. Therefore, the regulations regarding housing allocation were considered 












Community participation conferred legitimacy upon official decisions, by allowing 
township communities to work within the 'legal' system of the state. 
Thus, the Ikapa Town Council wavered between vanous degrees of legality, 
depending on the particular intersection of interests. In implementing state policies it 
was within the legal framework of the state regime but considered illegitimate by the 
people of the townships. However, by collaborating with neighbourhood groups, who 
rejected the state, the Ikapa officials gained some community sanction. Where 
'modern' official processes clashed with the 'traditional' social decision-making 
methods familiar to township residents, the officials incorporated the latter into the 
official processes in order to legitimate apartheid administration. 
By contrast, the Lagunya community organisations were elected by the township 
residents themselves and were directly accountable to them. These local organisations 
received growing recognition from township residents as their legitimate 
representatives and were increasingly supported due to their understanding of 
localised issues and shared histories.97 For instance, the New Crossroads case shows 
that neighbourhood interests were promoted by the Residents Association because of 
a shared history of negotiation for houses, while Fadana (pers. comm. 8 April 2005) 
recalled how WCCA compiled its own waiting lists for houses in the Lagunya 
townships at a time when Morape (pers. comm. 5 April 2005) admitted that the 
official waiting lists were ignored by township residents and officials alike, having 
become obsolete and unusable. It is evident that local residents trusted their civic 
groups to allocate houses fairly, even though state processes could bestow 
questionable 'legal' rights. 
9
7 
The civics had, according to Jacobs, 'a strong attachment to the local area [and] a capacity to define 
local grievances' making decisions that were 'appropriate to the local context' (1992: p.24). 
Community buy-in essentially invested the civics with legality and legitimacy within the townships. 
Jacobs (1992) notes that this eventually led to the recognition of the civics as the legitimate 
representatives of the township communities hy government business and international aid groups and 












Local government housing administration and changing state paradigms 
Changes in urban policies and local housing administration structures during the 
apartheid era reflected the state's quest for legitimacy in the African townships, 
acknowledging the critical importance of housing in generating civic challenges to the 
state's authority. During the 1980s, the state grappled with shifting ideologies around 
residency and housing rights for urban Africans, experimenting with changing 
policies and administration systems. In the Western Cape the Coloured Labour 
Preference Policy, which denied permanent residency to most urban Africans in the 
Western Cape, perpetuated the relationship between access to accommodation and 
permanent employment in order to safeguard employment for the Cape Coloured 
people. This clashed with the changing ideologies of the central state. 
In the Lagunya townships the critical shortage of housing and the chronic conditions 
of overcrowding shaped the ways in which officials and residents alike contested 
control over the allocation of houses. Although many 'illegal' or 'informal' housing 
processes had been in practice for many years (Fast, 1995a: p 275), subverting the 
official housing administrative system, the rent and service boycotts of the mid-1980s 
saw direct community confrontations with the state around housing issues, 
coordinated by the civic groupings that had emerged after the 1976 riots (Frankel, 
Pines, & Swilling, 1988). 
Making increasing efforts to legitimise Africans rights to live and work in the city the 
state launched its 'Great Housing Sale' in 1983 with the intention of selling off state 
housing to registered occupiers (Gardner, 1997). Kruss (1987) reports that in the 
townships of Lagunya the civics coordinated a campaign against the sale of houses, 
which failed to answer urban Africans basic lack of rights. Township dwellers 
understood that while lessening the duties of the state to provide housing, such an 
offer substantially increased their responsibility for their own housing (Rasool, 
1984).98 
98 Mabin and Parnell (1995), Grassroots newspaper (April, 1988), and the Ikapa archive record that 
many of the buildings in the Lagunya townships in fact warranted serious repairs before they could be 












There is little specific mention in the literature of the allocation of houses other than 
in primary sources such as government policy documents (Republic of South Africa, 
1977, Republic of South Africa, 1982) and Fast's thesis on Nyanga housing (1995a). 
However, struggles to control housing allocation emerged as a pivotal aspect of 
housing administration in my research. In acknowledgement of the critical nature of 
the allocation of houses in the townships, for instance, in 1988 the Ikapa Town 
Council established an official mechanism specifically to tackle this task, the Housing 
Allocation Committee. The allocation of houses necessitated the identification of 
legally registered occupiers, a process fraught with a variety of problems such as the 
use of subversive strategies by residents and councillors alike in order to lay legal 
claim to houses. 
[n the Ikapa townships other technical and bureaucratic procedures also complicated 
the registration process. Registration of titles to houses was only possible after the 
opening of township registers, which required professional surveying and the 
production of general plans (Royston, 2002). This could only be achieved after the 
identification of municipal boundary lines, which was stalled at provincial 
government level while the placement of municipal boundaries was disputed (Ikapa 
File. Agenda and Minutes June 1988). This delayed the registration of ownership until 
the early 1990s. While the Lagunya communities blamed the local authority, the Ikapa 
officials were effectively powerless to begin the transfer of property process until the 
township registers were opened. 
The shortage of housing in all the Western Cape townships continued to grow and by 
the early 1990s the shortfall was estimated at over a hundred thousand units (Driver, 
1992). In response to the resulting proliferation of informal settlements and the 
continued influx of people into the urban areas, the state resorted to harsh repressive 
mechanisms such as the use of 'Hut Squads' to demolish any new informal 
settlements, introducing new policies such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
to deal with the mushrooming of squatter areas. However, in spite of its ruthless 
attitude to 'rural outsiders', the state's support for the established 'legal' township 
dwellers increased with the inception of a financial aid scheme to facilitate housing 












In the poor crowded Lagunya townships, access to housing was necessarily a rough 
terrain in which the rights to allocation were often bitterly contested. Thus, the Ikapa 
Town Council shaped an allocation procedure that, although prescribed by official 
government policy, also involved the use of family indabas and community groups in 
order to achieve community sanction. 
My empirical investigation into the allocation of houses in New Crossroads traces the 
complex nature and the implementation of allocation processes, exploring the 
interrelationships that developed between various role players from local government 
and the local communities. In New Crossroads the process of allocation was initially 
quite different from the other Lagunya townships, involving collaboration between the 
Ikapa local authority and the New Crossroads Residents' Committee. This process, 
which benefited both the local council and the Nev.' Crossroads community, was a 
legacy of the Old Crossroads Executive Committee that had established a similar co-
operative process with the local authority prior to the move to New Crossroads. While 
the Ikapa Town Council received recognition for its allocation decisions from a local 
community, the community established some control over their own housing 
destinies, simultaneously excluding residents of other township communities from 
gaining access to houses in New Crossroads. 
Community organisations In the Lagunya townships continuously contested the 
allocation process in New Crossroads, seeking a measure of agency motivated by their 
own vested interests in the houses there. This speaks clearly to the analytical themes 
that have developed during this research around the changing relationships and 
competing identities that existed in the complex township environments of the BLA 
period. 
Concluding remarks 
Mabin and Parnell (] 995) argue that the role of local government has generally been 
underestimated in terms of its mediating function between "conflicting ideological 
and material imperatives" (p.46). This research reflects the truths inherent in this 












allocation processes within the Ikapa area, demonstrating the nature of the interactions 
between local communities and the state. It contributes to our understanding of how 
local government officials historically mediated the implementation of central 
government ideologies in urban townships, shaped by particular historical legacies, 
material inadequacies, and changing community dynamics. which in tum informed 
the responses of both local government officials and local residents. 
My findings resonate with the broader literature on the place of 'insiders' and 
'outsiders' in South African townships, both past and present. While Wilkinson 
(1998) has shown how the state engineered social divisions through its influx control 
measures, and Todes and Walker (1991) have contextualised this same argument in 
terms of changing gendered access to accommodation resulting from housing 
legislation, my research, while reflecting the same state influences on creating 
divisions of interest, has also shown ways in which differences were constructed and 
used in township struggles for housing. These tensions were expressed in terms of 
conflicts between traditional and modern values and practice, and political and non-
political identity. 
In many ways this research reflects the contemporary situation in the Jkapa area 
today, where housing remains in critically short supply, where waiting lists are still 
fraught with queue jumping and unfair practices, and where insecurity of tenure 
undermines the lives of the urban poor, perpetuating apartheid housing grievances. In 
this respect Cross's more recent work in informal settlements in the Ikapa area reflects 
the continued manifestation of the 'insider' versus 'outsider' polemic. She states: 
" ... that the central identifying characteristic of communal tenure is 
its identification of right holders with a specific bounded community 
[that] separates [people] into insiders and outsiders; and limits land 
rights to insiders". (1993: p. 3) 
It is interesting to note that Cross relates this identification of rights to land in terms of 












" ... with their perceptions of what is legitimate, as opposed to what is 
prescribed in the official tenures. (2002: p. 4) 
Thus, township residents continue to by-pass official processes in order to access land 
and housing, resources that have remained in critically short supply, in spite of the 
democratisation of local government in South Africa today. 
My research has contributed to the historical record of the administration of the 
African townships during the time of the Black Local Authorities, filling a lacuna in 
Western Cape history, the era of the Ikapa Town Council, which due to the 
particularly violent nature of those times had not previously been recorded. This thesis 
has traced the institutional history of the local authority structure in terms of policy 
and structural changes in the Ikapa jurisdictional area. With a particular focus on 
housing history, it has recorded the realities of implementation of state policies by 
local government officials, investigating the personal experiences of members of the 
Council, as well as various community leaders and residents in order to 
comprehensively cover a past that is fast disappearing. 
Adding to an understanding of the nature of township relationships that evolved in 
response to the critical lack of resources, particularly housing, my thesis demonstrates 
how actors from both the state and the local community strategised around the 
constraints of the Lagunya environment, in terms of both official ideologically-driven 
policy, political upheaval, and local community issues. The case study of New 
Crossroads housing allocation has illustrated the complex nature of the competition 
for access to resources, the relationships that evolved and the strategies that were 
employed. 
Finally this research has explored the competing identities in the Lagunya 
environment of the 1980s and early 1990s, the curtain call of the apartheid era, 
interrogating the way relationships were configured in the quest for legitimacy and 
rights and has shown that, in spite of the broader political climate of the time, local 
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1811/85 Staff reporter. "Councillors to quit over rent". 
22/1185 Riaan de Villiers & Chris Bateman .. "Violence after 169 
women are held". 
24/1185 Riaan de Villiers. "Khayelitsha for homeless leaders". 
24/4/85 
13/9/85 "PC hits out at local system". 
27/4/86 Pottinger. "The BLA Act of 1982 failed to give economic 
viability to the authorities". 
21/9/89 "New homes misery". 
16110/89 Staff reporter. "Armed men prevent meeting in school". 
19/3/91 Chris Bateman. "Squatters agree to move to new site". 
1617191 DAG. ""Hut squads" and the 24 hour hotline to eliminate 
squatting" 
1611 0193 Crime reporter. "Police give warning on township safety 
today" 
28/5/93 Ramotena Mabote. "President F.W. de Klerk has agreed to the 














25/1/94 Staff reporter. "Huge Ikapa bank 'scam'. 
24/5/94 Clive Sawyer. "City Council limit role in Ikapa Labour crisis". 
Die Burger 13111/93 Christo Van Staden. " Ikapa-ondersoek:Kommissie hoor van 
uitsoek-whisky" 
Grassroots October 1983 "Councils built on lies" 
November 1983 Vol. 4. NO.9. 
February 1985 Vo1.6 No. 1. "We won't pay". 
April 1988 Vol. 9. No.2. 
South 29111/92 Sabata Ngcaj. "AWB Bullies command township security -
claim". 
Weekend Argus 26111/83 Pippa Green & David Breier. " Apartheid gets heave-to in 
this week's Community Council poll 
317/93 Vuyo Bavuma. "Ikapa's sweet revolution". 
2511/94 
15110/94 Andre Weiss, Municipal reporter. "Township time". 
Umkhanyiseli NoA2.1987 
Black Sash Case Files 
Black Sash Advice Office Annual Report 1984 
BC 1090 Athlone Advice Office Annual Reports 1980 -1989 
BC 668 E. Special Projects, 1988 












APPENDIX A - Time lines 
This appendix contains a series of timelines that provide a quick reference to the 
Black Local Authority period. The timelines aid in contextualising the Ikapa history 
against a background of contemporary political events as well as legislative and 
institutional changes. They are not conclusive making reference mainly to information 
mentioned in this thesis. 
Contents 
1. Timelines preceding the Black Local Authorities 
2. Timelines from 1982 and the establishment of Black Local Authorities 















1922 - Stallard 
1923 l\iative (Urban 
1945 - Black (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act 
No. 25 
1961 - Urban 
Bantu Councils 
Act Ko. 79 
1971 - Bantu Affairs 
Administration Board 
Act 
1977 - Community 
Councils Act Ko. 125 
Cnder Dept of Co-operation 
& Development 
1979 - Housing 
Amendment Act No. and 
Riekert Commission report 
1981 Croesser Working 
Group set up to investigate 
sources of finances for 
BLAs 
1982 - Black Local 






1976 - RIOTS I 
1977 22 Administration 
Boards established to 
administer Community 
Councils 
Urban Foundation estab. 
1978 - UCASA founded 
1979 - Community 
Councils introduced into 
the Cape 




1920 - Housing Act 
Central Housing Board 
I 
1944 CHB abolished when 
National Housing & Planning 
Commission set up 
1957 - Housing Act 
Dept of Housing 
established + Bantu 
Housinl! Board 
I 
1968 Moratorium on 
building of houses for 
lIrh5ln A frir5ln, 
1971 -Administration 
Boards take over 
responsibility for Black 
housing from White Local 
Authorities 
1975 - Introduction 
of 30-year leasehold 
I 1978 - June 99-year leasehold 
iel!islation introduced 




1955- Coloured Labour 




1971 - Bantu Affairs 
Administration Boards 
take control of townships 
under Dept of Co-
operation & Development 
1978/9 - First houses 





1980 - First residents 















CF:NTRAL GOVERNMli:NT IMPORTANT HOUSING IKAPA HISTORY PROVINCIALIIMUNICIPAL 
EVENTS LEGISLA TION GOVERNMENT 
1982 - Bla('k Lm:al Authorities Act I I I 
1983 - Republic of South Africa 1983 Founding or 1983 Steyn Commission 11910 - First 
Constitution Act the United to investigate financing of 
elections for BLAs 
introduces Tricameral System of Democratic Front Black Housing 
'Own' + 'General' Affairs Launch or 'Great Housing 
Sale' 
1984 - Black Communities 1984 - Tricameral I 1984 government allows 1984 - Coloured 
Development Act upgraded Admin Constitution 1984 - Black Communities 'illegais' onto Khayelitsha Lahour Reference 
Boards to Development Boards under Nationwide rent and Development Act upgraded site 'n service stands in Policy rescinded 
the Dept of Co-operation & service hoycotts earlier leasehold rights to Site C 
Development - Promotion of Local statutory rights 
Government Affairs Amendment Act 
1985 - Regional Services 1985 first State of 1985 Black Communities Rent hoycotts begin in 1985- J ,ocal Government 
Councils Act introduces Emergency imposed Development Act - land made Ikapa area Training Act to facilitate 
regional tier of government 21 Novemher available for leasehold training of officials for BLAs 
for resource distribution 
I 
1986 - Second State of 1986 Cape Town 
1986 - Black Communities 
1986 'Great Housing Sale' 
Community Council hecomes 1986 Local Government Emergency imposed 12 June hegins. While Paper on 
Development Amendment Act - Aholition of Influx Control Cape Town Town Afrairs Amendment Act 
all Community Coullcils to and Pass Laws. Department 
Urbanisation published 
Committee. Rent and service Development Boards under 
Black Communities control of new Dept. of become Town Councils of Constitutional Development Act -
boycotts in the Cape 
Provincial Government Act Development & Planning 'kitskonstabcls' introduced in Constitutional establishes freehold rights ror 
Executive Councils under established Arricans 
Ikapa Development & Planning 
Provincial Administrators 
I 1987 - Banning of many 1987 S.A. Housing 
1987 - 99-year 
1987 Western 
1987 - Local Councils Act I civic and political Trust joint venture leasehold becomes Cape Regional organisations like the UDF netwccn government + 
available in Ikapa 
Services Council 
pri vate sector p<;f:lhH"ht'd 












]990 Thornhill Commission 
on new local government 
models for South Africa 
1991 Interim Measures 
for Local Government Act 
1992 - De Loof Report 
To inform national housing 
policy & strategy 
1991 - Local Government 








1991 - F.W. De 
Klerk comes to 
power 
1992 SANCO estah. 
National Housing 
Forum estah. 
1994 Local Government Transition 
Act 
ANr fJovprnmpnt rnmp" tn nnWPf 
I 
Figure 10. Time lines from 1988 until 1995 
HOUSIN(; 
LEGISIJA'flON IKAPA HISTORY 
19R8 - Conversion of Certain 
1988 - Cape Town Town 
Committee becomes Cape 
Town Town Council 
renamed IKAfJA TOWN 
COUNCIL 
Rights to Freehold Act 
1989·· SA Housing Advisory Housing Allocation 
Committee established Council investigation into 
guidelines for a new suhsidy 
scheme for housing. Conversion 
Act of previous year 
lakes effect 
1990 - Independent 
Development Trust estah. 
1991 Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act 






991 COLLAPSE! Administrators 
ake over Ikapa Town Council 
ppointed by Provincial 
Administrators 
Q 993 Commission of Inquiry into orruplion at Ikapa Town Council 
994 - Dispute Resolution 





Town Council dissolved Transitional 




198R - Municipal Elections 
Allempt to resurrect BLAs. 
Now permilled to demolish ~ 
without a court order and 10 
grant leasehold rights to occupiers. 
1989 Regulations governing 
the control + supervision of an 
urhan Black residential area 
repealed 
1990 Local Government 
Negotiating Forum estab. 
1991 Suspension of 
finance to BLAs hy Provincial 
Admi ni slra! ions 














APPENDIX B - Legislation pertaining to Ikapa history 
The following is a list of legislation that is relevant to this thesis. The Acts appear in 
chronological order with a brief explanation of the nature of each. 
Native (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923 
Africans required to live in locations. 
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945 
For the registration and better control of contracts of service and the regulation of 
housing for Africans. Introduced Section 10 regulations for urban Africans. 
Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950 
Forced physical separation between races by creating different residential areas for 
different races. Led to forced removals of people living in "wrong" areas, for example 
Coloureds living in District Six in Cape Town. 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No. 52 of 1951 
Gave the Minister of native Affairs the power to remove Africans from public or 
privately owned land and to establish resettlement camps to house the displaced 
people 
Bantu Authorities Act, No. 68 of 1951 
Provided for the establishment of black homelands and regional authorities and, with 
the aim of creating greater self-government in the homelands. abolished the Native 
Representative Council. 
Black Laws Amendment Act, No. 54 of 1952 
N arrowed the definition of the category of Africans who had the right to permanent 
residence in towns. 
Urban Bantu Councils Act, No. 79 of 1961 
Created African councils in urban areas that were supposed to be tied to the 
authorities running the related ethnic homelands. 
Black Affairs Administration Act, No. 45 of 1971 
Bantu Affairs Administration Boards were established by the state in 1972 and 1973 
to control and manage the African population in the townships. Created by the state to 
co-ordinate more efficiently the influx of labour and management of this labour force 
in the townships. BAABS took over from about 450 local municipal authorities as the 
central pivots of township control (Bloch, 1982). 
Security Intelligence and State Security Act, No. 64 of 1972 
Established a State Security Council to advise government on the formulation of 
national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the country and the manner 
of implementation, and to advise on a policy to combat any threat to the security of 












Community Councils Act, No. 125 of 1977 
Official acknowledgement of permanent urban Africans 
Established African Community Councils. Administration Boards established 
All African residential areas belonging to white municipalities vested in the boards 
Black Local Authorities Act, No. 102 of 1982 
Provides for the establishment of local committees, village councils and town councils 
for African persons in certain areas 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 110 of 1983 
Introduced the tricameral government giving Coloured and Indians representation in 
parliament. Large amount of executive power vested in the State president 
Black Communities Development Act, No.4 of 1984 
Administration Boards replaced by Development Boards who thereby acquired the 
land on which African residential areas were situated 
Development Boards were to develop local authorities until they could operate 
autonomously. Administrators were to transfer all land owned by them to local 
authorities of area concerned. Boards were still under the control of the Department of 
Co-operation & Development 
Black Communities Development Amendment Act, No. 52 of 1985 
Local authorities could make land available for leasehold 
Exemption of registration of leasehold rights from transfer duties 
Regional Services Councils Act, No. 109 of 1985 
Provides for the joint exercise and carrying out of powers and duties in certain areas 
by certain bodies and for the delimitation of regions. 
The establishment of Regional Services Councils 
Promotion of Local Government Affairs Amendment Act, No. 45 of 1985 
Broadened the statutory definition of local authorities to include BLAs, Community 
Councils and Development Boards. 
UCASA recognised as the official mouthpiece of the BLAs 
Local Government Affairs Amendment Act, No 110 of 1985 
Development Boards transferred to the control of the more reformist DCDP to help 
improve their legitimacy 
Black Local Authorities Amendment Act, No. 58 of 1986 
To amend the Black Local Authorities Act, 102/82 
Provide for the establishment of town committees 
To provide that all community councils be deemed to be town committees 
Now 5 different forms of BLAs: Greater City Councils, City Councils, Town 
Councils, Town Committees, Local Authority Committees 
Abolition of Influx Control Act, No. 68 of 1986 
As a result of the White paper on urbanization. Repealed Black (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945. Africans regarded as citizens of South Africa 












Black Communities Development Amendment Act, No. 74 of 1986 
Gave freehold property rights to Blacks 
Existing Deed of Grant and Right of Leasehold could be retained or replaced with fuJI 
title and 99-year leasehold retained as an alternative form of tenure 
Made provision for property owned by Development Boards transferred to BLAs 
Provided for developers and employers to become more involved in housing schemes 
Abolition of Development Bodies Act, No. 75 of 1986 
Provides for the abolition of the development Boards and for the transfer of their 
powers, assets, liabilities, rights, and staff to a public authority. 
Provincial Government Act, No. 69 of 1986 
All four Provincial Councils ceased to exist and replaced by Provincial Administrators 
and Executive Committees appointed by State President 
New Provincial Authorities would deal with general affairs 
Provinces would have responsibility for local government in African communities. 
Abolition of Development Bodies Act, No. 75 of 1986 
Abolished the Development Boards on 1 July 
Their powers, staff and functions transferred to the Provincial Administrations 
Amended by Acts 47/88 and 81190 and 134/92 and 56/93 
Black Community Development Amendment Act, No. 46 of 1988 
Provided for the simplification of title deeds for African township dwellers and a 
quicker procedure in the opening of Township Registers 
Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act, No. 81 of 1988 
Amended by Act No. 108/93. Provided for conversion of certain occupational rights 
in development areas to leasehold. Increased the powers of BLAs considerably. 
Old township regulations were terminated 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, No. 112 of 1991 
Provided for the upgrading and conversion into ownership of certain rights granted in 
respect of land pending the opening of Township Registers. Title could be registered 
officially at a Deeds Office Registry 
Interim Measures for Local Government Act, No. 128 of 1991 
Created an opportunity for local government authorities to work together to prevent 
the duplication of services 
Local Government Transition Act, No. 209 of 1993 












APPENDIX C - Organisational diagrammes of the Ikapa Town Council 
The diagrammes on the following pages illustrate the 
planned hierarchy and departmental layout for the Ikapa 
authority when it was upgraded to a Town Council in 
1988. However, the archival records show that many 
envisaged posts were never filled, while many others 















I. Rendering of community admin 
2. Provision of engineering services 
3. Ensurance of sound financial admin 
4. Creation of efficient work performance 
I I I 
Dept. of Town Secretary Dept. of Town Engineer Dept. of Town Treasurer Management Advisory Services 
Electro-technical and Admin. of trading accounts Organisational & work study 
Administration & mechanical engineering Accounting services duties, job evaluation 
Community Development services, building services, Adherence to financial Development & maintenance of 
township development regulations programmes 
I "'-
Administration Community Services Branch 




Estates Division Welfare services 
(Source: lkap(f File 21/IP Annexurefill'. /988.) 












Administration of accommodation 
matters: I.Council housing 
2. Home ownership 
I 
Housing section 
To administer council houses. 
Letting of properties 
2. Recovery of rental arrears + 
service charges 
3. Rent remissions 
4. Squatter control 
5. Maintenance of voter's role 
















To administer home ownership: 
1. Marketing home 
ownership 




Marketing sub-section Selling sub-section 
(Source: lkapa Fife 211lP Anl/nure file. 19B8.) 
Figure 12. Housing administration of Ikapa Town Council in 1988 
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